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In September 2010 and February 2011, the Canterbury region experienced devastating 
earthquakes with an estimated economic cost of over NZ$40 billion (Parker and Steenkamp, 
2012; Timar et al., 2014; Potter et al., 2015). The insurance market played an important role in 
rebuilding the Canterbury region after the earthquakes. Homeowners, insurance and 
reinsurance markets and New Zealand government agencies faced a difficult task to manage 
the rebuild process. From an empirical and theoretic research viewpoint, the Christchurch 
disaster calls for an assessment of how the insurance market deals with such disasters in the 
future. 
Previous studies have investigated market responses to losses in global catastrophes by 
focusing on the insurance supply-side. This study investigates both demand-side and supply-
side insurance market responses to the Christchurch earthquakes. Despite the fact that New 
Zealand is prone to seismic activities, there are scant previous studies in the area of earthquake 
insurance. This study does offer a unique opportunity to examine and document the New 
Zealand insurance market response to catastrophe risk, providing results critical for 
understanding market responses after major loss events in general. A review of previous studies 
shows higher premiums suppress demand, but how higher premiums and a higher probability 
of risk affect demand is still largely unknown. According to previous studies, the supply of 
disaster coverage is curtailed unless the market is subsidised, however, there is still unsettled 
discussion on why demand decreases with time from the previous disaster even when the 
supply of coverage is subsidised by the government. 
Natural disaster risks pose a set of challenges for insurance market players because of 
substantial ambiguity associated with the probability of such events occurring and high spatial 
correlation of catastrophe losses. Private insurance market inefficiencies due to high premiums 
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and spatially concentrated risks calls for government intervention in the provision of natural 
disaster insurance to avert situations of noninsurance and underinsurance. Political economy 
considerations make it more likely for government support to be called for if many people are 
uninsured than if few people are uninsured. However, emergency assistance for property 
owners after catastrophe events can encourage most property owners to not buy insurance 
against natural disaster and develop adverse selection behaviour, generating larger future risks 
for homeowners and governments. 
On the demand-side, this study has developed an intertemporal model to examine how demand 
for insurance changes post-catastrophe, and how to model it theoretically. In this intertemporal 
model, insurance can be sought in two sequential periods of time, and at the second period, it 
is known whether or not a loss event happened in period one. The results show that period one 
demand for insurance increases relative to the standard single period model when the second 
period is taken into consideration, period two insurance demand is higher post-loss, higher than 
both the period one demand and the period two demand without a period one loss. 
To investigate policyholders experience from the demand-side perspective, a total of 1600 
survey questionnaires were administered, and responses from 254 participants received 
representing a 16 percent response rate. Survey data was gathered from four institutions in 
Canterbury and is probably not representative of the entire population. The results of the survey 
show that the change from full replacement value policy to nominated replacement value policy 
is a key determinant of the direction of change in the level of insurance coverage after the 
earthquakes. The earthquakes also highlighted the plight of those who were underinsured, 
prompting policyholders to update their insurance coverage to reflect the estimated cost of re-
building their property. The survey has added further evidence to the existing literature, such 
as those who have had a recent experience with disaster loss report increased risk perception if 
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a similar event happens in future with females reporting a higher risk perception than males. 
Of the demographic variables, only gender has a relationship with changes in household cover.  
On the supply-side, this study has built a risk-based pricing model suitable to generate a 
competitive premium rate for natural disaster insurance cover. Using illustrative data from the 
Christchurch Red-zone suburbs, the model generates competitive premium rates for 
catastrophe risk. When the proposed model incorporates the new RMS high-definition New 
Zealand Earthquake Model, for example, insurers can find the model useful to identify losses 
at a granular level so as to calculate the competitive premium. 
This study observes that the key to the success of the New Zealand dual insurance system 
despite the high prevalence of catastrophe losses are; firstly the EQC’s flat-rate pricing 
structure keeps private insurance premiums affordable and very high nationwide homeowner 
take-up rates of natural disaster insurance. Secondly, private insurers and the EQC have an 
elaborate reinsurance arrangement in place. By efficiently transferring risk to the reinsurer, the 
cost of writing primary insurance is considerably reduced ultimately expanding primary 
insurance capacity and supply of insurance coverage. 
Keywords:  Catastrophe Risk, Earthquake Commission, Intertemporal Insurance Model, 
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Homeowners, the insurance industry and numerous state agencies were faced with a major 
difficult task of rebuilding the Canterbury region in the aftermath of the 2010-11 Christchurch 
earthquakes. One of the biggest challenges was to manage the relationship between all the 
interested parties of the post-earthquake rebuild period. From an empirical and theoretic point 
of view, the Canterbury disaster calls for an investigation of the insurance market response and 
an assessment of how the insurance industry deals with such disasters in the future. 
Despite the fact that New Zealand is highly prone to seismic activities, there is scant previous 
research work in the area of earthquake insurance. This thesis investigates the impact of 
extreme events of catastrophic nature such as earthquakes and floods, to the residential 
insurance business class based on the case of the 2010-11 Christchurch earthquakes. The 
investigations look at the pre- and post-disaster periods to examine how insurance companies 
and insurance consumers are impacted by catastrophic losses from extreme disasters. The two 
approaches from the demand and supply perspectives will converge to provide results that are 
critical for understanding market responses after major loss events. While this is not the first 
study in the area of natural disasters, it does offer a unique way of understanding the insurance 
market. Numerous studies that previously looked into natural disaster insurance do not examine 
both supply and demand side responses in the aftermath of the same disaster within the same 
period. This is a novel approach to document the impact of the earthquake from both sides of 
the market which could offer useful information to insured, insurers, government social 
insurance agencies, scholars and all other interested parties.  
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The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: Section 1.1 gives the research background, sub-
sections 1.1.1 and 1.1.2 discuss the global outlook of natural disasters and insurance for natural 
disasters and the challenges respectively. Section 1.2 states the research hypotheses. Section 
1.3 describes the overall objectives of the study. Section 1.4 justifications of the study. Section 
1.5 gives a summary of the thesis outline. 
1.1. Research Background 
1.1.1. Global Outlook of Natural Disasters 
A natural disaster can be defined as an event, or series of events, triggered by the forces of 
nature resulting in socio-economic losses beyond the capacity of the affected 
community/geographical area to cope with them. Natural disasters include floods, droughts, 
heat waves, hurricanes, tornadoes, winter storms, wild fires, gusts, and earthquakes.  
In the recent past, concerns about natural disasters, more particularly, earthquakes and floods 
have attracted a lot of attention from scholars and practitioners. Researchers (Aseervatham et 
al., 2013, 2014, 2015; Bond et al., 2012; Born and Viscusi, 2006; Browne and Hoyt, 2000) 
have begun to explore the threats that disasters pose to the society and their implications on the 
broader insurance markets. Despite the increasing familiarity with the consequences of these 
natural disasters, losses due to disasters are on an upward trend, both in human and economic 
terms. Over the last 50 years, the number of reported losses, both insured and uninsured, and 
their impact on human and economic development have been increasing. The Swiss Re and 
Munich Re data shows that the rise in insured losses is primarily driven by increasing 
occurrences of natural catastrophes (McAneney et al., 2016; Michel-Kerjan et al., 2015). A 
look at the past claims burden due to natural disasters, shows that approximately US$3 billion 
per year was paid in the 1970s. This increased to US$16 billion in the period 1987–2003, and 





Figure 1-1: Insured Loss (USD bn) by Catastrophic Events 
 (Data Source: Swiss Re Economic Research and Consulting and Cat Perils) 
The upward trend in total economic losses from natural catastrophes over the last four decades 
with the highest ever catastrophe-related economic losses recorded in 2011 shows the 
increasing importance for societies to maintain adequate insurance coverage. Table 1-1 shows 
the top 10 costly insured catastrophic events between the year 1980 and 2015. The peak of 
catastrophic related cases was in the year 2011 with New Zealand and Japan recording the 
highest losses from earthquakes followed closely by floods in Thailand. Tornados and 
hurricane related losses in the USA were the costliest disasters during this period.  
Similarly, in early 2012, Swiss Re published in the annual sigma report that the number of 
natural catastrophe events had reached an unprecedented record level of 175 events in 
2011(Kish, 2016; Munish Re, 2015). In the same year, insurers were liable for insured 
catastrophe losses amounting to US$116 billion worldwide. This translates to a 142 percent 




























Table 1-1: Top 10 Costliest Global Insured Catastrophe Events for the Period 1980-2015 
Location Event Year Insured Loss  
(2014 $M (USD)) 
Share of Losses 
 Insured 
USA Hurricane Katrina 2005 75,884 0.50 
Japan Earthquake/Tsunami 2011 42,400 0.19 
USA Hurricane Sandy 2012 30,680 0.43 
USA Hurricane Andrew 1992 28,900 0.64 
New Zealand Canterbury Earthquake 2011 25,476 0.78 
USA Earthquake 1994 24,633 0.35 
USA Hurricane Ike 2008 20,535 0.49 
USA Hurricane Ivan 2004 17,388 0.60 
Thailand Flooding 2011 16,960 0.37 
USA Hurricane Wilma 2005 15,250 0.57 
(Data Source: Munich Re, 2015) 
The total economic catastrophic losses to society due to disasters both insured and uninsured 
reached an estimated US$370 billion by the end of 2011.The gap between the total economic 
loss and the total insured liability amounting to US$254 billion in 2011 is an indication that 
lack of sufficient insurance coverage is a global problem. This continues to leave the majority 
of individuals and organisations financially vulnerable to catastrophic events. This economic 
damage is mostly shouldered by corporations, government agencies, relief organisations, and 
ultimately by individuals, which is an indication of a widespread lack of insurance protection 
against consequences of natural disasters. It must not be lost that the biggest percentage of the 
insured catastrophic loss comes from the developed nations. Therefore the reported insured 
losses are only the tip of the iceberg since there is virtually no disaster insurance coverage in 
most of the developing countries that are very vulnerable to effects of natural disasters. This 
compounds the global catastrophic problems at a time when the gap between insured and 





Figure 1-2: Global Catastrophe Losses, Insured (Blue) and Uninsured (Red), for the Period 
1970-2015 
 (Data Source: Swiss Re Economic Research and Consulting and Cat Perils) 
However, a recent study by Born and Klimaszewki-Blettner (2013) noted that the increases in 
catastrophes should not be the subject of much debate, unlike the usefulness of models to 
predict catastrophic events and the appropriateness of the corresponding models to estimate 
losses following natural disasters. Thus, the importance of studies on the impact of natural 
disasters and insured losses upon the global catastrophe market, and more specifically upon the 
world’s insurance and reinsurance market, cannot be overstated. Justifiably, a number of recent 
researches on catastrophe risk have focused on the topics of industry capacity, reinsurance, 
mitigation and securitisation (Cummins and Trainar, 2009; Powell and Sommer, 2007; Rode 
et al., 2000). Similarly, a number of stakeholders: insurers, regulators, and consumers, have 
kept an unwavering focus on natural disasters and catastrophe risk management issues 
enhancing the understanding and co-operation between private insurers, state agencies and 











Insured losses Uninsured losses
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1.1.2. Insurance for Natural Disasters and the Challenges 
Insurance is one of the widely recognised risk transfer tools for ex-ante management of natural 
disaster risks (Dacy and Kunreuther, 1969). However, despite the existing loss estimation 
models, insurance of natural catastrophes is somewhat unique compared to the more well-
known general insurance or life insurance. The insurability of natural disasters is impeded by 
difficulties in precisely predicting loss probabilities, compared to high-frequency, low-severity 
risks such as automobile accidents. A major limitation on the availability of coverage in many 
countries is mainly the result of insurability constraints, particularly the independence between 
insured portfolios with the consequences of high accumulation risk and serious loss potential 
for insurers. According to Hogarth and Kunreuther (1989), the willingness of insurers to 
provide coverage against natural catastrophic threats is affected by a host of ambiguity issues. 
In addition to their nature as low-frequency, high-severity, and strongly dependent perils, 
increased construction activity in extremely high-risk areas, climate change, and global 
warming complicate the insurability of these risks for underwriters. Natural disaster events 
often result in large unexpected property losses persuading insurers to take various actions to 
stabilise their underwriting performance. Some of the immediate remedies for maintaining 
financial stability and viability might include a reassessment of the portfolio of risks undertaken 
by the insurer and a re-evaluation of alternative measures to manage them. Perhaps, most post-
catastrophe reassessments would entail changing the underwriting risks and rating factors. This 
results in changes in premiums; changes in coverage levels, implementation of new incentives 
for policyholders to mitigate losses, changes in the terms and conditions of reinsurance 
arrangements, complete exits from some catastrophic markets, and perhaps entries into others. 
It may also encourage the consideration of alternative forms of risk management.  
The catastrophes experienced in the last few decades have raised public policy awareness and 
spurred debate about the appropriate partnership between public and private insurance markets 
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in addressing natural disaster exposures. Around the world, these debates include the 
consideration of the proper role for government intervention. Consequently, policy groups and 
academic researchers have proposed guiding principles for the development of this role. There 
are now a number of countries with state-sponsored national/government programs for natural 
catastrophes, including New Zealand, Turkey, France, Japan, Spain, Switzerland, Taiwan, 
Australia and some states in the USA, which demonstrates that government involvement in 
insurance is essential (Castellano, 2010). In the USA for example, such principles generally 
recognise the benefits of encouraging private markets to provide coverage while in New 
Zealand the government appreciates the extreme exposure to natural disasters to which citizens 
are exposed, making risk-based private insurance premiums very expensive. The need for state 
regulatory intervention in the private property insurance market hinges on the ability of private 
insurers to adapt to changes in the risks they choose to bear, and consequently to meet the 
demand for coverage. Conversely, the ability of private insurers to adapt to changes in the 
underlying risk exposure is affected by the regulatory regimes in which they operate. In most 
of the countries prone to natural disasters, there is a range of proposals for successful strategies 
for managing catastrophic risks, including the appropriate role of both the private sector and 
government and the feasibility of capital market solutions. There is a need to fully understand 
the impact of existing regulatory and legal regimes on the dynamics of the market due to the 
increasing catastrophic exposures. 
This work looks at natural disaster insurance in New Zealand. The study focuses on New 
Zealand because of its susceptibility to high magnitude earthquakes and the elaborative unique 
private-government insurance mechanism for residential and contents coverage against the 
effects of earthquakes. A successful study of the New Zealand insurance market will open-up 
the unique features that make New Zealand one of the countries with the highest percentages 
of homeownership, with insurance coverage globally at above 90 percent (Brown et al., 2016; 
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McAneney et al., 2016). This study will similarly contribute to the growing scholarly interest 
in natural disasters and it will propose measures to help in alleviating the catastrophic losses 
associated with underinsurance or total uninsured. This is the first research that uses both theory 
and empirical data to demonstrate the market reaction post-loss and proposes the necessary 
interventions.  
1.2. Research Hypotheses 
There is sufficient empirical evidence to confirm that the reason why the private insurance 
industry has been reluctant to cover a number of natural hazards is the ambiguity associated 
with either the probability of specific events occurring and/or the magnitude of the potential 
consequences (Kunreuther and Hogarth, 1990, 1992; Kunreuther et al., 1995). Insurers may 
lack the information needed to estimate loss probabilities and thus to accurately price disaster 
insurance policies. If there is considerable ambiguity or uncertainty associated with the risk, 
insurers may wish to charge a much higher premium than if they had more precise estimates 
of the risk (Kunreuther et al., 1995). Moreover, if the capacity of the insurance industry is 
reduced due to recent large loss events, then premiums may rise due to the immediate shortage 
in supply which is hypothesised to normalise after a short period. 
This study is based on the hypothesis that, insurance and reinsurance markets are increasingly 
facing challenges to offer natural disaster insurance coverage because of the substantial 
ambiguity associated with the probability of such events occurring and the insurers’ losses are 
potentially high and often spatially correlated. Premium rates of such events would be 
relatively higher than the expected loss. The insurer has to provide a large amount of capital in 
case of catastrophic events. This is hypothesised to lower insurance demand since it is not 
optimal for the policyholders to purchase insurance cover at a very high premium. The private 
insurance markets would, therefore, find it uncompetitive to offer coverage for an extreme 
catastrophe exposure. To avoid the insurance market inefficiency due to extremely high 
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premiums and spatially concentrated risk, government intervention in the provision of natural 
disaster insurance is of absolute necessity which in the end averts situations of noninsurance 
and underinsurance. 
1.3. Objectives of the Study 
The overall objective of the study is to understand the challenges faced by insurers in providing 
coverage for natural disasters, in the context of the aftermath of Canterbury quakes in New 
Zealand. The specific objectives of the study are: 
(i.) To offer a comprehensive survey of the existing literature on the insurance reaction in 
the aftermath of major catastrophes. 
(ii.) To develop and simulate a theoretic intertemporal insurance model that examines the 
demand for insurance.  
(iii.) To assess the optimal supply and demand for natural disaster insurance coverage for 
homeowners. 
(iv.) To examine the aftermath effects and reactions of the demand-side aspect of residential 
property insurance coverage. 
(v.) To examine the aftermath effects and reactions of supply-side aspect of residential 
property insurance coverage.  
(vi.) To present a pragmatic premium pricing model to price natural disaster insurance while 
incorporating New Zealand’s unique residential insurance market characteristics.  
In the end then, this dissertation generally aims to undertake a theoretic and an empirical 
comprehensive analysis to examine if indeed catastrophic events affect the insurance industry 
with major impacts on pricing and if so, whether new post-earthquake pricing structures affect 
insurance uptake and disaster preparedness. Further, an important question that is more precise 
to the study’s objectives is whether natural catastrophes directly lead to changes in premiums, 
changes in risk perception, and changes in demand and in supply. If so, what mechanisms of 
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supply and demand reactions comprise these effects and the necessary natural disaster 
mitigation measures to be put in place? 
With the above research objectives, it must be noted that residential home insurance in New 
Zealand enjoys an insurance penetration of about 98 percent for fire and general cover. This 
implies that 98 percent of homes automatically have natural disaster insurance cover provided 
by the Earthquake Commission (EQC). Opting out of catastrophe cover above the EQC sub-
limit does not occur. But competitive insurance market identification of risk, appetite for risk 
and pricing for risk are matters that each insurer will assess across all their lines of business so 
they can operate as competitively as possible. Thus it is anticipated that some of the supply-
side and demand-side signals may not always be linear. However, in theory it is expected that 
the price of an insurance contract corresponds to the underlying probability of a loss event and 
the exposed value, as well as a measure of risk aversion, plus a premium loading that comprises 
operational costs and the cost of capital amongst other overheads. 
1.4. Justification of the Study 
Evidence shows that individuals have difficulties with assessing probabilities associated with 
low-probability but high-impact risks with which individuals and organisations have few 
experiences, such as natural disasters (Kunreuther et al., 2001). This translates into poor 
decision making with respect to natural disaster insurance purchases (Kunreuther et al., 2013). 
This dissertation provides an extensive review of existing studies on the post-catastrophe 
insurance reaction with the aim of establishing concise results on how the insurance market, in 
general, reacts to extreme events of a catastrophic nature. The research extends the current 
literature on natural disaster insurance deducing both theoretical and empirical reactions of 
insurance markets post-catastrophe. This literature review on previous studies and the current 
research findings will be a major contribution to New Zealand scholarly work, from the current 
unclear, or lack of, local literature to explain how the local insurance industry is affected by 
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disasters. This is the first research that uses both theory and empirical data to demonstrate the 
insurance industry’s reaction pre- and post- extreme losses and proposes the indispensable 
intervention measures in terms of wider insurance coverage. This study will similarly be an 
invaluable contribution to the growing scholarly interest in natural disasters and proposes 
measures to help in alleviating the catastrophic losses associated with underinsurance and/or 
un-insurance. 
In a broader perspective then, our research will contribute to a better understanding of post-
catastrophe insurance reactions which would efficiently help address insurance consumer 
needs, improve insurance underwriting capacity to provide adequate and affordable insurance 
coverage and improve responsiveness in the occurrence of a major catastrophic event in the 
future. In the end, results from this dissertation provide better understanding and co-operation 
between private insurers companies, state agencies and insurance consumers and could be a 
base for suggestions on how to change inefficient contract arrangements and developing 
alternative financial and policy instruments that will seek to address future challenges and 
understanding of disaster insurance by all interested parties. 
The research results, if widely disseminated, will also provide a key to guiding other disaster-
prone regions in designing resilient disaster insurance mechanisms and hence contribute to 
remedying the current global underinsurance in major disaster-prone territories. 
The intertemporal insurance model used in the theoretical simulations is a completely new 
extension and approach to the standard model of the demand for insurance which is based on 
a single period. The model generates results that can be compared to, and contrasted with, those 
of the standard environment. Above all, this model is a novel approach to studying the effects 
of: changes in size of first period’s loss, increases in risk aversion, increases in the premium, 
and increases in the perceived probability of loss. In particular, then, the model is a natural 
theoretical way to establish how the demand for insurance is affected by the size of the loss 
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suffered in the previous period (that is, the post-catastrophe insurance demand effects). Future 
studies could extend this model by examining multiple periods with an identical (and different) 
insurable risk in each period; and identical (and different) insurance supply characteristics in 
each period. 
The comprehensive survey on insurance demand offers a unique investigation of the actual 
experience of insurance consumers in a market with very high insurance penetration. This by 
itself is the first survey of its kind to empirically examine consumer reaction post-disaster and 
compare the findings with those of the proposed intertemporal model of insurance. There are 
ranging opinions about the implications of sum insured to the insurance market more so to the 
insured. Whilst this survey did measure the voluntarily changes in the level of coverage post-
quakes, the possible introduction of a voluntary deductible by the policyholder due to this 
policy modification remains unexplored. Future research could seek to investigate the level of 
voluntary deductible that the policyholder is willing to bear when given an option to nominate 
a sum insured for their property and/or a possibility of under (over)-insurance. The question of 
whether such a measure introduces moral hazard or adverse selection could be similarly 
explored in the future. 
Lastly, a look into the existing insurance market arrangement in New Zealand homeowners’ 
coverage reveals that there are complexities and challenges posed by the integration of 
compulsory EQC cover to the primary underwriting of natural disaster under the fire and 
general insurance risks. This research introduces an actuarial pricing framework to provide a 
structure with which to examine the complexity of natural disaster risk pricing and, as such, it 




1.5. Thesis Outline 
This thesis consists of nine chapters. The chapters can be grouped into three parts. The first 
part consists of three chapters that present a general introduction, literature and methodology 
of the thesis. The second part gives five consistent, but stand-alone chapters that examine and 
model both demand-side and supply-side of insurance market in the aftermath of a natural 
disaster. The third and final part presents the last chapter of this thesis that provides a summary, 
conclusions and recommendations of the study. The thesis structure is outlined as follows: 
Chapter 1 - Introduction. This first chapter of the study gives an overview of the research to 
provide a brief opening preamble the dissertation and the problems that inspired this study. The 
rest of the chapter is organised as follows: Section 1.1 gives the research background, with sub-
sections 1.1.1 and 1.1.2 discussing the global outlook of natural disasters and insurance for 
natural disasters and the challenges respectively. Section 1.2 states the research hypotheses. 
Section 1.3 describes the overall objectives of the study. Section 1.4 gives the justification for 
the study. Section 1.5 gives a summary of the thesis outline. 
Chapter 2 - Literature review. This chapter looks at previous studies and identifies the research 
gaps that exist in the provision of insurance to natural disasters, and in how demand and supply 
for insurance respond to extreme events. This literature review is built on the pioneering work 
on the economics of insurance, incorporating the recent empirical works which take a novel 
approach to understanding the disaster-insurance relationship.  
The chapter is organised as follows: Section 2.0 gives a brief introduction and objectives of 
this study. Section 2.1 presents the background of pioneering work on optimal insurance. 
Section 2.2 looks at relevant studies on the impact of catastrophes on the supply-side of the 
insurance industry. Section 2.3 discusses the studies investigating the reactions in terms of 
demand-side impacts from catastrophes. Section 2.4 presents a review of supply-side reactions 
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post-catastrophe: indirect effects on insurers’ profitability and market valuation. Section 2.5 
presents a summary of the key findings from the previous studies. 
Chapter 3 - Research methodology and design. This chapter describes the research 
methodology and data set used in this study. On methods, this chapter uses both empirical and 
theoretical models to demonstrate the implication of catastrophes on the insurance market from 
both the supply and the demand sides. Section 3.0 gives a brief introduction to the chapter. 
Section 3.1 outline the research strategy used in the supply-side. Two chapters, chapter seven 
and chapter eight, of this work examine the supply-side of insurance market in the aftermath 
of a major natural disaster. Sub-section 3.1.1 gives the theory methodology while sub-section 
3.1.2 gives the empirical methodology. Sub-sections 3.1.2.1 and 3.1.2.1 describe the data 
source and data analysis respectively. Section 3.2 presents the research strategy used in the 
demand-side analysis. Similarly, chapter five and chapter six, of this work examine the 
demand-side of insurance market in the aftermath of a major natural disaster. Sub-section 3.2.1 
gives the theory methodology while sub-section 3.2.2 gives the empirical methodology. Sub-
sections 3.2.2.1- 3.2.2.6 present data source, pilot study, questionnaire design and coding, 
conception and execution of the survey and ethical consideration, data analysis, and some 
survey limitations respectively. Section 3.3 gives the conclusions. 
Chapter 4 - An empirical analysis of general insurability of natural disasters. This chapter 
provides a comprehensive empirical analysis of the challenges faced in providing insurance 
coverage for natural disaster risks. The main objective of this chapter is to present a coherent 
discussion of the global challenge faced by private insurance market to insure catastrophe risk 
and the possible solution to address these challenges. The chapter is organised as follows: 
Section 4.0 gives a brief introduction and objective of this chapter. Section 4.1 describes the 
challenges faced in insuring natural disasters. Section 4.2 presents a probabilistic catastrophe 
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loss model for natural disasters. This is an earthquake model is used to reasonably determine 
the probability of losses occurring and likely severity when disastrous earthquake event strike. 
Section 4.3 demonstrates the need for government involvement in the provision of natural 
disaster insurance coverage. Sub-sections 4.3.1 - 4.3.4 present a discussion of important 
government-sponsored natural disaster schemes worldwide. Section 4.4 gives the discussion 
and conclusions of the study. 
Chapter 5 - Optimal insurance demand based on an intertemporal model. This chapter presents 
a basic theoretical model that examines insurance demand post-loss based on an intertemporal 
approach. The chapter gives an in-depth analysis and discussion on the performance of the 
proposed insurance model.  The chapter is organised as follows: Section 5.0 gives a brief 
introduction and objective of this chapter. Section 5.1 presents a review and discussion of the 
previous insurance demand models and where the present study stands. Section 5.2 provides 
an introduction to the theory on intertemporal insurance demand. This section also discusses 
the underlying research question in this chapter: That is, how demand for insurance changes 
post-catastrophe and how to model it theoretically.  Section 5.3 presents both analytical and 
numerical illustrations of the proposed insurance model. Sub-section 5.3.1 gives the analytical 
framework and the properties of the intertemporal model. Sub-section 5.3.2 presents an 
illustrative example of intertemporal modelling using hypothetical datasets. Section 5.4 gives 
a discussion of several findings that can be drawn from the simulation results and conclusions. 
Chapter 6 - An investigation of residential insurance demand-side reactions after a natural 
catastrophe: the case of 2010-11 Christchurch earthquakes. This chapter gives an empirical 
analysis of the post-Christchurch earthquakes insurance reactions using survey data. The 
chapter illustrates and explains how the insurance market reacted after the earthquakes focusing 
on the demand-side aspect of residential property insurance coverage. The chapter is organised 
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as follows: Section 6.0 gives a brief introduction and a comprehensive review of the previous 
studies on post-catastrophe market responses. Section 6.1 presents the hypothesis and research 
question studied in this chapter. Section 6.2 presents data and methods used in this study. Sub-
section 6.2.1 describes the data sources and data collection techniques used in the study. Sub-
section 6.2.2 presents a detailed profile of the survey respondents. Sub-section 6.2.3 describes 
the data analysis process use in the analysis of the survey questionnaire. Section 6.3 presents 
the main results and discussions. Simple descriptive results to illustrate what happened after 
the earthquakes are presented in sub-section 6.3.1; while some simple statistical analysis results 
are presented in sub-section 6.3.2. Section 6.4 gives the conclusions and recommendations of 
the study. 
Chapter 7 - A risk-based pricing model for natural disaster risk: an actuarial perspective for 
residential insurance cover. The objective of this chapter is to present a pragmatic approach 
that can be used in the rate-making of fire and general cover for residential property with natural 
disaster risk as a rider.  This is an actuarial risk-based pricing perspective that takes into 
consideration the key features of New Zealand natural disaster insurance as provided by the 
Earthquake Commission (EQC). The chapter is organised as follows: Section 7.0 gives a brief 
introduction and objective of this chapter. Section 7.1 introduces the challenges faced in the 
provision of insurance for natural disaster risks and how the New Zealand insurance market 
copes with these challenges. Section 7.2 describes the current paradigm in natural disaster 
insurance pricing and the opportunities provided by the proposed pricing model. Section 7.3 
presents the model’s framework. This section also gives a discussion of the actuary’s role in 
insurance pricing and demonstrates how the model fits in New Zealand’s residential insurance 
coverage using an empirical claims data from earthquakes disasters. Section 7.4 gives the 
conclusions and recommendations.  
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Chapter 8 - The dual insurance model and its implications for insurance demand and supply 
post-Christchurch earthquakes in New Zealand. This chapter looks at the empirical implication 
of the earthquake for the insurance market by doing an empirical analysis of post-Christchurch 
earthquakes insurance reactions. The chapter is organised as follows: Section 8.0 gives an 
introduction and objective of this chapter. Section 8.1 gives an introductory background and 
economic impact of the 2010-11 Christchurch earthquakes. Section 8.2 gives a broad 
discussion of natural disaster insurance. Sub-section 8.2.1 discusses the need for government 
participation in natural disaster insurance. Subsection 8.2.2 discusses the New Zealand natural 
disaster insurance through the Earthquake Commission and subsection 8.2.3 gives a description 
of some natural disaster insurance programs worldwide with government involvement. Section 
8.3 gives a description of reinsurance of the dual insurance model framework in New Zealand. 
Section 8.4 presents results for various empirical analyses of New Zealand insurance industry 
reaction post-Christchurch earthquakes. Section 8.5 gives the conclusions 
Chapter 9 - Summary, conclusions and recommendations. A brief introduction to this final 
chapter of the complete thesis is given in section 9.0. The rest of the chapter is organised as 
follows: Section 9.1 outlines the summary and conclusions of this research. Section 9.2 
presents the contributions and significance of the study. Finally, section 9.3 presents the 





2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.0. Introduction 
This chapter looks at previous studies and identifies the research gaps that exist in the provision 
of insurance to natural disasters, and in how demand and supply for insurance respond to 
extreme events. There is a substantial literature investigating how insurance companies respond 
to losses in the aftermath of catastrophes globally, but many of these previous studies 
concentrate on the insurance supply-side reaction. This literature review is built on the 
pioneering work on the economics of insurance, incorporating the recent empirical works 
which take a novel approach to understanding the disaster-insurance relationship.  
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: Section 2.1 presents the background of 
pioneering work on optimal insurance. Section 2.2 looks at relevant studies on the impact of 
catastrophes on the supply-side of the insurance industry. Section 2.3 discusses the studies 
investigating the reactions in terms of demand-side impacts from catastrophes. Section 2.4 
presents a review of supply-side reactions in the post-catastrophe: indirect effects on insurers’ 
profitability and market valuation. Section 2.5 presents a summary of the key findings from the 
previous studies. 
2.1. Background of Pioneering Work on Optimal Insurance 
A number of works on the economic theory of insurance (Arrow, 1960, 1963, 1970; Borch, 
1960, 1962; Mossin, 1968; Smith, 1968) provide a theoretical foundation for the analysis of 
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the strategic behaviour of insurers. Borch (1960) proved that any Pareto optimal set of treaties1 
is equivalent to a pool arrangement. Significant contributions to the theory of optimal insurance 
by developing necessary and sufficient conditions for Pareto optimal exchanges in risk pooling 
arrangements were made by Borch (1962). The study showed how risk aversion affects the 
optimal coverage of participants in the pool. In Borch’s analysis, however, insurance is 
costless, and there are no constraints imposed on the feasible insurance policy. Since this 
pioneering work, a lot of work has been done on understanding insurance contracts and the 
necessary constraints on insurance policies. Regarding risk-shifting, Arrow (1960, 1963) 
discusses three of the main reasons that risk shifting is limited: moral hazard, adverse selection, 
and transaction costs. Arrow (1963) showed that in the absence of moral hazard, full insurance 
above a deductible is optimal when the premium contains a fixed- percentage security loading2. 
He also proved that risk aversion on the part of the insurer is another explanation for 
coinsurance. Arrow (1965) emphasised on the problem of moral hazard and suggested that 
coinsurance arrangements in insurance contracts can be explained by this information problem. 
His analysis presents a framework that explains the role of different institutional arrangements 
for risk-shifting such as insurance markets, stock markets, implicit contracts, cost-plus 
contracts, and futures markets. All of these institutions transfer risk to parties with a 
comparative advantage in risk bearing. In the usual insurance mechanism, risk averse 
individuals confronted with risk are willing to pay a fixed price to a less risk averse 
organisation, in exchange for the latter undertaking the risk. 
Mossin (1968) looked into the problems concerned with rational behaviour in buying insurance 
coverage against given risks. In particular, the Mossin study directs attention to the wealth 
                                                 
1 A treaty is merely an agreement in between two or more insurance companies whereby one (direct insurer) 
agrees to cede and the other or others (reinsurer) agree to accept reinsurance business as per provisions specified 
in the agreement. 
2 Fixed value charged in excess of premium over the actuarial value. 
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effect on the propensity to take insurance coverage. It is shown that this effect is negative if the 
individual’s utility function displays risk aversion that decreases with wealth (decreasing 
absolute risk aversion, or DARA). In more general terms, the study noted that if an individual 
has DARA, he would assume more risk relative to wealth. 
Smith (1968) used the analogy that the problem of optimal insurance coverage is formally 
similar to the problem of optimal inventory stock age under uncertainty. In his work, 
formalisation of the household’s insurance purchasing decision is modelled in an expected 
utility maximisation framework. The model suggests that given an actuarially fair premium, 
the homeowners would purchase an amount of insurance coverage that fully protects against 
the potential loss. This is a very good observation, and as such, it helps in this research to unveil 
how homeowners’ respond to insurance demand in the aftermath of a catastrophe. Furthermore, 
if the probability of total loss is less than the insurance price per-dollar of coverage, then partial 
insurance coverage is optimal for the household. This is the same as saying that if the premium 
is actuarially unfavourable then it will never be optimal to take full coverage under Mossin 
(1968). Due to the reputed government subsidy in natural disaster insurance rates, it seems 
likely that the marginal insurance premium is less than the probability of total loss. At least; at 
this stage there is not sufficient literature to suggest to the contrary. 
More closely related to the present thesis, Smith (1968) also looked into the standard deductible 
model of the demand for property insurance by individuals. Smith implicitly assumes that 
individuals are able to estimate the probabilities related to all possible and anticipated loss 
outcomes. In Smith’s analysis, factors which are key determinants of the demand for insurance 
include wealth, the probability of loss, the price of insurance and the ultimate value of the 
property exposed to risk, as well as the individual’s risk aversion. The present research 
appreciates Smith’s key insurance demand determinants and seeks to essentially incorporate 
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them into both the intertemporal theoretical model and the research survey questionnaire. More 
importantly, the probability of loss parameter in Smith’s model is assumed to be known to both 
the insured and insurers. This is a fundamental assumption that is frequently made to model 
the demand for insurance, and this study retains the assumption. All these pioneering works 
have been further enriched and extended in numerous papers on the economics of insurance. 
In this analysis, the theoretical model and empirical investigation of the supply and demand of 
insurance markets take a narrower approach to concentrate on the effects of disasters on 
homeowners’ insurance consumption. 
On optimal contracting and reallocation of risk, Raviv (1979) is premised on the optimal 
contracting work of Arrow (1970, 1974). Raviv (1979) suggested that every phase of economic 
behaviour is affected by uncertainty, and the economic system has adapted to uncertainty by 
developing methods that facilitate the reallocation of risk among individuals and firms. By 
examining different insurance contracts for single as well as multiple losses, Raviv shows that 
the Pareto optimal insurance contract involves a deductible and coinsurance of losses above 
the deductible. In his conclusion, the deductible feature is shown to depend on the insurance 
costs while the coinsurance is due to either risk or cost sharing between the two parties and 
upper limits on insurance are shown to be Pareto suboptimal. The major shortcomings of Raviv 
(1979) analysis are that; first, adverse selection problems are not clearly analysed by assuming 
both the insurer and the insured know the probability distribution function of the losses, and 
secondly, moral hazard problems are ignored by assuming the monetary loss exogenous and 
not under the insured's control. 
In conclusion, if the demand for insurance is not inelastic, the empirical evidence is consistent 
with the theory that low-risk insureds3 would be inclined to purchase less insurance in a market 
                                                 
3 The class of policyholders who’s exposure to risk is relatively low as only a small number of them are likely to 
suffer a loss 
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with adverse selection than in a market free of adverse selection (Chiappori and Salanie, 2000; 
Dionne and Doherty, 1992; Pauly, 1974). This is further supported by the adverse selection 
literature (Crocker and Morgan, 1998; Jeleva and Villeneuve, 2004; Rothschild and Stiglitz, 
1976) which postulate that insureds are better informed about their actual probability of loss 
than insurance companies. Kunreuther (1984) argues that property owners may not purchase 
flood insurance and other natural disaster policies because they underestimate their true 
probability of loss. Kunreuther’s proposition points to a possible second difference between 
the natural disaster insurance market and those insurance markets characterised by adverse 
selection. In most of the adverse selection literature, the market is made up of high-risk and 
low-risk insureds, each with different probabilities of loss. Both high- and low-risk insureds 
estimate their probability of loss, but the insurance company does not estimate individual 
insureds’ risk level. The optimal contract achieves self-selection, so in the end the company 
knows perfectly who is high-risk and who is low-risk by the contract that they each select. In 
the case of flood insurance, Kunreuther’s suggestion is that without distinction to risk class, 
insureds underestimate their loss probability (Kunreuther, 1984). From the perspective of an 
individual who underestimates the true probability of loss and must make the decision whether 
or not to purchase insurance as modelled by Smith (1968), the price of insurance quoted by the 
insurer would appear high. If the insured underestimates the actual loss probability, subsidised 
insurance premiums may still remain expensive. Kunreuther and Kleffner (1992) showed that 
the incentive to voluntarily adopt self-insurance is reduced if the insured is required to purchase 
full insurance and that individuals tend not to use the maximisation of expected utility to make 
their decisions but rather use simple decision rules that result in their under-investing in self-
insurance. To extend this argument, Kleffner and Kelly (2001) noted that if premiums are not 
risk-based, the insured would invest less in self-insurance. 
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2.2. Recent Studies that Investigate the Insurance Supply-side Impact from 
Catastrophes 
The supply of post-catastrophe insurance coverage has also received considerable attention. 
Some studies (Grace and Klein, 2009; Grace et al., 2006; Klein and Kleindorfer, 1999) give 
detailed investigations of the performance of the Florida insurance market with a special focus 
on prices, availability of coverage, policy terms, and profitability. Key results in their analyses 
are that market restructuring, increased prices and tightening the availability of insurance, as 
well as the substantial losses suffered by insurers, have adversely affected the supply of 
coverage. Using results by Angbazo and Narayanan (1996) who worked on catastrophic shocks 
in the property-liability insurance industry, Born and Viscusi (2006) and Grace et al. (2004) 
examined the homeowners’ insurance market response to natural catastrophes. They found that 
the impact of disaster shocks on insurers’ performance is addressed by subsequent premium 
increases, and in most extreme cases firms exit from the affected territories. However, their 
results are incomplete without an analysis of how such catastrophes affect market-structure and 
performance culminating in firm exits from the affected region.  
An extensive investigation by Choi and Weiss (2005) looked into the relationships between 
market structure and performance of property liability insurers over the period 1992-1998 using 
data at the company and group levels. The findings provide support for the efficient structure4. 
Further empirical work is also provided by a section on the impact of catastrophes, Hurricane 
Andrew and the Northridge Earthquake, on the price and profit models they used.. The results 
prove that more efficient firms can charge lower prices than competitors, enabling them to 
capture larger market shares and economic rents, leading to increased concentration. Although 
                                                 
4 The efficient structure hypothesis holds that stock insurers and mutual insurers will be sorted into market 




the overall results suggest that cost-efficient firms charge lower prices and earn higher profits, 
they do not point out the ramifications of concentrated risk in the event of catastrophic 
exposure. Similarly, Chen et al. (2008) investigated the effects of 9/11 on the insurance 
industry, hypothesising a short-run claim effect resulting from insufficient premium ex-ante 
for catastrophic losses, and a long-run growth effect resulting from ex-post insurance supply 
reductions and risk updating. 
Another important contribution of this research is to look into the cost of risk and the amount 
of risk assumed by the insurer. A review of such work starts with the work of Kleffner and 
Doherty (1996) who studied the relationship between the cost of bearing risk and the amount 
of risk insurers assume in their underwriting portfolio. This work is centered on an analysis of 
the variety of insurer’s characteristics that affect their ability to write earthquake insurance. 
Kleffner and Doherty’s work estimates a cross-sectional model of earthquake insurance that 
incorporates firm characteristics expected to affect an insurer’s cost of risk bearing, such as its 
marketing system, organisational form, profitability, leverage, diversification, taxes, and the 
percent of business in personal lines. Using an empirical test to examine whether the magnitude 
of an insurer's earthquake exposure is negatively related to its cost of risk bearing; they 
observed that the higher the firm's leverage, the less earthquake risk it assumes; and the more 
diversified it is as an insurer. As measured by how concentrated it is, stock insurers assume a 
greater amount of risk than mutual insurers, and insurers that use the independent agency 
system assume less earthquake risk than those that use the direct writer marketing system. 
These are very strong empirical findings that set the stage for future research to extend to how 
the magnitude of catastrophe, the cost of bearing the risk and the availability of government 
subsidy affect the demand and supply of residential property insurance. Based on Kleffner and 
Doherty’s findings it is safe to postulate that, if firm-specific risk does not affect the value of 
the firm, then it will not affect operating decisions. However, when risk bearing is costly, then 
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we expect firms' optimal risk level to equate the marginal cost of risk and the marginal cost of 
reducing that risk. Evidently, this implies that firms with a higher cost of bearing risk should 
assume less risk. In this context, the existence of costly risk bearing implies that not all insurers 
are equally equipped to insure catastrophic lines of insurance business. The insurers 
concentrating on commercial or residential property insurance could have different risk bearing 
capacity and supply constraints. Born and Klimaszewski-Blettner (2009) show that following 
an unexpected catastrophe, commercial property insurers perform better than residential 
property insurers. Although this could be explained by differences in exposure and 
underwriting flexibility, a difference also exists in the distinct degree of regulation intensity. 
The existing studies do not document how premiums, policy forms, and contract terms vary in 
different territories. In their more recent work, Born and Klimaszewski-Blettner (2013) found 
that a strict regulatory environment distorts the ability of homeowner’s insurers to offer 
insurance coverage relative to their commercial property counterparts. They observed that it is 
not only the different degrees of regulation that make a comparison of homeowners and 
commercial lines’ responses to catastrophes worth being further investigated; but also found 
differences in the underlying risk exposure as well as insurers’ flexibility in negotiating 
insurance contract terms. Moreover, they observed differences in reinsurance structures and 
geographical diversification. All these differences provide the authors with the sort of natural 
experiment with which to evaluate and compare personal and commercial lines insurers’ 
responses to unanticipated catastrophic events. In their research, they attempted to identify the 
crucial factors that drive insurers’ decisions to offer insurance coverage in catastrophe-prone 
lines of business. The authors’ empirical results suggest important policy implications for 
improving the availability of insurance against catastrophic threats. They derived empirically 
founded strategies that might help to expand the limits of insurability, improving the supply of 
coverage capacity. Special focus is given to the impact of regulatory constraints; to the extent 
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that the paper found a negative effect of regulatory actions on insurers’ willingness to offer 
coverage. This would suggest that some regulations may unintentionally hinder insurers’ 
ability to respond to any changes in risk as they see fit and, thus, it endangers the adequate 
supply of coverage against natural disasters. This contributes to the discussion on a reasonable 
program of handling mega disasters, both in the private insurance context and with regard to 
public–private partnerships. The present study acknowledges the fact that such areas are more 
intensely regulated in the homeowners’ insurance context than in commercial property 
insurance, but it seeks to put emphasis on homeowners’ insurance. 
Another crucial area of literature for review on is studies that examine insurer’s willingness to 
offer insurance coverage. Born and Klimaszewski-Blettner (2013) examined the main factors 
that drive insurers’ willingness to offer coverage in catastrophe-prone property insurance lines. 
They compare insurers’ supply decisions in personal and commercial lines, with an emphasis 
on insurers’ responses in the aftermath of natural disasters. Catastrophic property risks pose 
severe problems for insurers and thus, affect the supply of insurance coverage in catastrophe-
prone lines of business. Limitations on the availability of coverage mainly result from 
insurability constraints. The study observed a lack of critical independence between insured 
units with the consequence of high accumulation of risk and serious loss potential for insurers 
(Born and Klimaszewski-Blettner, 2013). A further observation is that the insurability of 
catastrophic risk is hindered by difficulties in precisely predicting loss models, compared to 
high-frequency, low-severity risks, for instance, automobile accidents. This puzzling problem 
is documented by Hogarth and Kunreuther (1989), and Kunreuther and Hogarth (1990), who 
note that the willingness of insurers to provide coverage against natural catastrophic threats is 
affected by ambiguity issues. In addition to catastrophes being low-frequency, high-severity, 
and strongly dependent perils, increased construction activity in high-risk areas, global 
warming, and climate change complicate the insurability of these risks for insurers, and some 
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researchers are already paying attention to such areas (Bellman and Hemmingsson, 2016; 
Gurenko, 2015; Surminski et al., 2016).  
On the actual implication of catastrophe to the insurer, Born and Viscusi (2006) provides a 
comprehensive investigation of natural disasters. Using a very large dataset on homeowners’ 
insurance coverage by state, by firm, and by year for the period 1984 to 2004 in the USA 
general insurance market, their work documents the positive effect on losses and loss ratios of 
both unexpected catastrophes as well as large events which they term as blockbuster 
catastrophes. Insurers adapt to these catastrophic risks by raising insurance rates, leading to 
lower loss ratios after the catastrophic event. There is a widespread effect of unexpected 
catastrophes and blockbuster catastrophes that reduce total premiums earned in the state, which 
reduces the total number of firms writing insurance coverage in the state, and that leads to the 
exit of firms from the state. Firms with low levels of homeowners’ premiums are most 
adversely affected by the catastrophes. In conventional insurance markets, such as automobile 
insurance, the insurer faces a large number of independent risks that tend to follow a fairly 
predictable pattern across time. By charging premiums that the firm can invest and earn a return 
on before paying off the losses, the firm would be able to run a profitable insurance business. 
Catastrophic losses caused by natural disasters are much more problematic from an insurance 
standpoint. Rather than a large number of risks that on average follow a quite predictable year-
to-year pattern, catastrophic losses tend to be lumpy. According to Born and Viscusi (2006), 
catastrophic risks pose a variety of problems for insurers. First, because the losses arise from a 
small number of lumpy events, the insurer may not have sufficient resources to cover the losses. 
In the absence of adequate reinsurance, the firm may go bankrupt or may choose to exit the 
country in which there is a substantial exposure to such catastrophic risks. The second 
implication of catastrophic losses is that they influence the rate structure even for firms that 
45 
 
remain quite viable in the presence of natural disasters. Suppose that an insurer is writing 
coverage in a very high-risk region that experiences a major disaster once every decade, and in 
disaster year, the firm will suffer losses well in excess of premiums. For it to be profitable to 
write coverage in the region, the insurer uses a common practise that charges more for 
insurance in the subsequent years in which there are no catastrophes than it would if there were 
no the threat of catastrophic risks. On the contrary, the present study believes that so long as 
the firm charges at least expected indemnity as premium in each year, then on average they 
would be solvent. Although the indemnities are lumpy and large on their arrival, premiums 
should not be higher in subsequent non-loss years. Non-loss premium income needs to be 
sufficiently spread as a catastrophe reserve fund against claims in a loss year, and then the 
insurer can either fund loss claims directly, or re-insure them, or use the continued premium 
income to fund a short-term loan to cover for losses. In any of these cases, premiums should 
not be different in loss and in non-loss years. A third phenomenon linked to natural disasters is 
the need for learning about the risks over time. The distribution of losses due to catastrophes 
may change over time for a variety of reasons. Locational patterns may have shifted over time, 
as reflected in increased construction in high-risk regions. 
To the extent that insurers are rational Bayesian decision makers, one would expect them to 
update their risk beliefs over time when writing insurance coverage. Surprisingly, Born and 
Viscusi (2006) found no econometric analysis whatsoever that addresses these and other 
fundamental aspects of how catastrophic risks affect insurance markets. There have been 
extensive discussions of a conceptual nature as well as analyses of the potential role of 
reinsurance, but there has been no empirical examination of how catastrophic risks affect 
insurance company behaviour. Born and Viscusi’s work provides a detailed empirical 
examination of how catastrophic risks affect the performance of the market for homeowners’ 
insurance. The dataset they used is unprecedented in the homeowners’ insurance literature in 
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terms of its level of detail. A major concern in the literature on insurance is how premiums are 
adjusted over time in response to fluctuations in interest rates. This phenomenon, which is 
known as the underwriting cycle, is often captured in empirical analyses of insurance markets 
by including some type of interest rate variable. Total premium payments reflect both the price 
of insurance as well as the quantity of insurance, so in many respects are a less instructive 
measure than the loss ratio, which serves as an ex-post measure of insurer profitability. Born 
and Viscusi (2006) includes a measure of the one-period-lagged homeowners’ premiums in the 
analysis to capture the fact that there is a strong autoregressive character to insurance 
underwriting, as firms that write a large number of premiums in a given year would tend to 
continue to do so in subsequent years. They found the elasticity of premiums earned to 
homeowners’ premiums from the previous year to be 0.973. Catastrophic events have a mixed 
effect on insurance premiums. One would expect these unexpected catastrophic events to raise 
the rate that firms charge for insurance. Thus, for any given number of policies written, the 
total premiums rise. However, these major catastrophes may also reduce the quantity of 
insurance written, both because of the higher rates and insurance rationing, as well as due to 
the effect of exiting of firms from the market. 
Aseervatham et al. (2014) observed that natural catastrophes are threats to insurance markets. 
The authors observed significant supply distortions in the aftermath of natural disasters when 
insurers tend to exit affected areas, resulting in a lack of available coverage (Born and 
Klimaszewski-Blettner, 2013; Grace et al., 2006; Kraut and Richter, 2015). Aseervatham et al. 
(2014) infers how the availability of private market insurance can be ensured even in the 
aftermath of large scale and unprecedented catastrophes. For this, they first take a closer look 
at hazard specific insurance market reactions. Although insurance market reactions after 
natural catastrophes have been analysed extensively in recent years, there is no intensive study 
which analyses hazard-specific market reactions. The pioneering work in this analysis is 
47 
 
provided by Aseervatham  et al. (2014). Most of the previous studies have either focused on 
one type of natural hazard (Browne and Hoyt, 2000; Grace and Klein, 2009), while others do 
not differentiate between different types of catastrophes at all (Aseervatham et al., 2013; Born 
and Klimaszewski-Blettner, 2009; Thomann, 2013). The main aim in analysis of this nature is 
to test whether there is one general type of insurance market reaction to natural catastrophes 
by comparing insurers’ supply decisions after major catastrophic events. Supply decisions 
might differ because the hazards vary in damage size, predictability and correlation. Therefore, 
analysis examining the extent of the characteristics that drive the insurability problems is 
required in order to deduce recommendations for mitigating market distortions. 
2.3. Recent Studies that Investigate the Insurance Demand-side Impacts from 
Catastrophes 
The implications of catastrophes on insurance consumers have also drawn the attention of 
recent scholarly work. Kousky and Cooke (2012) examined the premiums a solvency 
constrained insurer would have to charge given a loss distribution with fat-tails, micro-
correlations, or tail dependence. They found that, faced with those premiums, it may be rational 
for a utility-maximising homeowner not to purchase insurance. Grace and Klein (2003) 
estimated the demand for catastrophe insurance using data from the Florida homeowners 
market. They reported that the demand for catastrophe coverage is more price-elastic than the 
demand for non-catastrophe coverage. 
Several studies that have examined the reaction and conduct of property insurance markets in 
the aftermath of catastrophes; and more particularly the theory supporting demand for 
catastrophe insurance, have attracted considerable attention. These analyses mainly 
concentrate on more recent catastrophic events and their implications for the property insurance 
market. Kriesel and Landry (2004) investigated the factors that determine consumers’ 
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participation in the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) in the USA insurance market. 
Their empirical results for coastal homeowners confirm earlier findings on the overall flood 
insurance programs, indicating that flood insurance demand is price inelastic and responsive to 
the level of storm risk. The results also indicate that homes located further from the shoreline 
have a lower probability of holding flood insurance, all else equal. Locating away from the 
shoreline was interpreted as a form of self-insurance, which should lower the demand for 
formal insurance. For the seminal analysis of the relationship between self-insurance and 
market-insurance, see Ehrlich and Becker (1972). Similarly, Grace et al. (2004) analysed 
factors affecting homeowners’ insurance contracts in markets subject to different levels of 
catastrophe risk. Using a slightly different approach and data sets to Kriesel and Landry (2004), 
Grace et al. (2004) investigated the demand for home insurance coverage in USA using two-
stage least squares regression and data on insurance contracts, housing and demographic 
variables. Their model estimated the demand effects of standard variables, such as price and 
income, as well as variables more specific to residential insurance transactions under 
catastrophe risk, such as coverage options and an insured’s risk characteristics. Grace et al. 
(2004) reported that the demand for catastrophe coverage is more price elastic than the demand 
for non-catastrophe coverage. A general observation is that options that expand coverage tend 
to increase demand, suggesting that consumers are willing to pay the incremental cost of 
additional coverage. Results from most of these studies can, to a certain extent, be used to 
generalise that lower deductibles are also associated with higher demand. A common 
explanation for this phenomenon is that consumers tend to follow experts’ advice to decrease 
their deductibles and use the savings to purchase additional coverage that offers a better value 
in terms of protection against risk.  
Michel‐Kerjan and Kousky (2010) went further to study the demand for flood insurance using 
a database of more than 7.5 million NFIP policies and claims filed for the years 2000-2005. 
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Their work focussed on the characteristics of the buyers of flood insurance, the types of 
contracts (deductibles and coverage levels), the claims handling process, price determination, 
and the costs of the NFIP. Some of findings are in accordance with well-documented 
expectations of homeowners' decision making regarding insurance purchasing, for instance the 
choice of very low deductibles It was also revealed that the response to the 2004 hurricane 
season also suggests that homeowners may desire more coverage and that this demand become 
more pronounced if another devastating hurricane season is expected, but their finding does 
not indicate the magnitude the change in insurance demand. To give an indication of the 
magnitude of post-disaster shift in insurance demand, Kousky (2017) provides a recent 
investigation on insurance demand. This study observes that the occurrence of disasters alters 
risk management choices, including the decision to insure. Using a database of flood insurance 
policies for all states on the Atlantic and Gulf coasts of the USA between 2001 and 2010, the 
research uses fixed effects models to examine how up-take rates respond to the occurrence of 
hurricanes and tropical storms. The key interesting finding is that, being hit by at least one 
hurricane disaster in the previous year increases net flood insurance purchases by 7.2 percent. 
But this effect dies out by three years after the storm. 
Aseervatham et al. (2013) investigated whether, and to what degree insurance demand 
reactions of less sophisticated homeowners differs from the reactions of more sophisticated 
businesses in the aftermath of catastrophe. Using the annual statement data and financial 
information for all USA property insurers for the period 1984-2007, Aseervatham et al. (2013) 
found strong evidence for different demand reactions to catastrophes between the residential 
insurance market and the commercial insurance market. In the findings, homeowners seemed 
to demand more insurance after catastrophic events while businesses do not record major 
drastic changes in their insurance consumption level. Assuming that businesses behave more 
rationally and are more sophisticated in insurance contracts; Aseervatham et al. (2013) 
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concluded that the informational value of the occurrence of a catastrophic event is extremely 
low. The model used in their study hypothesises that the individual’s overreactions to 
catastrophic events cause an insurance demand shift resulting in a 2.9 percent change in 
premium rates. In conclusion, the authors provided evidence that risk perception increases even 
if households were not directly affected. Although sufficient evidence is provided for the 
difference in post-catastrophes reactions for both the residential and the commercial insurance 
market, and a need for a behavioural approach in explaining individuals’ demand for residential 
cover, there is a need for conclusive discussions to explain the behaviour. Their study however, 
provides the groundwork for the direction of future research work on post-catastrophe analysis. 
The authors proposed that future research should focus on distinguishing between different 
types of catastrophe risk, a case study as an avenue to extend this work is also proposed. 
The key determinant of insurance demand is another area of interest that links the current 
research to the previous literature. There are theoretical reasons that determine the buyer’s 
characteristics of insurance, but this may differ among policyholders. Browne and Hoyt (2000) 
estimated a catastrophic flood insurance demand model. In this demand model, the key drivers 
are the price of insurance, the loss probability and the loss amount. The factors are related such 
that if the loss probability increases while the insurance premium remains constant, a risk-
averse agent demands a higher insurance coverage. In line with the existing literature, the 
insurance demand is expected to be high in the aftermath of catastrophes if the insured do not 
adjust their coverage accordingly after price increases. If this is the case, then it allows Browne 
and Hoyt’s demand model to test a number of different hypotheses which remained puzzling 
prior to the event, explaining why relatively little catastrophic insurance is purchased in the 
USA. First, the model allows the authors to test whether price is a significant factor in the 
decision to purchase flood insurance. Second, they can test the extent to which the purchase of 
insurance coverage depends on the consumer's perception of the need for coverage. Greater 
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insurance purchases following floods are expected. Third, they also test whether mitigation 
efforts undertaken by the government to reduce the frequency and severity of catastrophe losses 
influence insurance consumption. In their work, Browne and Hoyt (2000) reported that flood 
insurance purchases are positively related to income and negatively related to price. Consistent 
with earlier studies (Gallagher, 2014; Hudson et al., 2014; Smith and Katz, 2013), they found 
that the purchase of flood insurance policies in a given USA state is positively related to the 
dollar value of flood losses that occurred during the prior year in that state. 
As to whether insurance consumers are adequately insured, Dumm et al. (2015) observed an 
interesting phenomenon in insurance markets for catastrophic risks where individuals tend to 
underinsure for catastrophic risks prior to their occurrence. On the other hand, other works 
documented that when catastrophic events have recently occurred, individuals tend to demand 
more insurance (Kunreuther, 1978; Kunreuther and Pauly, 2005; Zeckhauser and Sunstein, 
2008). Reasonable explanations for this uneven demand for catastrophe insurance include 
expected government subsidies, framing of the risk (Johnson et al., 1993), and overreaction to 
recent events (Palm, 1995). Although these numerous studies document some form of reaction 
post-catastrophe, the approach of the current work to investigate the actual effect of a 
catastrophe is novel in that, it seeks to interview the insurers, insured and other stakeholders to 
document the actual experience as well as to run a theoretical model to simulate the anticipated 
post-catastrophe reaction. 
2.4. Supply-Side Reactions Post-Catastrophes: Indirect Effects on Insurance Market 
The theme of this work is centered on supply and demand of residential property insurance and 
how this is affected in the event of a major catastrophe. An indirect effect of catastrophes on 
insurance industry profitability and market valuation is deemed appropriate to establish a 
complete holistic picture of the extent to which an insurance company’s operations could be 
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curtailed. An interesting study by Shelor et al. (1992) found a positive effect of the 1989 
California Earthquake on property-liability and multiple line insurers’ market valuation. As a 
result, the researchers noted an increase in insurers’ stock prices independent of their actual 
written business in the affected areas. Aiuppa et al. (1993) confirmed these findings in a related 
study. These results point to an argument that despite the high indemnity payments 
immediately post-disaster, investors expect positive business prospects due to an increase in 
insurance demand. Chen et al. (2008) used the 9/1 terrorist attack in USA to analyse the 
influence of catastrophic losses on insurers’ profitability. By analysing abnormal earnings 
forecast revisions the authors were able to detect two opposing effects of catastrophes on 
insurers’ performance. First, in the short run insurers suffer from a claimed effect since they 
did not expect a terrorist attack of this magnitude. Second, insurers benefit in the long-run from 
a positive growth effect due to an increase in demand for insurance coverage. Interestingly, 
this brief review leaves the gap of showing if there are correlations between the long-run 
growth of insurance sector post-natural catastrophes and availability of insurance coverage. 
2.5. Summary 
This work has given a comprehensive review and summary of the key studies that touch on 
extreme events insurance and how such events affect demand and supply of insurance 
coverage. The review would be incomplete without either making remarks or mentioning the 
essential features that lead to the insurability of risks emerging from disaster events. Natural 
disasters create challenges for insurers because there is substantial ambiguity associated with 
the probability of such events occurring, and the insurers’ losses are often highly correlated. 
Most importantly, catastrophic risks are typically characterised by two main features. First, 
many catastrophes, from earthquakes to hurricanes, have been shown to be fat-tailed (Muir-
Wood, 2012; Newman, 2005; Schoenberg et al., 2003). Statistically, an event with a fat-tailed 
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loss distribution implies that the probability of the event declines slowly relative to its severity. 
This in turn implies that the premium for such events should be much higher than the expected 
loss because the insurer has to provide a large amount of capital should a catastrophic event 
occur. It is evident that higher premiums suppress demand, but how higher premiums and 
higher a probability of risk actually affect demand is still largely unknown. Similarly, this 
review demonstrates that the supply of disaster coverage is curtailed unless the market provides 
some form of subsidy, but there is still unsettled discussion on why demand decreases with 
time from the last disaster, even when the supply of coverage is highly subsidised by the state. 
The second feature of catastrophic risks is that losses are spatially correlated (Vaughan and 
Elliott, 1978). This means that a large number of buildings and other assets in close proximity 
are simultaneously affected by the occurrence of the natural disaster. Due to this high 
correlation between insured risks, there is little or no risk diversification within the insurance 
pool. These features, along with the last few year’s increases in natural disaster events and the 
uncertainty surrounding their occurrence compounds the non-insurability of natural disasters 
in a free-insurance market economy due to the implied larger risk of insolvency for the private 
insurers. With these unique prerequisites, this work extends major parts of these gaps and seeks 
to develop reasonably accurate estimates of post-catastrophe reaction using a mix of empirical 
data and a theoretical model. This is not an easy task with low-frequency, high-severity events 
affected by a wide range of factors and subject to considerable ambiguity as described herein. 
To address all these problems, this study incorporates actuarial modelling techniques as it 
attempts to measure catastrophe risk and diversify this risk exposure as well as propose an 
actuarial-based pricing approach. Perhaps a major challenge would be how to allocate natural 
disaster costs amongst the primary stakeholders in a manner that is consistent with non-
catastrophe events. For example, in automobile coverage, extensive historical data are always 
available and deployed to estimate insurance premiums for individuals with different risk 
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attributes. All this information gives a better understanding and quantification of the different 
drivers of the increase of extreme losses due to major catastrophes in the last few decades and 
the reactions of the insured and insurers to post-disasters would be critical to define better 





3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND DESIGN 
3.0. Introduction 
This chapter introduces the research methodology used in this study and how it has 
guided data collection, analysis and development of the theoretical framework of the 
study. This methodology chapter gives a description of the research methods used in 
the analysis of chapter four all through to chapter eight. The five chapters independently 
contribute to the thesis on post-catastrophe insurance supply and demand: theory and 
evidence.  
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: Section 3.1 outline the research strategy 
used in the supply-side. Sub-section 3.1.1 gives the theory methodology while sub-
section 3.1.2 empirical methodology. Sub-sections 3.1.2.1 and 3.1.2.1 describe the data 
source and data analysis respectively. Section 3.2 presents the research strategy used in 
the demand-side. Two chapters, chapter five and chapter six, of this work examine the 
demand-side of the insurance market in the aftermath of a major natural disaster. Sub-
section 3.2.1 gives the theory methodology while sub-section 3.2.2 empirical 
methodology. Sub-sections 3.2.2.1 - 3.2.2.6 present data source, pilot study, 
questionnaire design and coding, conception and execution of the survey and ethical 




3.1. Research Strategy on Supply-side 
On the analysis of supply-side, this study developed a theoretic framework that can be 
used to price natural disaster risk, and an illustration of the model using empirical data 
from Christchurch earthquake claims for the red-zoned properties is presented. This 
part of the investigation also conducted written interviews with local insurance 
companies and regulators with the aim of collecting business statistics pre- and post-
Christchurch earthquakes. The business statistics help to analyse how the premium rates 
and other contract terms changed post-Christchurch disaster from a supply-side 
perspective. The ICNZ proved to be a valuable and resourceful organisation that 
provided a descriptive account of the insurance and reinsurance responses post-
Christchurch disaster besides providing business statistics from all local underwriters 
in Christchurch residential insurance market. 
In essence, the method used to study the insurance supply-side effect and reaction post-
loss is of twofold. First, the methodology develops a theory in the form of a statistical 
model that takes into consideration the rating parameter of catastrophic risk using New 
Zealand residential property as a case study. Second, the methodology uses an empirical 
research into the effects of the Christchurch earthquakes supply-side of insurance. The 
empirical analysis aims to investigate the effect of the Christchurch earthquakes on the 
insurance industry using pre-loss and post-loss business statistics.  
3.1.1. Theory Methodology 
The theory method here presents a pragmatic premium pricing formula to price fire and 
general cover for residential property with a natural disaster as a rider. This is a unique 
actuarial perspective pricing formula that is based on the standard statistical method 
and international actuarial notation. This approach takes into consideration the key 
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features of New Zealand’s residential property and contents insurance coverage which 
is made up of two layers of insurance contract run in a dual-insurance system.  
Hypothetical pricing data is used to demonstrate how the formula is used to price 
natural disaster risk. This model will play an important role in setting internal 
benchmark rates in the pricing of natural disaster insurance coverage.  
3.1.2. Empirical Methodology 
The empirical research in this part of the thesis chapter investigates the supply-side 
implications of earthquakes to insurance markets. The methodology is centered on the 
supply-side of the insurance market to examine how catastrophe risks are insured in 
New Zealand. The method gives a diagnostic analysis of the natural disaster insurance 
market for residential property and contents. The empirical analysis is carried out using 
data sets of business statistics in all business lines for the local insurance products. A 
similar analysis for residential property and contents coverage is independently 
examined.  
3.1.2.1. Data Source   
The main source of dataset for this chapter was insurance industry business statistics. 
The data collection process involved both primary data and secondary data sources. 
This process started by writing to all insurance companies and government departments 
that were involved with earthquake claims in Christchurch. The correspondence emails 
aimed to set-up interviews to gather primary data on premiums, claims and exposure 
measures amongst others data variables. The main aim was to gather as much data as 
possible, but the degree of responses from the private insurers was very low. One 
confidential private insurer provided data for this analysis. The private insurer provided 
58 
 
business statistics for the years 2006 to 2014. However, before the data was released 
the insurer required signing of a non-disclosure/confidentiality agreement. 
The main source of secondary data was the Insurance Council of New Zealand (ICNZ), 
Earthquake Commission (EQC) and Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority 
(CERA). The data used in this analysis is from two sources: Insurance Council of New 
Zealand (ICNZ) and one confidential private insurer that provided comparable data for 
this analysis. The ICNZ data contains business statistics on the data portal for the 
periods 2008 to 2015 which is published annually, therefore it gives a broad 
presentation. The Council currently has 28 members who collectively write more than 
95 percent of fire and general insurance in New Zealand. The secondary data from the 
ICNZ, in particular, gives a broader representation of the business statistics of both the 
entire industry and a specific class of interest from 2008 to 2014. This information is 
published annually by the ICNZ. Using this data, the study gives a brief analysis of how 
New Zealand’s insurance business statistics as well as any noticeable reactions in the 
aftermaths of the Christchurch earthquakes.  
3.1.2.2. Data Analysis  
Both data sets, one from the private insurer and the other from ICNZ, for the period 
2006 to 2014 were concurrently analysed in order to present a clear picture of the effects 
of the earthquakes on the entire industry and on a particular single insurer. Insurance 
ratios, data plots, statistical analyses and the relevant tests were performed using IBM 
SPSS Statistics version 20 and Microsoft Excel 2013. Simple descriptive and 
visualization figures and tables are also used to explain what happened after the 
earthquakes based on survey responses. The major data collection obstacle this research 
had to deal with was the unwillingness of many organisations to share data. So an 
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opportunity to compile extensive data for rigorous analyses of the insurance market 
pre-quakes had been lost which would have otherwise informed this study of the major 
trends and market dynamics post-catastrophe. 
3.2. Research Strategy on Demand-side 
Two chapters, chapter five and chapter six, of this work examine the demand-side of 
the insurance market in the aftermath of a major natural disaster. The research strategy 
adopted to study the demand-side aimed to develop a theoretical model on insurance 
demand responses post-loss and an empirical chapter based on survey data on insurance 
demander’s responses post-loss. Both perspectives are geared towards investigation of 
how a major catastrophe affects insurance demand from policyholders’ viewpoint.  
3.2.1. Theory Methodology 
The theoretic model utilises a methodology based on insurance in an intertemporal 
setting. This method is used to examine and give an in-depth analysis of how the 
demand for insurance changes in responses to loss incurred in the previous period. The 
underlying research question in this model is how demand for insurance changes post-
catastrophe, and how to model it theoretically. The intertemporal dynamic model 
investigates insurance consumption decisions in an intertemporal setting. In this model, 
an agent is allowed to update their insurance demand, initial wealth and a host of other 
risk and consumption decision parameters in the subsequent periods. 
In this approach, insurance will be sought in two periods of time (sequential), and at 
the second period it is known whether or not a loss event happened in period one. Thus, 
it is possible to model the demand for insurance in period two conditional upon the loss 
event happening or not in period one. Above all, this methodology incorporates a 
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parameter on probability updating; so the consumer increases the probability belief for 
a loss event in period two, in an effort to explain why demand for coverage might 
increase after a loss event. Simulation results have been achieved using hypothetical 
values for all the parameter assumption. This result explains how the insurance demand 
changes post-loss.  
3.2.2. Empirical Methodology 
This section presents the research methodology used in the empirical study and how it 
has guided data collection and analysis of survey focusing on the demand-side aspect 
of residential property insurance coverage. The study gives an empirical analysis of 
pre- and post-Christchurch earthquakes insurance reactions using survey data. The key 
interest using this methodology on the demand-side is centered on the analysis of 
changes in the level of insurance coverage and other variables that contributes to change 
in insurance demand post-loss. The study further investigates how various insurance 
demand determinants variables affect the level of insurance coverage post-loss. In 
addition, this analysis method goes further to investigate how varying demographic 
attributes of the insurance demanders affect insurance demand post-catastrophe in New 
Zealand residential insurance market. Simple descriptive and visualization figures and 
tables are used to explain what happened after the earthquakes based on survey 
responses. Simple descriptive statistical analysis (Chi-square test and correlation 
analysis) have also been used to analyse the survey responses.  
3.2.2.1. Data Source   
This study uses data from an online survey conducted through random sampling of 
Christchurch dwellers. The sample respondents to the survey questionnaire composed 
of employees from four major public organisations. As a note of caution, the survey is 
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probably not representative, given that the data was gathered from only four 
institutions: University of Canterbury, ARA Institute, Christchurch Airport and 
Christchurch Women's Hospital. However, representation was not the primary 
intention; the researcher needed some data to show insurance market responses from 
demand-side. The sample of interest only consisted of homeowners insured prior to the 
2010-11 earthquakes, and these four institutions provided easily accessible email 
contacts which could be used for an online survey. To this end then, the survey data is 
only intended to be illustrative, not necessarily representative of the entire population, 
but the survey participants in the sample were all affected by the earthquakes and they 
had some relationship with the insurance companies. In compiling this dataset, this 
study aimed to examine the influence and effect of each of these variables on insurance 
demand using a multinomial logistic model with an appropriate statistical test. 
3.2.2.2. Pilot Study 
One pilot study was conducted before the actual research survey was carried out. A 
focus group of 10 participants within the University of Canterbury was sent an email 
with the survey questionnaire. The main two aims of the pilot test were: first to examine 
the participants’ response rate and factors that affect participation in the post-
catastrophe survey or might hinder accurate completion of the survey, and second to 
ensure that the survey design and the technical aspect of the questionnaire would 
capture the data necessary to meet the survey objectives.  
The focus group results were used to revise the survey questionnaire and other 
respondent materials prior to the full-scale study survey. Based on the pilot test results, 
improvements were made in the invitation email and minor text changes were made to 
the questionnaire title and few questions. The potential limitations of the pilot study 
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were considered and appreciated. The main limitation was primarily a small sample 
size within one organisation which could not provide sufficient representative results 
and the possibility of making inaccurate predictions or assumption based on the small 
size of the pilot data. 
3.2.2.3. Questionnaire Design and Coding  
The method of e-mail online survey is used in this study. This particular research 
instrument has been chosen due to the unique characteristics of the study population in 
Christchurch and the need for efficiency of data collection in the aftermath of the 
quakes. The survey consisted of closed-ended questions formulated to ensure in-depth 
information on insurance coverage is provided. The questions were formulated based 
on the objectives, hypotheses of this research and main research question. Using the 
guides in Sue and Ritter (2011), questions were developed following a logical 
progression starting with simple demographic profile questions, progressing to more 
specific natural disaster questions to sustain the interest of respondents and gradually 
stimulate question answering. 
A survey cover letter was sent to the compiled email addresses to explain the purpose 
of this research and its relevance, and to seek respondents’ consent to participate in the 
study. The letter also contained an online link where willing participants could complete 
the questionnaire. Contact information of the researcher had been provided in case a 
respondent raises questions relating to the survey. The questionnaire was made up of 
24 questions designed to test the hypotheses of this research as well as investigate the 
post-earthquake reactions from insureds’ viewpoint. The survey questionnaire was 
worded carefully to avoid long, ambiguous, leading and biased questions. More 
particular information on the survey question can be obtained in Appendix 1.  
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In the coding of the questionnaire responses, the survey used a mix of numerical rating, 
multiple choices and checklists where appropriate. The Likert scale of 1 to 8 was also 
used to scale most of the responses to the questionnaire. After sorting all the data set, it 
was necessary to transform them into ordinal and categorical dummy variables coding 
scheme to enable statistical analysis. This is in line with Walter, Feinstein, and Wells 
(1987). 
3.2.2.4. Conception and Execution of the Survey and Ethical Consideration  
The process of putting together a survey questionnaire began in the early months of 
2015. After a series of refinement editing, and taking in to account all the comments 
from varying stakeholders, the first draft of the questionnaire was ready by May 2015. 
All data collection activities necessitated conformity to standard procedures for 
conducting household surveys. In this light, the process sought survey approval from 
the University of Canterbury ethics committee; this was cleared by June 2015. The 
request for permission to survey the university staff was also granted by the university 
survey policy group. 
In the aftermaths of the quakes, many homeowners left their damaged homes to new 
suburbs or relocated to other cities. An online survey was hence considered as the most 
efficient survey method. The university’s Qualtric survey tool, which is jointly 
administered by academic services group and the centre for evaluation and monitoring, 
was the preferred survey tool. The use of a number of survey tools such as survey 
monkey was strongly discouraged for official university research purposes.  
The university communication office distributed the Qualtric survey link on 28th June 
2015 via the university weekly e-newsletter on the researcher’s behalf. The survey was 
directed only to insured homeowners and real-estate property owners and was 
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structured to take no more than 10 minutes to complete. However, this did not yield 
anticipated results, and we only got a paltry 7 responses from the university 
communications invitation. Next, the survey process took a more direct approach by 
emailing the respondents directly appealing to them for their support by taking time to 
complete the survey. The second survey invitations included the employees from four 
major public organisations: University of Canterbury, Christchurch Polytechnic 
Institute of Technology, Christchurch Airport and Christchurch Women's Hospital. In 
total, 1600 emails were sent between September and November 2015, but it was not 
possible to establish if all email address were still valid. A total of 254 of participants 
went on to complete the survey, representing a response rate of 16 percent. After sorting 
and cleaning the compiled data a total of 221 responses out of 254 met all the required 
information for analysis.  
3.2.2.5. Data Analysis  
Analysis of the survey data is done in two parts. The first part, which forms the main 
findings of this survey, entails simple descriptive analysis. In this descriptive analysis 
of the survey respondents’ responses, clear summaries of results are presented in the 
figures and tables below. The main purpose of this analytical approach is to exhibit, in 
a simple manner, what actually happened to insurance demand-related variables after 
the earthquakes. A chi-square test of independence is also used to examine differences 
in participants’ responses where appropriate. 
3.2.2.6. Some Survey Limitations 
The major reason why this study conducted an online survey was due to lack of funds 
to facilitate direct door-to-door interview or mailing paper-based questionnaire via the 
Christchurch suburbs addresses. Perhaps other survey approaches would have 
65 
 
improved the response rate. Another challenge was that many of the heavily affected 
homes in city East suburbs had been red-zoned as unfit for habitation and residents had 
moved to other suburbs or to other cities. So it was difficult to collect a broader dataset 
of those deeply affected by the earthquake. This particular survey method was chosen 
due to such unique characteristics of the study population in Christchurch and the need 
for efficiency of data collection in the aftermath of the quakes. The survey aims to 
provide a comprehensive reaction of home insurance buyers post-catastrophe. The 
resulting databases will be used to formulate and update insurance demand models for 
a natural disaster, as well as to inform the interested stakeholders on the lessons learned 
from insurance market experience in the aftermaths of catastrophic natural disasters.  
3.3. Conclusions 
The general goals of this research are centered towards investigating demand and 
supply market responses to the Christchurch earthquakes. In part, this is also to establish 
how the homeowners reacted in terms of their buying characteristics to their home 
insurance contracts in the aftermath of the Christchurch earthquakes. This study then 
documents a post-catastrophe response on both supply-side and demand-side and 
captures the perception towards risk in the period immediately after catastrophe as 
drivers of insurance decision. 
This chapter outlined the methodology and justification for the chosen research design. 
Both empirical and theoretical research approach are described along with the datasets 
used in each case. The research instrumentation was discussed in detail and issues 
pertaining to validity, ethical consideration, coding, and transformation were presented. 
The interview and survey procedure were also described. Lastly, the statistical software 




4. AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF INSURABILITY OF NATURAL 
DISASTERS 
4.0. Introduction 
This chapter provides a comprehensive empirical analysis of the challenges faced in 
providing insurance coverage for natural disaster risks. The main objective of this 
chapter is to present a coherent discussion of the global challenge faced by the private 
insurance market to insure catastrophe risks and the possible solutions to address these 
challenges. The role played by the government insurance schemes is also illustrated and 
some examples of government insurance schemes worldwide are discussed. 
The chapter is organised as follows: Section 4.1 describes the challenges faced in 
insuring natural disasters. Section 4.2 presents a probabilistic catastrophe loss model 
for natural disasters. This is an earthquake model which is used to reasonably determine 
the probability of losses occurring and likely severity when a disastrous earthquake 
event strikes. Section 4.3 demonstrates the need for government involvement in the 
provision of natural disaster insurance coverage. Sub-sections 4.3.1 - 4.3.4 present a 
discussion of important government-sponsored natural disaster schemes worldwide. 
Section 4.4 gives the discussion and conclusions of the study. 
4.1. Challenges Faced in Insuring Natural Disasters 
One of the essential characteristics of a risk is that it should meet some specific 
insurability prerequisites. These insurability conditions are essential for risk transfer as 
a risk treatment tool. To discuss the concept of insurability, consider a standard 
insurance policy under which premiums are paid at the inception of the contract to cover 
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losses which might occur within the contract time period. There are two conditions that 
must be met before an insurer can offer coverage against an uncertain event. The first 
is that the probability of the loss event occurring and the extent of losses likely to be 
incurred in monetary terms must be quantifiable, or estimated at least partially. The 
second condition is that the insurer should have the ability to set premiums for each 
potential policyholder. If a loss event satisfies these two conditions then, the event is 
considered to be insurable even though there are other generic insurability 
requirements.  
Extreme catastrophic events, such as natural disasters, pose a set of challenges for 
insurers because they involve potentially high and spatially correlated losses that are 
extremely uncertain to predict when calculating the premiums. Besides not meeting the 
minimum insurability conditions, natural disaster events with extremely high insured 
losses have increased significantly in the last few decades (Kleindorfer & Kunreuther, 
1999; Amendola et al., 2000; Aseervatham et al., 2013; Nguyen, 2013).  The continual 
growth in losses from disasters is increasing the existing challenges faced by the private 
insurance market for catastrophe risk. To address the global challenge posed by natural 
disasters, some countries (Turkey, Japan, France, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, 
Taiwan, USA, Australia, and Mexico) have passed regulations to intervene in the 
provision of disaster insurance coverage. There are ways in which governments can 
create conditions for a private market to emerge; by acting as a reinsurer of last resort, 
providing subsidies to catastrophe insurance, and establishing government-sponsored 
mechanisms to directly provide coverage. A common rationale for disaster assistance 
and government intervention in disaster insurance markets is that private markets fail 
to provide socially adequate levels of insurance coverage. The challenge remains to 
make such disaster insurance programs actuarially viable like other forms of coverage 
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provision. To do so requires four conditions which are entirely different to the usual 
insurability conditions; (i) a wide coverage which sometimes might be through 
compulsory insurance, (ii) reasonably fair pricing which perhaps might not be 
actuarially fair so to speak, (iii) a keen attention to the political and economic realities 
inherent in the immediate post-disaster environment, and (iv) encouragement of active 
risk management in communities prone to disasters through appropriate incentives.  
It is worth noting that catastrophic risks are characterised by two main features. First, 
many natural catastrophes, from earthquakes to hurricanes, have been shown to be fat-
tailed (Muir-Wood, 2012; Newman, 2005; Schoenberg et al., 2003). Statistically, an 
event with a fat-tailed loss distribution implies that the probability of the event declines 
slowly relative to its severity. This implies that the premium for insurance of such an 
event must be relatively higher than the expected loss because the insurer has to provide 
a large amount of capital to cover catastrophic events. The second feature of 
catastrophic risks is that losses are spatially correlated. This means that a large number 
of buildings and other properties in close proximity are simultaneously affected by the 
occurrence of a given natural disaster. Owing to this high correlation between insured 
risks, there is insufficient risk diversification among the insurance pool. Due to these 
features (fat-tailed and spatially correlated losses), increases in the number of natural 
disaster events and the uncertainty surrounding their occurrence in the last few years 
compounds the non-insurability of natural disasters in a private insurance market. This 
is due to the high-risk of insolvency for the private insurers in the aftermath of 
catastrophe losses. 
With these unique prerequisites, insurers must be able to develop reasonably accurate 
estimates of their future claims. This is helpful for setting appropriate premium rates 
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and for structuring investments to ensure efficient cash flow management, to build-up 
sufficient catastrophe reserves and to keep the probability of financial insolvency as 
low as possible. This is challenging given that low-frequency, high-severity events are 
affected by a wide range of factors and are subject to considerable ambiguity. To 
address these problems, actuaries normally utilise sophisticated modelling techniques 
to attempt to measure catastrophe risk and diversify risk exposure using risk-based 
efficient pricing methods. When efficient pricing and risk diversification mechanisms 
are employed with proper reinsurance arrangements in place, then insurers can 
potentially overcome the non-insurability problem. There are several ways by which 
insurers can manage and diversify catastrophe risk, including reducing concentration 
of exposures, modifying the terms of their insurance contracts, encouraging risk 
mitigation, purchasing reinsurance, utilising catastrophe-hedging financial instruments, 
holding more capital and establishing sufficient catastrophe reserves.  
4.2. Probabilistic Catastrophe Loss Model for Natural Disaster (Earthquake 
Model) 
There is limited natural disaster data available to reasonably determine the probability 
of losses occurring and likely severity when a disastrous event strikes. In the absence 
of historical data, insurers are cautious when they model anticipated future catastrophe 
risks. Catastrophe models serve this purpose by maximising the use of available 
information on the risk to estimate the potential losses from natural or man-made 
catastrophic events. This chapter does not aim to present a catastrophe modelling 
approach. Instead a brief conceptual discussion of the characteristics of the existing 
probabilistic catastrophe model is presented. The model used in this discussion is based 
on a progressive version of the initial catastrophe model proposed by previous 
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researchers (Grossi, Kunreuther, and Patel, 2005; Hochrainer, 2006), as is shown in 
Figure 4-1. This consists of five basic components: stochastic, hazard, a portfolio of the 
asset at risk, vulnerability, and loss. The model characterises the risk of natural disaster 
phenomena as underwritten by primary insurers. For example, in the case of earthquake 
cover, the catastrophe is characterised by its epicentre location and moment severity, 
along with other interrelated underwriting office parameters. The frequency of certain 
magnitudes or frequencies of events will also describe the hazard in question.  
A probabilistic catastrophe loss model integrates detailed database and scientific 
understanding of the highly complex physical phenomena of natural disaster events. 
The specific exceedance probability curve is computed using a multi-collaboration of 
natural hazards expertise, like seismologic and engineering expertise. This makes the 
catastrophe loss model responsive and pragmatic in modelling events of a catastrophic 
nature. However, it should not be lost that the modelling of catastrophic risk is a 
complex process that depends on subjective and objective inputs related to the natural 
disaster and underwriter’s office experience.  
 
Figure 4-1: Structural Components of the Probabilistic Catastrophe Loss Model 
 (Initially Developed By: Grossi et al. (2005), Hochrainer (2006), and Mahdyiar and 
Porter (2005)) 
Typically, the stochastic component helps in stochastic simulations, a procedure that 














founded on the scientific understanding of the catastrophe in question, to generate a 
large randomised set of potential extreme events. The hazard component incorporates 
at least three variables regarding the source parameters of the disaster: the locations of 
future events, the frequency of occurrence, and severity. It also simulates the event 
across the affected region and calculates local intensity at each affected location. For 
example, using earthquake natural disaster as a conceptual illustration to determine the 
frequency and local intensity of an earthquake, various parameters are needed, depth, 
rupture length, seismic wave amplitude, dip angle, rupture mechanism, location, and 
magnitude. The spatial distribution of past earthquakes within the region is used to 
estimate the spatial distribution for future earthquakes. Historical data on earthquake 
magnitudes are usually fitted to an exponential distribution. The Gutenberg-Richter (G-
R) relationship is used to model the occurrence rate of earthquakes and their magnitude. 
The G-R relationship states that the log of the cumulative annual frequency of an 
earthquake declines as the magnitude increases (Hochrainer, 2006; Muntendam-Bos 
and De Waal, 2013). 
 
Figure 4-2: Frequency-Magnitude Relationship of a Seismic Zone 
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The G-R relation has been the subject of extensive research by seismologists (Bird and 
Kagan, 2004; Cosentino et al., 1977; Kagan, 1991). The present situation can be 
summarised as follows; for small and moderate magnitudes of earthquakes, and for 
large space-time volumes, the G-R is valid to high accuracy. However, for the largest 
magnitudes, some more or less significant deviations have been documented by 
Pisarenko and Sornette (2004). From a statistical point of view, the study of such 
magnitudes is hampered by the insufficient number of large earthquakes. It is therefore 
inevitable that the existing models of the deviations from the G-R, and the numerous 
proposals to modify it for large magnitudes, suffer from a large statistical uncertainty. 
As a consequence, the problem of finding an adequate description of the tail property 
of the magnitude distribution cannot be considered as definitely settled.  
Let x  be a random variable that denotes an earthquake event happens at particular date 
and time, then a model of the probability distribution of x , )(xF , assumes that the G-
R law holds as far as the maximum magnitude , beyond which no earthquakes can 
occur (Cosentino et al., 1977; Pisarenko, Lyubushin, Lysenko, and Golubeva, 1996). 
This is represented by Equation 4.1; 
                           (4.1)
 
Where the parameter M  represents the maximum possible earthquake size, maxMM 
, and m  denotes the magnitude of the earthquake when it occurs as described by 
Gutenberg-Richter law. For any given number of earthquakes occurring in a large 
seismic zone then, mM  . The parameter   is denotes the slope of the Gutenberg-
Richter law at small values of x  when the probability distribution )(xF , is plotted. 
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The parameter M  plays a very important role in seismic risk assessment and in seismic 
hazard mitigation. The parameter is very useful for earthquake risk underwriters; 
having a reliable estimate of maximum magnitude, it is comparatively easy to make 
adequate decisions on the standard building code or about insurance policy pricing. The 
exposure distribution component includes details of the location and the characteristics 
of the property at risk of damage. For example, in the present case of modelling 
earthquake catastrophes for residential property, this model characterises the portfolio 
of properties at risk as precisely as possible. The underwriting factors include features 
such as construction type, the number of levels in the structure, and the property age. 
Others might include soil type, slopes of land, proximity to bodies of water or known 
fault lines. If the property is already insured, information on the nature of the policy, 
such as the deductible and sum insured or coverage limit, is also recorded. 
When quantifying the physical impact of the catastrophe on the property at risk; the 
hazard and portfolio of residential properties components enable the calculation of the 
vulnerability or susceptibility to damage, or other forms of loss, as a result of the impact 
of the hazard on the property at risk. From this measure of vulnerability, the loss to the 
property is evaluated. In essence, this step in the model quantifies the physical impact 
of the natural hazard phenomenon on the property at risk. How this vulnerability is 
quantified may differ from model to model or from one underwriting insurer to another. 
In many cases, the vulnerability component would define the loss in terms of the 
percentage of the value expected to be lost for that property type at a defined hazard 
value, specific to the exposure category. For example, the exposure could be a wooden 
single storey house in a Christchurch suburb, built in 1984, for which the vulnerability 
would convert an earthquake measuring 6.5 on the Richter scale or a peak gust wind-
speed of 248 km/h into a mean damage ratio of say 25 percent of the property’s value.  
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In the loss component, physical damage is translated to total ground-up losses. Insured 
losses are calculated by applying policy conditions to the estimates of total loss. After 
the loss estimations have been completed, they can be analysed in ways of interest to 
the stakeholders and more particularly, they are used in premium rate computations. 
Ordinarily, the output includes probability distributions of total monetary loss, as well 
as net losses after the application of insurance policy conditions for both annual 
aggregate and annual occurrence losses. 
Most theoretic research (Ermoliev and Flåm, 2001; Kesete et al., 2014; Smith and 
Matthews, 2015) is based on similar models of catastrophe risk that assumes a smooth 
aggregate total loss distribution or a distribution of a binary (that is, loss or no-loss) 
variable. While this is adequate for addressing many questions, an engineering model 
can provide a more accurate and detailed representation of the risk. Importantly, it can 
also capture the great variability that exists among individual property loss 
distributions, which is necessary to optimise the design of a portfolio of insured 
properties. 
Use of an explicit loss model also allows joint optimisation of insurance purchasing and 
retrofit decisions since the effect of the latter on the distribution of insured losses can 
influence both optimal insurer and homeowner behaviour. Despite these benefits, loss 
models have rarely been integrated into the economic catastrophe risk literature. Some 
studies (Athavale and Avila, 2011; Grossi et al., 2005; Klein and Kleindorfer, 1999) 
used loss model results from engineering, modelling firms to investigate the impact of 
mitigation on insurer losses and insolvency probabilities, and on how losses are 
distributed among stakeholders. Grossi et al. (2005) offered a useful summary of how 
catastrophe modelling can be integrated with insurance management. Other studies 
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(Hayek and Ghanem, 2004; Kesete et al., 2014) created an insurance portfolio 
optimisation model that takes input from a catastrophe model, including disaggregation 
of insured properties by location and building type. They focus on the role of the 
primary insurer and run the model with 6 locations, 10 structural types, and 34 
earthquake scenarios. Their results confirm that any pragmatic catastrophe model 
should be able to estimate (i) the probability of occurrence of a catastrophic event, (ii) 
the upper intensity limits of a particular occurrence, (iii) the financial loss that will 
result for a particular event, (iv) the cost of managing the exposure, and (v) the 
concentration and accumulation of risk.  
4.3. Need for Government Participation in Natural Disaster Insurance 
Governments may intervene in the provision of natural disaster insurance because there 
is no satisfactory solution available in the private market to achieve the specific role of 
compensation schemes which enhance higher disaster insurance penetration and 
political pressure for government intervention due to inherent natural disaster risk 
within the country.  
Private insurance markets for catastrophe risks may fail for a variety of reasons, and 
governments may try to intervene to stimulate the insurability of catastrophic risks. To 
demonstrate how the challenge faced in the natural disaster insurance market works, it 
is necessary to describe the supply and demand curves of the participants in the market. 
In standard non-catastrophe insurance, the insurance market is made-up of only two 
types of participants; individuals who buy insurance and companies that sell it. An 
individual will purchase an insurance contract so as to alter the pattern of uncertainties 
when a loss event occurs in future.  
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This is illustrated in Figure 4-3 which shows a general equilibrium in an insurance 
market in a standard Edgeworth box diagram, based on the theory proposed by a 
number of studies (Diamond and Stiglitz, 1974; Mossin, 1968; Pauly, 1974).  
 
Figure 4-3: General Equilibrium in an Insurance Market 
Note that, 1w  is used to denote wealth if there is no loss and 2w  denotes wealth if a loss 
event occurs. The convex indifference curves correspond to the policyholder, and the 
concave curves are the indifference curves of the insurer (who in this graph is assumed 
to be risk-averse). Point  is the initial point, where no insurance is transacted. A Pareto 
improvement is possible in the nested area since both policyholder and insurer reach a 
higher indifference curve compared to the initial situation at point  and are better off 
in terms of their wealth in this area than at the starting point . The realisation of a 
point in this area depends on the market perception towards risk and the underwriting 
approach of the insurers. The slope of the insurance line gives an indication of the level 
of the insurance premiums: a flatter insurance line implies a higher insurance premium 
as is shown by insurance line . There is also a probable insurance line  as clearly 






company are tangent at point  in which both the policyholder and the insurer are 
better off. This, therefore, shows a Pareto improvement compared to the initial point  
and in general point B can be regarded as a possible insurance equilibrium based on 
(Mossin, 1968). However, the uncertainties surrounding natural disasters make it 
difficult for the insurers to estimate the frequency and severity associated with a given 
catastrophe risk. In most cases, a risk-based underwriting will generate unaffordable 
premiums as shown by the high-risk premium flatter insurance line . It is clear that 
the new insurance line  has no other intersection points with the nested area. In such 
a scenario, demand for catastrophe insurance may be too low since it is not optimal for 
the policyholder to buy insurance coverage at such a high premium. At all points on 
the policyholder would be on a lower indifference curve than at the initial point . In 
order to avoid the insurance market inefficiency due to extremely high premiums, 
government interventions will be necessary. The private insurance markets would find 
it uncompetitive to offer coverage in an extreme catastrophic exposure without some 
sort of government intervention.  
Section 4.1 has described and listed some nations where government participates in 
catastrophe insurance solutions in a variety of forms. These schemes are normally 
designed to offer insurance to individuals, mostly homeowners, who would otherwise 
find it unaffordable to buy policies in the private insurance market. In designing a public 
insurance program to avoid the difficulty faced by private market, the government-
sponsored schemes should be guided by two design principles. First, government 
programs should support, not replace, private markets and direct participation by the 
private markets should be encouraged as much as possible. Second, the program must 









insurance principles must be maintained. In essence, the government insurance scheme 
must require premiums which reflect the underlying risks and must operate with a 
capital reserving strategy. Likewise, the program should not operate with subsidies that 
have the effect of encouraging individuals to develop adverse selection behaviour. 
4.3.1. Natural Disaster Insurance; the Case of Flood Insurance in the USA 
In the USA, the standard homeowner’s insurance program covers flooding and 
associated natural hazard perils. It is therefore important for property owners to have 
protection from the floods associated with hurricanes, tropical storms, heavy rains and 
other conditions that heavily impact some states in the USA. The history of flood 
insurance goes back to the aftermath of the Great Mississippi Flood of 1927, when 
private insurers decided to leave the flood insurance market. The following decades 
marked a period through which hazard-prone communities relied heavily on 
government disaster relief. The federal government established the National Flood 
Insurance Program (NFIP) in 1968 (Dacy and Kunreuther, 1969; Michel‐Kerjan and 
Kousky, 2010). NFIP was created to help provide a means for property owners to 
protect themselves financially. Managed by the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA) which maps flood risks and sets flood insurance premiums, the 
programme is designed as a voluntary partnership between the federal government and 
local communities. The FEMA creates flood maps in participating communities, 
designating the risks in different flood zones. Property owners in participating 
communities are eligible to buy federal flood insurance. This is achieved by providing 
affordable flood insurance coverage for property owners and by encouraging 
communities to adopt minimum floodplain management policies and enforce 
floodplain management regulations. These efforts help mitigate the effects of flooding 
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on new and improved structures. Overall, the program reduces the socio-economic 
impact of natural disasters by promoting the purchase and retention of risk insurance in 
general, and national flood insurance in particular.  
The NFIP provides insurance up to a maximum limit for residential property damage, 
now set at US$250,000 for building coverage and US$100,000 on contents coverage. 
The underlying principle of the program is to subsidise the cost of flood insurance on 
existing homes, in order to maintain property values, while charging actuarially fair 
rates for new constructions. Since the enactment of the NFIP, flood insurance in the 
USA has been provided mainly by the government. However, private insurance 
companies have played a pivotal role as a distribution channel and servicing the 
policies. Also, there is some private flood insurance covering claim amounts above the 
NFIP residential cap for flood losses, and under certain special commercial insurance 
policies, even though this represents only a small portion of the market today. 
As at 1st January 2014, there were over 5.4 million flood insurance policies in force in 
the USA managed through a federal program which generated US$3.53 billion in 
premiums for a total of US$1.28 trillion of assets under coverage (Atreya et al., 2015). 
The average annual premium per policy for residential cover stood at US$645 
nationwide. The three key important facts about the standard flood insurance policy 
are; (i) It is a single-peril (flood) policy that pays for direct physical damage to insured 
property up to the replacement cost value (Replacement Cost Value - RCV - is the cost 
to replace that part of a building that is damaged without depreciation) or Actual Cash 
Value (Actual Cash Value - ACV - is Replacement Cost Value at the time of loss, less 
the value of physical depreciation) of the actual damages or the policy limit of liability, 
whichever is less. The contents coverage must be purchased separately. (ii) It is not a 
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valued policy. A valued policy pays the limit of liability in the event of a total loss. For 
example, say a home is totally destroyed by a fire and it costs US$350,000 to rebuild. 
If the homeowner’s insurance policy is a valued policy with a US$400,000 limit of 
liability on the building, the insured would receive US$400,000. Flood insurance pays 
just the replacement cost or actual cost of real damages, up to the policy limit, in essence 
this avoid over-insurance. (c) It is not a guaranteed replacement cost policy. A 
guaranteed replacement cost policy pays the cost to rebuild the home regardless of the 
limit of liability. For example, a property is totally destroyed by a fire and it costs 
US$400,000 to rebuild. If the homeowner’s insurance policy is a guaranteed 
replacement cost policy with a US$350,000 limit of liability on the building, the insured 
would still receive US$400,000. Flood insurance does not pay more than the policy 
limit.  
Although the program has been in operation for over 45 years, academic research on its 
operation and the demand for flood insurance through the NFIP is fairly recent. Browne 
and Hoyt (2000) provide the first empirical analyses of homeowners’ demand for flood 
insurance through a state-level analysis across the USA. Their empirical analysis 
suggests that both price and income are influential factors in one’s decision to purchase 
flood insurance, and flood insurance purchases at the state level are found to be highly 
correlated with the losses in the state during the prior year. Kriesel and Landry (2004) 
used household-level data from coastal zones in the USA to examine participation in 
NFIP for nine south-eastern counties. They find participation responsiveness to price 
to be inelastic while respondents with higher incomes were more likely to have flood 
insurance, with an elasticity. This implies that higher income households are more 
likely to purchase flood insurance, a finding that suggests that flood insurance is viewed 
as a normal good. Three studies have looked at specific states or cities. Zahran et al. 
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(2009) showed that household flood insurance purchases in Florida correlate strongly 
with local government mitigation activities. Additionally, they also showed that NFIP 
policy take-up correlates positively with prior flood experience, local hazard proximity 
conditions such as a land area in a floodplain, and the educational attainment levels of 
individuals in a locality. Michel‐Kerjan and Kousky (2010) reported that the majority 
of policies in Florida are located within the FEMA-defined high-risk floodplains. 
Kousky (2010) examined the demand for flood insurance in St. Louis, Missouri, and 
noted that the take-up rates increase with more land in the high-risk floodplains and the 
rates decline with levee protection along major rivers. However, most of these papers 
have not examined the supply and demand for insurance contracts post major 
catastrophic event holistically at the primary level where the direct insurers, individual 
insureds, and reinsurers interact. Grace et al. (2003) point out that, analysing the supply 
and demand for residential property insurance after a mega-disaster and integrating this 
analysis with research on risk diversification and mitigation is critically essential in 
order to formulate a complete picture of the catastrophe risk problem and to evaluate 
viable solutions. 
4.3.2. Natural Disaster Insurance; the Case of Earthquake Insurance in the 
USA 
The California Earthquake Authority (CEA) was established by the California 
legislature in 1995 following the 1994 Northridge earthquake, which cost US$12.5 
billion in insured losses and triggered an insurance availability crisis (Marlett and 
Pacini, 1999; Roth Jr, 1998). Designed to preserve the state-mandated offer of 
earthquake coverage, the CEA required the participation of 70 percent of California 
homeowner insurers before it could begin operation. Insurers choosing not to 
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participate are required to offer a similar brand of earthquake coverage to residential 
policyholders. The CEA commenced operation in late 1996 and allowed the 
policyholders of all participating insurers to purchase earthquake coverage directly 
from it. As of September 2004, the program insured approximately 724,000 
policyholders, generating approximately US$393 million of written premium annually 
(Jaffee, 2015). The CEA offers a scaled-down policy covering homes and certain 
apartment buildings, but not other structures such as swimming pools and garages. 
Contents coverage is limited to US$5,000; additional living expenses are capped at 
US$1,500. The standard deductible on the home and its contents is 15 percent and is 
applied to the total loss. The CEA also offers supplemental coverage that decreases the 
deductible to 10 percent and increases contents coverage to as much as US$100,000. 
Factors used to determine premiums include the location of the dwelling, the year it 
was built, and the type of construction. The pricing model takes information from every 
CEA earthquake policy and simulates earthquakes of varying magnitudes in various 
locations throughout the state. The model accounts for; (i) type of home (house, 
condominium), (ii) construction method (wood-frame, masonry), (iii) age of the 
construction, (iv) soil types, and (v) proximity to fault lines. To determine the 
earthquake risk for an area, scientists and engineers at the CEA’s computer modelling 
firm take data from a variety of highly respected sources. The computer model 
scientifically estimates the average annual loss to the CEA by estimating losses within 
each postal (ZIP) code. In other words, given its book of insurance policies, on average, 
how much insured earthquake loss is expected to occur? The combined losses of all ZIP 
codes produces the appropriate state-wide rate. Regional differences in rates are 
established by comparing expected losses from one ZIP code to another. Those who 
live in a ZIP code close to an earthquake fault line or with predominantly poor soil can 
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expect to pay more than those on firm soil, away from fault lines. The resulting rate 
determines the premium for a CEA policy. Depending on its date of construction, a 
house that has been retrofitted may be entitled to a 5 percent premium discount. The 
CEA’s actuaries place ZIP codes that present similar seismic risk into rating zones. 
Although the risk is not exactly the same for each ZIP code in a rating zone, the risks 
are similar enough to justify the zone groupings. This method of establishing rating 
zones produces rates that are more affordable. Affordable rates, in turn, permit the CEA 
to meet its goal of offering sound earthquake insurance to all Californians. More 
importantly, the CEA sells its policy through its participating insurers, who offer 
coverage to homeowners, condominium owners, and renters throughout California. It 
also provides retrofit assistance to help people protect their houses against earthquakes. 
The CEA funding plan totals approximately US$6.73 billion, which should enable the 
fund to survive a 1–in–800 year event (McAneney et al., 2016). Structured in layers, 
the fund is made up of monies from premiums, contributions from an assessment on 
member insurance companies, borrowed funds, reinsurance, and returns on invested 
funds. Unlike the New Zealand’s EQC, no public funds are pledged or available to 
cover CEA-insured losses. If an earthquake causes damage greater than the CEA’s 
claims-paying capacity, a very unlikely possibility, policyholders will be paid on a 
prorated basis. The prorated claims would be calculated on the basis of the total amount 
of expected claims compared to the remaining available funds. 
4.3.3. Natural Disaster Insurance; the Case of Earthquake Insurance in Japan 
The 1966 Earthquake Insurance Law (enacted after the Niigata earthquake of 1964) 
established the Japanese earthquake reinsurance (JER), to whom private nonlife 
insurers were obliged to offer earthquake insurance and cede 100 percent of the 
84 
 
earthquake premium and liabilities (Tsubokawa, 2004). The JER thus acts as the sole 
earthquake reinsurer for the private insurance market. The JER can be looked at as an 
earthquake reinsurance pool, retaining a portion of the liability and ceding the rest back 
to private insurers based on their underwriting capacity and to the Japanese government 
through reinsurance treaties. The reinsurance program is designed such that the liability 
of private insurers and the JER itself does not exceed the accumulated reserves from 
earthquake insurance premiums. The JER program was revised in May 2011 after the 
Great East Japan earthquake (GEJE). The total claims-paying capacity of the program 
is currently ¥5,500 billion (US$45 billion), which is estimated to correspond to the 
scenario of the 1923 Great Kanto earthquake with a return period of 220 years. Should 
insured earthquake losses exceed this amount, claims would be prorated accordingly. 
The role of the Japanese government is central to the program. The maximum liability 
of the government of Japan, JER, and private insurers is 87%, 10%, and 3%, 
respectively. It should be noted that under the previous reinsurance program (before 
May 2011), the government’s liability was only 78 percent, and the rest was shared 
equally between the JER and private insurers. The revision of the reinsurance program, 
leading to an increase of the government’s liability share, is the direct consequence of 
a depletion of the earthquake reserves of both the JER and private insurers after the 
GEJE (Mahul and White, 2012). 
Earthquake insurance offered by private non-life insurance companies is available as 
an optional endorsement to fire insurance policies. Earthquake coverage is available at 
policy limits of 30%-50% of the fire insurance limit, with maximum limits of ¥50 
million (US$400,000) per dwelling and ¥10 million (US$80,000) for personal property 
(Benfield, 2011). A three-step claims settlement allows for rapid damage assessment 
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and claims settlement. Payouts are not proportional to damage, but based on a three-
step system; total loss, half loss, and partial loss which allow for 100%, 50%, and 5% 
of the earthquake insurance policy limit, respectively. 
The premium rates are risk-based and vary according to the prefecture where the 
dwelling is located (divided into eight risk zones) and type of construction (wooden or 
non-wooden). For an insured amount of ¥10 million (US$80,000), the annual premium 
varies between ¥5,000 (US$45) for a non-wooden structure in Nagazaki Prefecture, and 
¥31,300 (US$255) for a wooden structure in Tokyo. Discount rates of up to 30 percent 
apply when the building is earthquake resistant, according to the Japanese Housing 
Performance Designation Standards, including a 10 percent discount for buildings 
constructed after 1981. The premium rates, calculated by the Non-Life Insurance Rating 
Organization, consist of the pure premium rate and a loading factor. The rates do not 
include any loading for profit since the program is not for profit. Despite this rating and 
because of Japan’s considerable earthquake exposure, rates are still considered high 
(Mahul and White, 2012). 
Residential earthquake insurance is also available through cooperative mutual insurers. 
These insurers conduct insurance operations on behalf of Japan’s cooperative societies. 
The largest of these cooperatives is JA Kyosai, which holds an estimated 85 percent 
market share of all the homeowners’ insurance written through cooperative mutual 
insurers. Like any cooperative, JA Kyosai operates on a non-profit basis. Its insurance 
products are different from those of private insurers. Cooperative mutual insurers offer 
building endowment policies: these policies offer more comprehensive coverage than 
the policies available through the private insurers and can be seen as a savings 
mechanism that provides funding for home repairs, whether caused by natural disasters 
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or other adverse events. The five-year (or longer) term policy automatically covers 
residential dwellings and personal property from damage caused by fire, flood, 
earthquakes, and other natural disasters. Unique to co-operative insurance is that, if the 
policy expires and the policyholder has not claimed a total loss, he or she is entitled to 
a partial refund of the premium.  
Earthquake insurance is automatically included in the building endowment policies 
offered by JA Kyosai. The policy limit is 50 percent of the fire insurance limit, up to 
¥250 million (US$2 million). The average fire insurance amount is ¥30 million 
(US$245,000), hence the average earthquake insurance limit is ¥15 million 
(US$123,000) (Hikichi et al., 2016). Under the building endowment policy available 
through JA Kyosai, the claims settlement process in case of an earthquake is 
proportional; a loss assessor estimates the damage percentage of the house, and this rate 
is applied to the earthquake policy limit. The premium rate is flat; the same wherever 
the dwelling is located. It only differs according to the structural material whether the 
building is a wooden or non-wooden structure. Co-operative mutual insurers are not 
subject to the Earthquake Insurance Law and do not participate in the JER but cede a 
significant portion of their liabilities to the international reinsurance market. They work 
outside the nonlife insurance regulatory framework and are instead accountable to the 
respective ministries; for example, JA Kyosai reports to the Ministry of Agriculture, 
Forestry, and Fisheries. Penetration under the private nonlife insurance program is 
estimated at about 25 percent of Japanese households, with slightly less than 13 million 
residential earthquake insurance policies in force: an estimated 48 percent of all fire 
insurance policies in force include earthquake coverage. Co-operative mutual insurance 
programs cover about 14 percent of Japanese households so that total penetration is 
estimated at 39 percent (Mahul and White, 2012). 
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4.3.4. Natural Disaster Insurance; the Case of Earthquake Insurance in Turkey 
In Turkey, the state is legally obliged to finance the costs of recovery and reconstruction 
of buildings after an earthquake. This responsibility of the state naturally brings an 
unplanned burden upon the Turkish economy with very limited central budget 
allocation in the occasions of a natural disaster. In the aftermath of the two major 
earthquakes in 1999, the Government of Turkey decided to enforce the earthquake 
insurance on the nationwide basis with the sole purpose of privatising the potential risk 
by offering insurance via the Turkish Catastrophic Insurance Pool (TCIP) and then 
exporting the major part of this risk to the international reinsurance and capital markets 
(Bommer et al., 2002). While this measure was aimed at reducing government’s fiscal 
exposure in the event of a major catastrophic earthquake, it was also intended to 
encourage risk mitigation and safer construction practices. To achieve these goals all 
registered residential dwellings in Turkey (the total number currently is about 19 
million) are required to be in the compulsory earthquake insurance coverage.  
Initially funded by the World Bank, the TCIP program became effective as of March 
2001 and is currently one of the most renowned insurance brands in the Turkish 
insurance market. High brand recognition and increasing earthquake insurance 
awareness among homeowners gives leverage to the take-up rate in earthquake 
insurance (TCIP policy count was about two million as of September 2004, increasing 
to 7 million by the end of 2014). 
The aim of TCIP is to provide an adequate level of protection with affordable 
premiums. Therefore, the maximum coverage of compulsory insurance is currently at 
approximately US$62,500 as of 1st February 2006. The sum insured is calculated by 
multiplying the size of the dwelling in square meters by construction prices per square 
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meter, which vary for different classes of construction. Construction prices for all 
classes of construction are adjusted periodically in line with changes in the construction 
cost index published periodically by the government. If the value of a dwelling exceeds 
this amount, policyholders can buy additional coverage from private insurance 
companies. To keep premium rates affordable, the TCIP does not cover dwelling 
contents, debris removal, and temporary living expenses. The California Earthquake 
Authority in the USA and the EQC in New Zealand, to a certain extent, do not always 
cover these items. The TCIP policy offers coverage on a first-loss basis, meaning that 
it does not impose underinsurance penalties when the value of a dwelling is 
significantly higher than the limit of coverage obtained from the TCIP. Unlike the CEA, 
which imposes a deductible of 10 percent, the TCIP applies a minimum 2 percent 
deductible to the sum insured to avoid small claims, reduce moral hazard and reduce 
the pools’ administrative and reinsurance cost. 
4.4. Discussion and Conclusions 
The USA disaster insurance system has received the most research attention because of 
regular catastrophic losses that have seen the insurance industry face liabilities far 
beyond the solvency position. The same challenges are faced by insurance firms 
operating in other disaster-prone territories. The global challenge faced by private 
insurance markets to insure catastrophe risk, and the possible solutions to address these 
challenges, have been comprehensively discussed in this chapter. Extreme catastrophic 
events, such as natural disasters, pose a set of challenges for insurers because they 
involve potentially high and spatially correlated losses that are extremely uncertain to 
predict when calculating the premiums. It has been shown that the insurance premium 
of such an event must be relatively higher than the expected loss because the insurer 
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has to provide a large amount of capital in case of catastrophic events. The demand for 
catastrophe insurance would then be too low since it is not optimal for the policyholder 
to buy insurance coverage at such a high premium. The private insurance markets 
would therefore find it uncompetitive to offer coverage in an extreme catastrophe 
exposure without some sort of government intervention. In order to avoid the insurance 
market inefficiency due to extremely high premiums, government interventions are 
necessary. In designing a public insurance program to avoid the difficulty faced by 
private insurance market for a natural disaster, the government-sponsored schemes 
should be guided by two design principles. First, government program should support, 
rather than replace the private insurance markets and direct participation by the private 
insurance markets should be encouraged as much as possible. Second, the program 
must generate actuarially fair rates and sufficient capital and reserves based on standard 
insurance principles must be maintained. 
But despite the uncertainty due to changes in insurance, risk-based pricing is an 
important step in encouraging individuals and organisations to put risk mitigation in 
place and to improve disaster resilience. From another perspective risk-based actuarial 
pricing alleviates the moral hazard problem of insurance consumers who think that they 
do not need to mitigate risks on the grounds of being insured, as is suggested in Brown 
et al. (2016), and Schuster (2013). However, due to increased occurrence of 
catastrophes and the changing nature of disasters, risk-based pricing could mean that 
those who cannot afford mitigation measures also cannot afford insurance and the 
private insurance industry cannot effectively meet two of the most important objective 
besides indemnifications. They ought to provide information to those residing in 
hazard-prone areas as to the nature of risks they face and incentivising those at risk to 
undertake loss reduction measures in anticipation of future disasters. Therefore, there 
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is a need for both private insurers and public disaster managers to develop a strategy on 
how to reduce losses from future natural disasters as well as to appreciate the limitations 
of individuals and organisations in dealing with low-probability, high-magnitude events 



















5. OPTIMAL INSURANCE DEMAND BASED ON AN INTERTEMPORAL 
MODEL 
5.0. Introduction 
In the aftermath of 2010-11 Christchurch earthquakes, a number of fundamental market 
shifts occurred in the New Zealand insurance industry. This alludes to the fact that, 
post-disaster insurance market changes are not exceptional within the insurance market 
context. It is globally observed that a unique type of market adjustment effect occurs 
when a major disaster event occurs (Auffret, 2003). This affects both demand and 
supply sides of the insurance market. The focus of this chapter is to examine the effects 
generated by post-loss experience from an insurance demand side standpoint. The 
influence of post-loss experience on insurance demand decisions appears in particular 
on insurance markets for catastrophic risk. For example in California, before the 1989 
San Francisco earthquake, 34 percent of the individuals considered insurance against 
an earthquake as an unimportant undertaking. But after the earthquake, only 5 percent 
held this opinion. Likewise, the earthquake occurrence increased insurance demand 
with 11 percent of the previously non-insured individuals subscribing an insurance 
contract Kunreuther (1996). 
This chapter presents a basic theoretical model that examines insurance demand post-
loss based on a two-period intertemporal approach. The chapter gives an in-depth 
analysis and discussion of the performance of the proposed insurance model that 
examines insurance demand response after a loss event has happened.  
 The chapter is organised as follows: Section 5.1 reviews and discusses the background 
of previous insurance demand models. Section 5.2 sets an introduction to the theory on 
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intertemporal insurance demand. This section also discusses the underlying research 
question in this chapter: That is, how demand for insurance changes post-catastrophe 
and how to model it theoretically.  Section 5.3 presents both analytical and numerical 
illustrations of the proposed insurance model. Sub-section 5.3.1 gives the analytical 
framework and the properties of the intertemporal model. Sub-section 5.3.2 presents an 
illustrative example of intertemporal modelling using hypothetical datasets. Section 5.4 
gives a discussion of several findings that can be drawn from the simulation results and 
conclusions. 
5.1. Previous Insurance Demand Models and Where the Present Study Stands 
Most of the previous analysis on the demand for insurance focuses on insurance in 
isolation within a single period time horizon. Using static models, most of the literature 
assumes there is only one area of uncertainty in the insurance analysis. Some studies 
(Arrow, 1963, 1965; Dreze, 1981; Mossin, 1968; Raviv, 1979; Smith, 1968) are 
credited for their enormous contributions to the analysis of insurance demand in a static 
setting. With such models, the question of the choice of the level of insurance coverage 
is not a simple one. Mossin (1968) shows that it is not optimal to purchase full insurance 
when insurance policies are not actuarially fairly priced. These classical models of 
insurance demand as described in a number of studies (Arrow, 1965, 1974; Dreze, 
1981; Mossin, 1968) have an important deficiency arising from their static features. 
One clear deficiency is that, in single period models, wealth and consumption are 
exactly the same variables. A second deficiency lies in the fact that these models do not 




Briys, Kahane, and Kroll (1988) and Mayers and Smith (1983) introduced multiple 
sources of uncertainty in the analysis of the demand for insurance. More specifically, 
Mayers and Smith (1983) examined the interrelationship between insurance holdings 
and other portfolio decisions and found that the combined analysis leads to different 
predictions about insurance demand. Extending some of the results obtained by these 
studies and using the notion of prudence as first introduced in Kimball (1991), 
Eeckhoudt and Kimball (1992) documents a detailed impact of background risk on the 
optimal coverage.  
Building on this new dynamic approach to insurance analyses, Gollier (2003) examined 
a simple consumption lifecycle model where the representative consumer faces a 
sequence of independent risks over his lifetime. The implicit assumption made in this 
study is that the policyholders must transform immediately the retained loss into a 
corresponding reduction in demand. This assumption implies that utility for wealth, and 
the attitude towards risk, are constant over time. But in the real world, people mostly 
compensate for losses to their wealth by reducing their saving or by borrowing money 
rather than just reducing their demand over several periods. In Gollier (2002) it is shown 
that a time-consistent cooperative multiplicity strategy provokes consumers to be much 
more risk susceptible than in the static version of the model. Because of time 
multiplicity, the attitude towards risk on wealth and towards risk on consumption is not 
the same, specifically the aversion to risk on wealth should be smaller than the aversion 
to risk on consumption. Meyer and Meyer (2004) suggested that a lower degree of risk 
aversion for wealth in a multi-period setting translates to depressed demand and welfare 
gains from insurance. Two reasons are given for these results. First, consumers are keen 
to consume immediately rather than to perfectly smooth their consumption over time, 
which implies that they do not adopt a perfect dynamic strategy. Second, they usually 
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face cash constraints, and when funds are needed, policyholders cannot withdraw to 
compensate for the loss, hence they are obliged to absorb incurred losses immediately. 
Gollier (2003) concluded that the ability of consumers to self-insure by accumulating 
wealth induces them to significantly reduce their demand for insurance relative to what 
the classical model suggests. However, consumers have a positive insurance demand 
when they have been unlucky enough to incur a sequence of accidents in the recent 
past, which reduce their accumulated wealth.  
The model that this research proposes is in close agreement with Cohen et al. (2008) 
which examines the implications of a model for multi-period demand decisions on the 
insurance market. Cohen et al. (2008) looked at the optimal insurance demand strategy 
of a consumer for a three-year period when the consumer faces a risk of loss in each 
period. Assuming that the estimated probability of incurring a loss is known and those 
losses in successive periods are independent; they looked at a perfectly competitive 
insurance market proposing insurance contracts at actuarially fair premia corresponding 
to the estimated expected loss. In this case, insurance contracts are subscribed for one 
period. Therefore, the consumer has to choose an amount of coverage characterised by 
the indemnity and premium at each period. Their study revealed that an individual is 
optimistic in the initial period and modifies his risk perception with respect to damages 
occurring or not. The occurrence of damage modifies the individual’s risk perception 
and he becomes less optimistic, while if no damage occurs, his risk perception does not 
change. To better isolate the risk perception arguments, the researchers assumed that 
preferences at the final period are represented by a linear utility function under 
certainty, and the individual chooses not to buy any insurance contract in the first 
period. In the second period, one chooses not to be covered only if he had no damage. 
Finally, in the third period, if one had never had loss, he/she chooses not to buy 
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insurance. If he/she had two consecutive loss events, he/she decides to buy a full 
coverage contract and in the intermediate cases, he is indifferent. This interesting 
example underscores the fact that what is important for the agent is not only the event 
occurring in the period directly preceding the moment of the decision but all sequence 
of events. In the end, the insurance demand example of Cohen et al. (2008) explains the 
modifications in insurance demand behaviour over time observed for catastrophic risk. 
Based on their findings, it appears that past experiences have cumulative effects on 
insurance decisions in the sense that an individual can maintain constant insurance 
demand after one occurrence of the loss and modify it only after two or more 
consecutive loss events. In this case, it is assumed that at any period, observing a loss 
renders the individual more pessimistic. This explains a behaviour in accordance with 
the availability bias which shows that individuals become more and more optimistic 
after experiencing losses. 
The present study looks into a slightly different but related literature. A standard model 
of precautionary saving has an agent in period one with no risk; facing a risk in period 
two. The agent can, therefore, save some wealth in period one in order to offset the 
negative effects of the risk in period two. This is called “precautionary saving”. Kimball 
(1991) refers to the precautionary saving motive as “prudence” which can cause an 
agent to respond to risk by accumulating more wealth; essentially this is similar to 
insurance that can be bought. The distinction is that precautionary saving adds to the 
resources one would have in the subsequent future periods, while insurance increases 
the resources available after a loss event occurs and reduces the available resources 
under good conditions. The concept of prudence is more useful for analysing the 
demand for insurance in the presence of background risk, since insurance as mentioned 
above, like precautionary saving, is a way of increasing the resources available in the 
96 
 
event of a bad outcome. The premium, in this case, is the loss of consumption in period 
one, and the expected indemnity is the reduction in risk or reduction in the effect of risk 
in period two because of the saving indemnity. The current study suggests that prudence 
and the intertemporal literature would be interesting if looked at together because there 
are two innovations in such demand model. One of the innovations is the dynamic 
intertemporal setting in it and the other is the separation between the risk and the 
indemnity.  
This analysis combines different literature results and sets up a dynamic intertemporal 
model, however, this is not the first study to do so. Other studies have already 
considered insurance demand in a dynamic setting (Cooper & Hayes, 1987; Schlesinger 
2000; Cohen et al., 2008; Volkman-Wise 2015). Most of these studies do not allow 
agents to transfer wealth between different periods and only consider situations where 
consumers only differ in their accident probability. When considering the proposed 
model, there are new contributions to the insurance dynamic aspects. First, the model 
incorporates a parameter on probability updating in an effort to explain why demand 
for coverage might increase after a loss event in the previous period. Secondly, since 
there is no consumption decision, the only effect of the first period decision on the 
second period decision is through wealth, and all of the standard parameters in period 
two like the probability of loss, premium price etc. Finally, the model provides a unique 
way to study the effects of increases in risk aversion, increases in the premium, and 
increases in the perceived probability of loss to the demand for insurance in different 
periods. This is an important extension to the literature of dynamic insurance models. 
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5.2. Methodology  
5.2.1. The Theory of the Intertemporal Model  
The underlying research question in this chapter is how the demand for insurance 
changes post-catastrophe, and how to model it theoretically. To address this question, 
this chapter proposes an intertemporal dynamic model which significantly departs from 
the popular models in the economic theory of insurance but utilises much of the existing 
literature findings. The intertemporal dynamic model investigates the insurance 
consumption decision in an intertemporal setting where an agent is allowed to update 
their insurance demand, initial wealth and a host of other risk and consumption decision 
parameters in the subsequent periods.  
In this intertemporal model, insurance can be sought in two sequential periods of time, 
and at the second period, it is known whether or not a loss event happened in period 
one. Thus, it is possible to model the demand for insurance in period two conditional 
upon the loss event happening or not in period one. Above all, the model incorporates 
a parameter on probability updating (that is, when a loss event happens in period one, 
the consumer increases the probability belief for a loss event in period two) in an effort 
to explain why demand for coverage might increase after a loss event. The model 
assumes that for the first period and in successive periods the estimated probability of 
incurring losses are independent. In essence, then, the intertemporal model of insurance 
is restricted to only two periods, with an identical insurable risk in each period and 
identical insurance supply characteristics in each period. 
In period one, a decision is made on insurance, and then the period one risk is allowed 
to play out. Any wealth that is not lost as uninsured losses or premium payments in 
period one is passed to period two. Then, a decision is made on insurance in period two. 
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It should be noted that the period two decision is made with full information on both 
the amount of insurance contracted in period one and the outcome of the period one 
contract, that is, if a loss occurs or not. Since the inherited wealth in period two depends 
upon the insurance decision in period one, it happens that the insurance decision in 
period two is expressible as a function of the decision in period one. 
Therefore in this model, it is easy to consider the comparison between (i) period two 
insurance conditional upon a loss in period one and conditional upon no loss in period 
one, and (ii) period two insurance (either with or without loss event in period one) and 
the period one insurance demand. 
The pure theoretical results are derived in the next section. It turns out that the model 
is an interesting extension to the standard model of demand for insurance, which is 
based on a single period. So, in the end, the model generates results that can be 
compared to and contrasted with, those of the standard environment. More 
innovatively, this model provides unique contributions to the theory of insurance 
demand. In particular, then, the first novelty is the fact that the model provides a natural 
theoretical way to establish how the demand for insurance is affected by the size of the 
loss suffered in the previous period, that is the post-loss insurance demand. Second, the 
model provides a unique way to study the effects of increases in risk aversion, increases 
in the premium, and increases in the perceived probability of loss to the demand for 
insurance especially when this occurs in a different period. Therefore, an agent is able 
to make a decision on the model’s variables using an intertemporal approach, which is 
not in the existing literature. 
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5.2.2. Analytical Framework 
Take an intertemporal perspective, with two consecutive periods. This analysis studies 
the insurance demand strategy of an individual for the two consecutive periods of time. 
In each period, a loss can occur, and insurance coverage can be sought in both periods. 
Assume there exists an insurer willing to offer insurance contracts that provide positive 
expected profit5. Assume the same loss in each period and that the individual faces a 
risk of loss of amount L  at each period. An insurance contract tC , where .2,1t  is 
proposed for one period. Thus, individuals have to make a decision on the choice of the 
amount of coverage at each period. The insurance contract offers indemnity tI  in return 
of premium t . Assume further that for each decision (insurance) period the estimated 
probability of incurring a loss is p  and that losses in the consecutive periods are 
independent such that: 
ptt  )1 periodin  /loss perodat  P(loss . 
The outcome of the first-period, a situation which is governed by chance, will impact 
upon the choice to be made in period two. In the same way, the choice made in period 
one will impact upon the choice made in period two. For instance, in a simple two-
dimensional loss situation, in period one a level of insurance coverage  is purchased 
against a loss amount  that happens with probability p . If , that is partial 
coverage was purchased, and if the loss happens, then in period two wealth is lower 
than it would otherwise have been by the amount of uninsured losses. This will impact 
upon the decision made in period two. 
                                                 
5 If the contracts were actuarially fair, the insured would only purchase full coverage always. We need, 
therefore, that the contracts be actuarially unfair, or in other words, that they offer positive expected 





Thus, in period two, the optimal insurance choice, , will be a function of (i) the size 
of loss in period one (at this point, either loss or no loss), (ii) the amount of coverage in 
period one, and (iii) all of the standard parameters in period two (probability of loss, 
premium price, etc.). The size of period one´s loss and the level of period one´s 
coverage will impact upon the level of initial wealth in period two. 
It is also assumed that 
1w denotes the amount of initial wealth in period one.  is the 
level of initial period two wealth conditional upon a loss occurring in period one, and 
 is the level of initial period two wealth conditional upon no loss occurring in period 
one. Insurance is priced linearly, such that an indemnity of C  costs qC , where 
1 qp . The model also introduces an intertemporal preference parameter  , which 
is used to measure period two utility in period one utility units. 
Now, the consumer's problem is to choose  to maximise the function (Equation 5.1); 
         (5.1)
 
Where  maximises                            (5.2) 
Since  will be a function of  for  this is a problem that needs to be solved 
recursively using backward induction. Starting then with the two optimisation problems 
in period two, this gives optimal choice functions . If a loss in period one leads 
to greater insurance in period two than if no loss happened in period one, then 
. Moreover, if a loss in period one leads to more insurance in period 
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the two functions  have been found, it is then possible to do the first period 
optimisation problem and find the optimal choice for . 
Observation 1. If the consumer is only partially insured in period one, and a loss event 
does happen, then initial wealth in period two would be lower by the amount of 
uninsured loss. So by under-insuring, the consumer causes a larger decrease in period 
two wealth when a loss happens in period one, but a higher period two wealth if a loss 
does not happen in period one (since the period one premium would be lower). 
Standard Result: Under decreasing absolute risk aversion, Observation 1 would also 
imply a greater demand for coverage in period two. But this is conditional on a loss 
happening in period one, and partial coverage.  
As an example, use  which is constant relative risk aversion (CRRA), and 
for which . Start with the period two choices; we need to choose  to 
maximise .  
The first-order condition is expressed in Equation 5.3; 
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Thus, in this case, we get the expression presented in Equation 5.4; 
              (5.4)
 
If we set  then the optimal insurance purchase in period two is 
expressed as shown in Equation 5.5; 
                                     (5.5)
 
It can be noted that the only difference between the two options is the size of initial 
wealth, . Thus, we now have Equation 5.6; 
                                     (5.6)
 
Since the denominator of this is positive, the effect of larger initial wealth upon the 
optimal insurance purchase is positive if , and negative if . But if 
 in other words that is, if . This is the condition for positive 
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is . Assuming partial insurance in period one, it is expected that , that is 
smaller initial period two wealth if a loss is suffered in period one than if not. In this 
case, then, the period two insurance purchase is greater after a period one loss has 
happened than when a period one loss did not happen. 




                                                            (5.7)
 
In order to continue, an assumption is made on how the period one outcome affects 
period two initial wealth.  
Assumption 1: In both periods, wealth is simply the level of inherited wealth from the 
previous period plus an intertemporally constant wage of amount, . That means, 
savings are rewarded with an interest rate of zero, and that there is no consumption 
outside of insurance in period one. 
This assumption now gives Equations 5.8 and 5.9; 
 wLqCw  )1(11                                                                                (5.8)
 
 wqCw  11                                                                                              (5.9)
 
When the period one insurance choice is made, the consumer now maximises as per 
equation 5.10; 
              (5.10)
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Equations 5.8 - 5.11 are as a result of assumption one and its defining conditions (5.8) 
and (5.9). Equations 5.8 and 5.9 imply that there is no consumption. The wealth in the 
second period is simply the wealth of the first period minus loss plus income. However, 
there is still utility derived from this wealth, but the model doesn’t expound on what 
this utility is derived from. It cannot be consumption as that would reduce the 
transferred wealth. In most cases, models of insurance in an intertemporal setting have 
to be solved both over insurance demand and consumption choices. As it stands, the 
model needs some improvement in the future more so on the effect of consumption 
decision and corresponding methodology to solve a bivariate optimization problem. 
Next is an illustrative example of the model numerically. The properties of this model 
have been demonstrated both analytically then numerically that  and 
how  relates to ; this is also supported by the assumption of a CRRA utility 
function. The two derivations are important because the numerical illustration alone 
can only be reduced to a single point in a graph.  
5.2.3. Numerical Illustration of the Intertemporal Model    
This section uses hypothetical values to demonstrate how insurance demand changes 
pre- and post-loss and how it compares with insurance demand based on empirical data 
from both the demand and the supply sides of the market. The insurance scenario 
described by the intertemporal framework model using hypothetical values is simulated 
and results are shown in the following scenario.  
Given the parameters; 
1w    
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So the optimum is at 25.070. 
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Comparing this to the solution for the case without intertemporal consideration, 
 
Candidate(s) for extrema: , at . 
Therefore optimum is at 23.837. 
 
Figure 5-2: Optimal insurance coverage without intertemporal consideration 
Results of the numerical simulation are plotted in Figure 1 and Figure 2. It can be clearly 
seen that the optimal insurance demand when there is an intertemporal consideration is 
at 25.070 whereas when there is not the intertemporal consideration, the optimal 
insurance demand is at 23.837. 
So, for this example at least, taking into account the intertemporal nature increases 
insurance demand, finally; 
 
 
So, insurance demand after loss increases by 9.2 percent (that is, from 25.070 to 
27.365), and the demand if no loss falls by 2.9 percent (that is, from 25.070 to 24.349). 
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The principal findings in this analysis indicate that insurance demand increases 
immediately after the loss event. This is in line with the availability bias which 
corresponds to an overestimation of the probability of an event that recently occurred 
and implies an increase in insurance demand after a natural disaster, this demand being 
low after a long period without a catastrophe. However, the result found does not rely 
in any way on probability estimation bias or errors.  
5.3. Discussion and Conclusions 
This chapter provides a theoretical explanation for the observation on insurance demand 
post-loss. Several findings can be drawn from the model’s results. First, it is notable 
that using the theoretical intertemporal model proposed in this analysis; (i) period one 
demand for insurance increases relative to the standard single period model, when the 
period two is taken into consideration, (ii) period two insurance demand is higher post-
loss, higher than both the period one demand, and the period two demand without a 
period one loss. 
Second, when the intertemporal model results are compared to the findings from 
previous studies on the insurance demand, it can be inferred that insurers will tighten 
the underwriting criteria when the insurance demand increases post-loss. Positive 
changes in the insurance demand will increase the cost of insurance cover in the short-
run. Two major policy implication outcomes of increases in insurance demand post-
loss based on Christchurch earthquakes is that; (i) deductibles changing from a  
percentage of the claim to a  percentage of the insured value, and (ii) stringent risk-
based underwriting measures in attempt to address any adverse selection behaviour that 
may emerge from the high-risk individuals. 
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Lastly, this analysis is still incomplete in a number of important ways. The model has 
restricted the analytical analysis by requiring certain assumptions. The critical 
limitation of model analysis is the Assumption 1 and its defining conditions (5.7) and 
(5.8) implying no consumption. The wealth in the second period is simply the wealth 
of the first period minus loss plus income. However, there is still utility derived from 
this wealth in both period one and two. What is this utility derived from? It cannot be 
consumption as that would reduce the transferred wealth, but if we allow the free choice 
of the amount of wealth the agents are allowed to keep and/or transfer, then savings and 
loans are essentially the same as consumption. However, since the wealth is evaluated 
through two utility functions, it is ambiguous how the results translate to known 
comparative statics results. In previous studies (Cooper and Hayes, 1987; Schlesinger 
2000; Volkman-Wise 2015) models of insurance in an intertemporal setting have been 
solved both over insurance demand and consumption choices. Future work will need to 
relax this assumption then compare results presented in this chapter with evidence from 







6. AN INVESTIGATION OF RESIDENTIAL INSURANCE DEMAND-SIDE 
REACTIONS AFTER A NATURAL CATASTROPHE: THE CASE OF 
THE 2010-11 CHRISTCHURCH EARTHQUAKES 
6.0. Introduction  
In September 2010 and February 2011, Christchurch city and its surrounding regions 
of the Canterbury plains experienced devastating earthquakes with an estimated 
economic cost of over NZ$40 billion (Timar, Grimes & Fabling, 2014; Doyle & Noy, 
2015; Chang-Richards & Wilkinson, 2016). The insurance sector played a very 
important role in re-building the Canterbury region after these devastating earthquakes. 
There is varying evidence of how post-catastrophe experiences affect the demand for 
insurance. A study by Slovic et al. (1974) was the first to postulate over-reaction by 
economic agents in the aftermath of a new disaster. Since then, natural disasters have 
gained attention with various studies observing that insurance consumers over-react to 
the occurrence of a new disaster (Aseervatham et al., 2015; Dumm et al., 2015). Seog 
(2008) theoretically demonstrated that catastrophic events lead to increases in insurance 
demand when there is an increase in public information regarding a disaster. Browne 
& Hoyt (2000) looked at effects of catastrophic events on the demand for insurance 
using state-level data from the USA for a period of 10 years. The authors found that 
higher premium rates post-disaster lead to depressed demand when considering flood 
insurance. However, their study pointed out that this pattern is consistent with the lower 
demand noted prior to a disaster, but does not support the increased demand post-
disaster, when premium rates are higher. 
111 
 
Working on the same USA National Flood Insurance Program, Michel‐Kerjan & 
Kousky (2010) observed that policy limits associated with flood insurance programs 
are increased and more policies are purchased after a flood event. This signals that once 
there is an extreme catastrophic event like heavy floods, individuals overweigh the 
probability of a future flood and demand more insurance. In a recent study, Gallagher 
(2010) estimated the change in probability that occurs in the aftermath of floods using 
a panel dataset of floods and the uptake of flood insurance in the USA. The author 
provides new evidence on how individuals update their beliefs over uncertain rare 
events. Most importantly, he found that the consumption of insurance is completely flat 
in the years before a flood; it picks up immediately following a flood, and then steadily 
diminishes to pre-flood level. Other studies (Kirsch, 1986; Camerer & Kunreuther, 
1989; Shanteau & Hall, 1992; McClelland et al.,1993; Palm, 1995; Ganderton et al., 
2000; Cohen et al., 2008) analysed insurance demand reactions in the aftermath of a 
catastrophe, suggesting that the insureds have the belief that the probability of an event 
is lowered when that event has already occurred. Timar et al. (2014) estimated how the 
pricing of earthquake-related risks changed following the Christchurch earthquakes. 
Their study finds strong evidence that a liquefaction risk discount emerged in the high 
seismic area immediately after the Christchurch earthquakes, but disappeared entirely 
within three years of the disaster event. The findings could not rule out a time-varying 
risk premium as a result of a rational response to risk, similar to responses identified in 
a number of other studies (Jackson, 1981; Keller, Siegrist & Gutscher, 2006). Papon 
(2008) also suggested that prior risk occurrences influence subsequent insurance 
choices. Although several works make the case for risk perceptions affecting natural 
disaster insurance decisions (Kunreuther, 1984; Kunreuther et al., 1995; Braun & 
Muermann, 2004; Kousky et al., 2006; Manson, 2006; Michel‐Kerjan & Kousky, 2010) 
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there is very little empirical work on how insurance demanders use their heuristic 
probability rule to update their past insurance coverage. Born & Viscusi (2006) found 
that major catastrophes may reduce the quantity of insurance written because of higher 
rates and insurance rationing, as well as exit of firms from the market. Similarly, West 
& Lenze (1994) argued that heavily flooding hurricanes are exemplified by relatively 
low insurance coverage. 
The existing studies give several clues as to how some economic factors may influence 
insurance demand. According to Joskow (1973), Browne & Hoyt (2000) and Kousky 
(2010) those with higher incomes are more able to afford insurance and have 
accumulated more assets that they want to protect. However, Cleeton & Zellner (1993) 
showed that the only role that income can play in affecting the amount of insurance 
demanded at actuarially fair prices is to affect the size of the potential loss independent 
of the demander’s degrees of risk aversion and how this varies with income. This 
chapter presents analysis involving the relationship between risk aversion, the level of 
income, the insured asset and the maximum premium the insurance demanders would 
be willing to pay for full insurance. 
In the analysis of determinants of insurance demand, Browne & Kim (1993) explained 
that education is a good proxy for measuring risk aversion. Specifically, more risk-
averse individuals due to higher educational attainment would have a higher demand 
for non-life products. Outreville (1996) also supported the view expressed by Browne 
& Kim (1993). In the same line, Dzaja (2013) suggested that education increases 
individuals’ risk aversion and encourages people to demand insurance. Treerattanapun 
(2011) pointed out that high level of education increases the understanding of risk and 
threats to financial stability, helping the understanding of insurance benefits. An 
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analysis by Park & Lemaire (2012) on 82 countries for a period of 10 years also found 
a positive relationship between education and non-life insurance demand levels. Ofoghi 
& Farsangi (2013) demonstrated a significant and positive relationship between risk 
aversion and auto insurance demand, in which those with insurance knowledge are 
more risk-averse. 
This study is a result of investigations that began in 2014 to examine post-disaster 
reactions of the insurance market after Christchurch earthquakes. The study gives an 
empirical analysis of pre- and post-Christchurch earthquakes insurance reactions using 
survey data. The work focuses on the demand-side aspect of residential property 
insurance coverage. The key interest in the demand-side reaction centres on an analysis 
of the change in the level of insurance coverage, and variables that contribute to such 
changes. Changes in the level of insurance coverage are used to proxy the insurance 
demand response post-Christchurch earthquakes. In this analysis of residential property 
insurance demand, the study does not seek to calculate and/or estimate the insurance 
demand function post-loss. The study instead examines the change in level of insurance 
coverage by conducting a demand-side survey to tease out, purely, the insurance market 
response from the demand-side perspective. The study further investigates how various 
insurance demand determinant variables influence the change in the level of insurance 
coverage post-catastrophe using simple descriptive analysis and correlation analysis. 
The output of this study is crucial to the understanding of how insurance demanders 
have adjusted their level of insurance as a result of the contract modifications and the 
effects of insurance demand determinant variables post-disaster.  
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: Section 6.1 presents the hypothesis and 
research question studied in this chapter. Section 6.2 presents data and methods used in 
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this study. Sub-section 6.2.1 describes the data sources and data collection techniques 
used in the study. Sub-section 6.2.2 presents a detailed profile of the survey 
respondents. Sub-section 6.2.3 describes the data analysis process used in the analysis 
of the survey questionnaire. Section 6.3 presents the main results and discussions. 
Simple descriptive results to illustrate what happened after the earthquakes are 
presented in sub-section 6.3.1; while some simple statistical analysis results are 
presented in sub-section 6.3.2. Section 6.4 gives the conclusions and recommendations 
of the study. 
6.1. Hypothesis and Research Question 
This research presents a novel area of investigation from New Zealand residential 
insurance standpoint after the 2010-11 earthquakes. The study proposes a set of 
hypotheses and research questions to be investigated. The hypotheses are discussed 
from an economic analysis and simple descriptive perspective with appropriate 
statistical tests to explain how insurance demand determinants respond to catastrophe 
losses.  
Hypothesis I. Insured assets and annual household income are positively associated 
with the annual premium insurance demanders are willing to pay for full residential 
property protection, and these have a positive influence on the change in the level of 
insurance coverage.  
The objective of this hypothesis is to test if household income and property value affect 
the insurance premium the demander is prepared to pay for protection of residential 
property. In general, the test will show whether there is an association between these 
three variables by carrying out a descriptive analysis. This hypothesis draws from the 
findings in the prior literature. For example, in Tooth (2015), the implied income 
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elasticity for the take-up of house insurance is around 0.02, suggesting that after 
controlling other factors, a 1 percent increase in income would only result in a 0.01 to 
0.02 percent increase in the likelihood a household buys house insurance cover. A 
similar study by Showers & Shotick (1994) used USA consumer expenditure survey to 
assess the effects of age, income and household characteristics on total insurance 
expenditure. They found insurance expenditure to be positively related to income, age 
and size of household and that the marginal importance of income is greater for small 
households. 
Hypothesis II. Demographic characteristics of households are associated with and 
influence the change in the level of insurance coverage for residential property 
insurance in the aftermath of a major disaster.  
Insurance consumer risk aversion is strongly affected by demographic characteristics 
like the value of insured assets, income, age, and education amongst other features. The 
degree of risk aversion is a key determinant of insurance demand. Here we use the 
demographic characteristics of survey participants to deduce a proxy for risk aversion. 
The main demographic characteristics of households of interest for this hypothesis 
include; age, gender, education, incomes, and property value. 
In the insurance literature, the level of risk aversion is hypothesised to be positively 
correlated with the insurance consumption of an individual. Numerous empirical 
studies (Browne & Kim, 1993; Beck & Webb, 2003; Hwang & Gao, 2003) demonstrate 
a positive and significant relationship between insurance demand and the level of 
education which would imply that a higher level of education leads to a greater degree 
of risk aversion and greater awareness of the need for insurance coverage. However, in 
macroeconomic and cross-section studies, this hypothesis does not always hold and it 
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cannot be concluded that there is a positive correlation between risk aversion and the 
level of education. For instance, a survey by Outreville (2014) on the relationship 
between risk aversion and education shows a negative relationship. This implies that 
higher education leads to lower risk aversion, which in turn leads to more risk‐taking 
by highly‐educated individuals. Aliagha et al. (2014) examine the role of income level 
and education level while purchasing flood insurance for residential properties. Their 
study found that the propensity to purchase flood insurance increases significantly with 
income levels while education level does not make much difference. They suggest that 
the increase is likely a result of property owners suffering greater losses of wealth, 
accumulated savings from income, and from the previous catastrophic floods than 
increases their risk aversion. According to Guiso & Paiella (2008), households that face 
income uncertainty or that suffered losses of income from severe natural disasters show 
evidence of a greater degree of risk aversion.  
Hypothesis III. Increases in both risk aversion and risk perception have a positive 
influence on the change in the level of insurance coverage for residential property 
owners in the aftermath of a major disaster. 
Insurers assess risk by making best estimates of the frequency and severity of a hazard 
using statistical techniques or catastrophe models. However, an expert’s generated risk 
perception information often has a minimal influence on decision making under risk by 
a layperson (Kunreuther et al., 2001). Some studies (Viscusi, 1985; Papon, 2008; 
Dumm et al., 2015) suggest that individuals often use heuristics and simple rules when 
they are assessing risk. Thus, individuals may judge an event as risky if it is easy to 
imagine or recall; for example, individuals who have had an experience of the 
Christchurch earthquakes may find it easier to imagine that a similar disaster could 
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happen again in the future and therefore report a higher perceived risk than individuals 
without this experience. An analysis of hypothesis III can be used to infer on the level 
of risks; whether individuals located in the epicentre of a disaster have a higher risk 
perception. It is postulated that properties in the epicentre of a disaster event are more 
likely to have higher levels of insurance coverage post-loss than properties that are far 
from the epicentre. However, if insurers use a risk-based underwriting approach, then 
it is expected that there would be a positive relationship between the perception of risk 
and the cost of insurance coverage, and a change in risk aversion and perception would 
have a positive influence on the demand for insurance by property owners in the 
aftermath of a major disaster. Thus, at higher levels of risk perception, both the price 
of coverage and the demand for insurance coverage would be higher. 
The underlying research question examined in this chapter is, “What is the demand-
side insurance market response after the Christchurch earthquakes?” A simple 
description of the survey responses is used to illustrate what actually happened to 
insurance demand-side related variables as a response to the Christchurch earthquakes.  
6.2. Data and Methods  
6.2.1. Data Source and Data Collection  
Following the Christchurch earthquakes, many households left their damaged 
properties and moved to new suburbs or relocated to other cities. An online survey was 
considered as the most effective data gathering method for these households. An online 
survey questionnaire link was distributed through a random sampling of Christchurch 
dwellers using publicly available emails. The process of survey design began in 
February 2015. After a series of editing refinements, and taking into account all the 
comments and suggestions from varying stakeholders, the first draft of the 
118 
 
questionnaire was ready in May 2015. The University of Canterbury research code of 
practice requires that all data collection activities conform to the standard procedures 
for conducting household surveys. In this light, the process required survey approval 
from the University of Canterbury Ethics Committee which was cleared in June 2015.  
A total of 1,600 individuals were surveyed through emails which were sent to them 
between September and November 2015. However, it was not possible to establish if 
all email addresses were still in use. A total of 254 survey participants completed the 
survey, representing a response rate of 16 percent. Sorting and cleaning of the 
completed questionnaires produced a total of 221 responses which could be 
meaningfully analysed. As a note of caution, the survey is probably not representative, 
given that the data was gathered from only four institutions (University of Canterbury, 
ARA Institute, Christchurch Airport and Christchurch Women's Hospital). However, 
representation was not the primary intention; the researcher needed some data to show 
insurance market responses from demand-side. The sample of interest only consisted 
of homeowners insured prior to the 2010-11 earthquakes, and these four institutions 
provided easily accessible email contacts which could be used for an online survey. 
Thus, the survey data is only intended to be illustrative, not necessarily representative 
of the entire population, but the survey participants in the sample were all affected by 
the earthquakes and they had some relationship with the insurance companies.  
An initial pilot test was also conducted to ensure that the survey design and materials 
would capture the necessary data to meet the survey objectives. A focus group made up 
of 10 respondents was contacted to examine the response rate and to identify factors 
that affect participation and that might hinder accurate completion of the survey. The 
focus group results were used to revise the survey questionnaire and other respondent 
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materials prior to the full survey. Based on the pilot test results, improvements were 
made in the invitation email and minor text changes were made to the questionnaire 
wording. 
6.2.2. Sample Profile  
Table 6-1: Respondents by age group 
Age group (Years) % Count 
18 - 30  1.81% 4 
31 - 40  6.33% 14 
41 - 50  26.70% 59 
51 - 60  38.01% 84 
61 - 70  21.27% 47 
Over 71  5.88% 13 
Total 100% 221 
 
Table 6-2: Respondents by gender 
Gender % Count 
Male 47.51% 105 
Female 52.49% 116 
Total 100% 221 
 
Table 6-3: Respondents by level of education 
Education  level % Count 
High school graduate 6.82% 15 
Technical/University graduate 38.64% 85 
Postgraduate degree 52.73% 116 
Other 1.82% 4 
Total 100% 220 
 
Table 6-4: Respondents by annual income 
Income ($) % Count 
Below 14,000 0.00% 0 
14,001 - 48,000 5.88% 13 
48,001 - 70,000 35.29% 78 
Above 70,000 58.82% 130 
Total 100% 221 
 
Table 6-5: Respondents by property value 
Value ($) % Count 
Below 300,000 6.36% 14 
300,000 - 400,000 12.27% 27 
400,000 - 500,000 16.36% 36 
500,000 - 600,000 22.73% 50 
600,000 - 700,000 12.73% 28 
Above 700,000 29.55% 65 




Table 6-6: Respondents by the maximum premium insured are willing to pay per annum 
Premium ($) % Count 
Below 600 3.50% 7 
600 – 900 14.50% 29 
900 - 1,200 47.50% 95 
Above 1,200 34.50% 69 
Total 100% 200 
 
6.2.3. Data Analysis  
Analysis of the survey data is done in two parts. The first part, which forms the main 
findings of this survey, entails simple descriptive analysis. In this descriptive analysis 
of the survey respondents’ responses, clear summaries of results are presented in the 
figures and tables below. The main purpose of this analytical approach is to exhibit, in 
a simple manner, what actually happened to insurance demand-related variables after 
the earthquakes. A chi-square test of independence is also used to examine differences 
in participants’ responses where appropriate. 
In most survey analyses, there are key explanatory variables of investigation that are 
often covariant. For example, in this survey response, an insurance demander’s decision 
to change the level of insurance coverage is closely related to the value of the insured 
asset and supply-side policy conditions; which in turn may be a function of property 
value, age, gender, income education or risk perception that vary together with other 
insurance demand determinant variables. So, to isolate and investigate the effect of an 
individual variable, a robust statistical approach is normally preferred. However, due 
to the nature of the survey questions, and possible interactions of demand and supply 
determinant variables, the present study acknowledges the inherent statistical 
shortcomings that emerge when regression analysis is used on this data-set, and in 
particular, the problem of endogeneity has already been identified. Consequently, part 
two of this survey analysis presents a simple tractable statistical analysis: Correlation 
analysis of the demand determinants and associated variables is carried out. 
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6.3. Results and Discussions  
6.3.1. Simple Descriptive Results  
6.3.1.1.Change in the level of insurance coverage after the earthquakes 
Respondents were asked whether they had changed their level of insurance coverage 
after the earthquakes. A summary of the results is shown in Figure 6-1. Of note, 41.7% 
of the respondents reported that they had increased their level of insurance coverage. 
However, the  percentage of the respondents who indicated no change in the level of 
insurance coverage after earthquakes were much higher, 55.5 percent, whereas only a 
mere 2.8 percent of the survey respondents indicated they had decreased the level of 
insurance coverage after the earthquakes. 
  
Figure 6-1: Change in the level of insurance coverage after the earthquakes. 
Source: Q15-In the aftermath of the 2010 and 2011 Canterbury earthquakes how have you 
voluntarily changed the level of your past insurance coverage? 
Base: 221 Survey respondents  
 
A further assessment is inferred from the participants’ response to the question about 
the reasons for the change of the level of insurance coverage. Respondents who had 
increased the level of insurance coverage were asked to indicate reasons for doing so. 
A summary of responses for both male and female participants are provided in Figure 












in their level of insurance coverage when compared to male participants at 30.93 
percent, who reported an increase in their level of insurance coverage. Figure 6-2 shows 
the percentage distribution of the specific reasons provided for the increase in the level 
of insurance coverage. “To cover a more valuable asset”, was most commonly 
nominated as a reason in both genders. A chi-square test of independence showed that 
there was a significant difference in the reasons both gender survey participants 
provided for an increase in the level of insurance coverage, 37.12)4(2  , 01.0p . 
However, there was little variation of results across all the different demographic 
groups when variation across age, income, and level of education is examined. 
 
Figure 6-2: Reasons for increase in level of insurance coverage post-earthquakes by gender distribution. 
Source: Q1-Which age group do you belong to?; and Q16-If increase, in response to Question 15 
above; why?  
Base: 88 Survey respondents  
 
The respondents could choose multiple reasons and so the specific reasons provided 
add to more than 100 percent. A further analysis was undertaken on the comments 
provided by the survey participants who selected “Other” as a reason for an increase in 
the level of insurance coverage.  
Some of the interesting comments provided by the respondents are: 
1) Risk aversion (higher dollar coverage costs little extra on premium).   
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2) This is tricky to answer because the insurance contract has changed form to a 
fixed dollar amount of cover versus full replacement previously. 
3) Because I was required to set the value by the insurance company. Before that 
the value was not defined.   
4) Total replacement policy not now applicable.   
5) Insurance company changed to “total sum insured” basis.   
6) Cover at previous level was insufficient for property. 
7) I was forced to change type of cover, not voluntary at all. 
8) We had to value the property ourselves - so the insurance concept has changed 
- it is no longer replacement value but the value we assessed was needed to 
replace it. 
9) Being clear about definition of full replacement. 
10) Full replacement cover is not available for natural disasters any longer. 
11) The earthquakes highlighted the plight of those who were underinsured and I 
don't want that to happen to me. 
The examination of the change in the level of insurance coverage indicates that: 
 The majority of the households in Christchurch marginally changed the level of 
insurance coverage as reported by the survey participants. 
 The households’ demographic features did not influence the decision to change 
level of insurance coverage as reported by the survey participants. 
 The main reason for the change in the level of insurance coverage was changes 
in the format of supply, so the insurance demanders had to adjust coverage as 
supplied in the insurance market in order to reflect the new policy requirements. 
These results also indicate that the change from a full replacement value type policy to 
a nominated replacement value type policy is clearly the key determinant of the 
direction of change in the level of insurance coverage after the Christchurch 
earthquakes. The comments provided by the survey participants focus mainly on the 
issues of changes in the policy format. 
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6.3.1.2.Change in the perception of probability of loss after the earthquakes 
The survey participants were asked to identify their perception, in relation to their 
current residential property and contents insurance policy, of how the probability of 
loss from the occurrence of another earthquake had changed. Figure 6-3 shows that 44.1 
percent of the respondents perceive the probability of loss from another earthquake had 
increased, whereas 23.7 percent of the sample perceives the probability had decreased, 
and 32.2 percent were neutral on neither increase nor decrease in their perception on 
the probability of loss from another earthquake. In support of these results, previous 
studies infer that many insurance demanders do not mathematically compute the level 
of risk, but rather they use heuristic rules to reduce the complex tasks of assessing 
probabilities and predicting values to simpler judgmental operations (Slovic et al., 
1977; Rothschild & Stiglitz, 1992; Raschky & Weck-Hannemann, 2007). An 
assessment by Mileti & O’Brien (1992) found that survey participants who suffered 
damage in a natural disaster perceived the future risk as higher than those who did not. 
 
Figure 6-3: Probability of loss from another earthquake 
(INSig– Increased significantly, IN – Increased, INSli – Increased slightly, NIND –Neither increased nor 
decreased, DESli–Decreased slightly, DE – Decreased, DESig– Decreased significantly) 
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Source: Q19-Based on your perception, in relation to your current residential property and 
contents insurance policy in the aftermath of 2010 and 2011 Canterbury earthquakes, 
how would you rate the overall changes in the following items?-Probability of loss from 
another earthquake. 
Base: 221 Survey respondents  
 
Previous research findings (Eeckhoudt & Kimball, 1992; Showers & Shotick, 1994) 
show that demand would increase with an increase in risk. Thus, the perception of risk 
helps the researcher to assess how past catastrophes impact insurance demand. 
This research went further to cross-tabulate the data for these respondents based on 
gender to compare if there is any meaningful difference in how each gender perceives 
the risk of another earthquake. The gender distribution of male and female participants 
shows a significant association between gender and change in the perception of the 
probability of loss in the aftermath of the earthquakes, 83.2)6(2  , 03.0p .  
 
Figure 6-4: Probability of loss from another earthquake by gender (Male-blue, Female-red) 
distribution 
(INSig– Increased significantly, IN – Increased, INSli – Increased slightly, NIND –Neither increased nor 
decreased, DESli–Decreased slightly, DE – Decreased, DESig– Decreased significantly) 
Source: Q1-Which age group do you belong to?; and Q19-Based on your perception, in relation to 
your current residential property and contents insurance policy in the aftermath of 2010 
and 2011 Canterbury earthquakes, how would you rate the overall changes in the  following 
items?-Probability of loss from another earthquake. 

















The results are presented in Figure 6-4 which shows that over half of the female, 56.07 
percent, of the survey participants believed that the probability of loss from another 
earthquake was higher than before, whereas the percentage of those with a neutral point 
of view on the issue (i.e. probability neither increased nor decreased) was at 25.23 
percent. The percentage was much lower for male; 30.69 percent of survey participants 
believed the probability of loss from another earthquake was increased, and a much 
higher percentage, 41.58 percent, were neutral (neither increase nor decrease). The 
main objective here is to illustrate the effects of insurance demand determinants in the 
response to the earthquakes. However, it is interesting to note that female participants 
reported a greater perceived likelihood of catastrophe loss from earthquakes in future. 
This is supported by previous studies on the existence of gender differences in the 
propensity to take risks and has been reported in a large number of the questionnaire 
and experimental studies. Byrnes et al. (1999) reviewed numerous studies on gender 
differences in risk perception. They concluded that the literature indicated that male 
participants are more likely to take risks than female participants. 
6.3.1.3.Satisfaction rate with the policy modification after the earthquakes 
In light of the findings on Question 15 and Question 16; the researcher examined the 
responses provided on both questions to assess how the survey participants viewed the 
policy modification. Respondents were asked about their satisfaction with the change 
in residential insurance contracts from a full replacement value type policy to a 
nominated replacement value type policy. The results show that the majority of the 
survey participants, 60.34 percent, reported that they were less satisfied with the policy 
modification. The percentage that was indifferent was much lower, 29.61 percent, while 
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a slight minority, 10.06 percent, reported being more satisfied with the policy 
modifications (Figure 6-5).  
 
Figure 6-5: Satisfaction rate for the policy modification 
Source: Q18-Comparing the new post-earthquake “sum insured” insurance coverage to the pre-
earthquake “full replacement value” insurance coverage, how do you rate your 
satisfaction? 
Base: 221 Survey respondents  
These results suggest that many policyholders, as reported by survey participants, were 
generally negative about their own policy modification and the new requirement to 
value their property themselves. While it might not be surprising that policyholders 
have a high dissatisfaction rate with the policy modification, a low satisfaction rate 
within the insurance industry cannot be inferred generally. The insurance industry has, 
since 2012, reported an incremental increase in the gross written premiums across 
residential insurance cover, however, the amount of coverage written may not 
accurately represent satisfaction. It’s already known from the survey that many people 
increased coverage while being less satisfied. 
Further examination revealed that older male respondents were more likely to be less 
satisfied with the changes. However, there was no evidence to suggest that the 









More satisfied Less satisfied Indifferent
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Figure 6-6 shows the participants’ response to their satisfaction rate when examined 
across the gender distribution. These results demonstrate that in general, male 
participants were less satisfied when compared to female participants.     
 
Figure 6-6: Satisfaction rate by gender distribution of the policy modification after the earthquakes 
Source: Q1-Which age group do you belong to?; and Q18-Comparing the new post-earthquake 
“sum insured” insurance coverage to the pre-earthquake “full replacement value” 
insurance coverage, how do you rate your satisfaction? 
Base: 221 Survey respondents  
 
It is imperative to report that this survey demonstrates the opportunities provided by 
the changes introduced in the insurance market after the Christchurch earthquakes, and 
as such, some respondents reported that “the earthquakes highlighted the plight of those 
who were under-insured and I don’t want that to happen to me”. However, the findings 
reaffirm that under-insurance continues to be a problem, especially with the new 
changes in which the policyholders nominate their sum insured.  
6.3.1.4.The availability of insurance coverage after the earthquakes 
The survey asked two questions with regard to the availability of insurance coverage 
after the Christchurch earthquakes. 
The two main concerns of the researcher are that: 
 Insurance firms might have exited the New Zealand residential insurance market 
following the Christchurch earthquakes. In reference to other insurance markets, 
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numerous studies have documented insurance firms’ withdrawal from markets 
prone to catastrophes in the aftermath of disasters (Klein, 2013; Born & Viscusi, 
2006, and Aseervatham et al., 2015). 
 Insurance demanders were most likely to have been denied insurance coverage 
following the Christchurch earthquakes. This is in line with previous studies that 
demonstrate that most insurance companies refused to offer coverage and/or 
retreated from markets prone to catastrophe losses because it is unprofitable to offer 
insurance cover against catastrophes in these high-risk markets (Raschky & Weck-
Hannemann, 2007; Michel-Kerjan & Kunreuther, 2012; Kunreuther, 2015). 
Survey participants were asked to comment on the availability of insurance coverage 
for their property after the Christchurch earthquakes. The results indicate that the 
majority of survey participants, 70.6 percent, felt that availability of insurance coverage 
had decreased in general. A smaller  percentage, 25.6 percent, of the survey participants 
were neutral as to whether the availability of insurance coverage had increased or 
decreased, while only a minority, 3.8 percent, observed that insurance availability had 
increased post-earthquakes. Participants’ response to this question raised curiosity, so 
the researcher sent a few emails to follow-up and/or to understand why so many 
participants reported a decrease in availability of insurance coverage, whereas the 
insurance industry statistics showed incremental growth in gross written premiums 
since 2012.  
An analysis was undertaken to establish the reasons behind the higher percentage of 
responses that indicate insurance availability has decreased. It became clear that the 
availability of insurance policies did not change, but there was a change in the insurers’ 
underwriting requirements, which pointed in the direction of dissatisfaction. From an 
underwriting perspective, post-earthquakes the insurers were seeking more 
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information, including the age of buildings, the spread of risk, construction, land and/or 
soil structure, the extent of strengthening work, and seismic reports. This array of new 
stringent underwriting requirements did not sit well with policyholders. To this end, the 
participants reported this dissatisfaction as if it were a reduction in the availability of 
insurance coverage. However, earlier on during the recovery period immediately after 
the Christchurch earthquakes, insurers were not taking on additional risk in 
Christchurch and so continued to provide coverage only to existing customers. The 
survey participants indicated that this practise remained in place for a period of six 
months to one year. Figure 6.7 presents a plot of the survey participants’ responses on 
the availability of insurance coverage post-earthquakes. The results can be fully 
appreciated when interpreted together with responses to the question about those who 
had been denied coverage after the Christchurch earthquakes. 
 
Figure 6-7: Availability of insurance coverage 
(INSig– Increased significantly, IN – Increased, INSli – Increased slightly, NIND –Neither increased nor 
decreased, DESli–Decreased slightly, DE – Decreased, DESig– Decreased significantly) 
Source: Q1-Which age group do you belong to?; and Q19 - Based on your perception, in relation to 
your current residential property and contents insurance policy in the aftermath of 2010 and 
2011 Canterbury earthquakes, how would you rate the overall changes in the following 
items?-Availability of insurance coverage.  
Base: 221 Survey respondents  
Further analysis was undertaken to examine if there were cases when insurance 
demanders were denied coverage. Survey participants were asked if they had had a case 
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in which an insurer declined to offer coverage to protect their property. This survey 
question was very important to establish if there is any link between availability and 
accessibility of insurance coverage after the Christchurch earthquakes. The results are 
presented in Figure 6.8, which shows strong evidence that insurance demanders were 
not denied insurance coverage. The results show that a majority, 88 percent, of the 
respondents reported that they had never been denied insurance coverage, whereas only, 
13 percent, had been denied insurance coverage. 
 
Figure 6-8: Cases where an insurance cover was declined 
Source: Q23-Have you had a case where an insurance provider declined to offer insurance 
coverage to protect your property against any potential risk? 
Base: 221 Survey respondents  
Of particular interest is the extent to which the small percentage (13 percent) of 
respondents who were declined coverage went on to provide further comments stating 
the reasons for insurance coverage refusal. The response comments are: (i) Claimed on 
the driveway damage and now they will not cover the driveway to the same extent as 
before; (ii) Did not have a kitchen; (iii) Immediately after the February earthquake the 
company was not taking on any new insurance; (iv) New building -  many companies 
would not undertake new policies; (v) No companies are taking on new customers; (vi) 
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No response to request for quote; (vii) Paid-out but not repaired therefore uninsurable 
except for public liability - yet fit to live in; (viii) Received payout - Company unwilling 
to offer 3rd party fire cover; (ix) Soon after the September 2010 earthquake and was not 
providing contents cover for Canterbury. 
Following the earthquake, there was a lot of uncertainty on the extent to which the 
disaster would affect the insurance market from an underwriting perspective. The 
researcher observes that it is most likely that those who were denied coverage might 
have tried to seek cover within the period of moratorium when the insurers had placed 
a number of restrictions on undertaking new risks. The results are in line with the 
existing insurance studies suggesting catastrophes suppress insurance supply, but 
government intervention in disaster insurance provision improves the supply (Grace et 
al. 2004; Harrington & Niehaus, 2001; Doherty, 1997). In some markets, notably in 
catastrophe-prone states in the USA, price suppression depresses availability, inviting 
government intervention. Similarly, a study by Parker & Steenkamp (2012) 
immediately after the Christchurch earthquakes found that insurers had placed a 
moratorium on new residential insurance coverage in the affected regions in order to 
limit their exposure. 
6.3.1.5.Change in insurance coverage per dollar and value of insured assets after 
the earthquakes 
The survey also sought to investigate changes in the value of the insured assets. There 
is evidence that the value of insured assets is related to the perceived insurance coverage 
per dollar of property insured. This is premised on the fact that, following the 
Christchurch earthquakes, many property owners opted to re-build their structures to 
high earthquake standards in order to reduce the amount and cost of insurance. This 
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increased the value of the property, and also made the building more tenantable (Brown 
et al. 2013). A change in property values in disaster-prone areas is also reported clearly 
in Dumm et al. (2012). Two variables, the change in insurance coverage per dollar and 
the change in the value of insured assets, were examined to probe these effects after the 
earthquakes. For the first variable, survey participants were asked, “Do you perceive 
insurance coverage per dollar of property insured is greater now than before the 
earthquakes?” A summary of the results is presented in Figure 6-9. Approximately 58 
percent of respondents believed that the insurance coverage per dollar of property 
insured was greater than before the earthquakes. The  percentage of respondents who 
perceived that their insurance coverage per dollar of property insured was not greater 
than before the earthquakes were much less, 30.5 percent, whereas only 11.5 percent of 
the respondents were not aware of how their insurance coverage per dollar of property 
insured had changed. 
 
Figure 6-9: Change in the insurance coverage per dollar of property insured 
Source: Q14-Do you perceive insurance coverage per dollar of property insured is greater now 
than before the earthquakes? 
Base: 221 Survey respondents  
 
For the second variable, survey participants were asked, “How would you rate the 













results observed indicate a sharp increase in property values after the earthquakes. In 
general, the majority, 70.7 percent, of respondents reported an upward change in 
property value. Only, 14.7 percent, reported no change in property value and a similar 
percentage reported a negative change.   
 
Figure 6-10: Insured property value post-earthquakes 
(INSig– Increased significantly, IN – Increased, INSli – Increased slightly, NIND –Neither increased nor 
decreased, DESli–Decreased slightly, DE – Decreased, DESig– Decreased significantly) 
Source: Q19- Based on your perception, in relation to your current residential property and 
contents insurance policy in the aftermath of 2010 and 2011 Canterbury earthquakes, how 
would you rate the overall changes in the following items?-Property Value. 
Base: 221 Survey respondents  
 
This result is consistent with observations from similar studies (Browne & Hoyt, 2000; 
Kelly & Kleffner, 2003; Powell & Harding, 2009) showing post-loss responses 
improves the coverage per dollar of insured asset. However, Parker & Steenkamp 
(2012) found that property prices suggested that the loss of residential properties 
outstripped the loss of population, generating some excess demand for housing around 
the Canterbury region. It can be inferred that rational property buyers’ behaviour in 
regard to residential insurance should reflect price-efficient policies relative to disaster 
risk exposure. Thus, this survey highlights the possibility that, in general, higher 
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property values and greater insurance coverage per dollar of insured assets after the 
Christchurch earthquakes is a reflection of an increased level of insurance coverage 
and/or a higher insurance demand. This is also supported in past studies (Nelson, 1994; 
Kelly & Kleffner, 2003) which shows that consumers would choose an insurance policy 
that yields the highest benefit per additional dollar of insurance expenditure holding 
other factors constant. 
6.3.1.6.Change in expenditure on insurance after the earthquakes 
A further question of interest is to examine how household expenditure on insurance 
responded to the changes in the insurance market after the earthquakes. Respondents 
were asked, “How would you rate the overall changes in your money spent on 
insurance?” To this end, the question seeks to investigate how the policyholder 
generally changed their expenditure on insurance, in order to depict how the 
earthquakes affected households’ expenditure associated with insurance coverage.  
 
Figure 6-11: Expenditure on insurance 
(INSig– Increased significantly, IN – Increased, INSli – Increased slightly, NIND –Neither increased nor 
decreased, DESli–Decreased slightly, DE – Decreased, DESig– Decreased significantly) 
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Source: Q19- Based on your perception, in relation to your current residential property and contents 
insurance policy in the aftermath of 2010 and 2011 Canterbury earthquakes, how would you 
rate the overall changes in the following items?-Money spent on insurance. 
Base: 221 Survey respondents  
Figure 6-11 presents a summary of the respondents’ responses to the changes in the 
expenditure on insurance in the aftermath of the earthquakes. The results show that the 
vast majority, 95.7 percent, of the survey participants had increased the total amount of 
money they spent on insurance post-quakes, and only 3.3 percent indicated a decrease 
in money spent on insurance. The result of money spent on insurance when linked with 
the household profile indicates that expenditure on insurance increases with greater 
incomes and greater property value. Moreover, Figure 6-11 presents the relationship 
between the increase in premiums post-quakes and the increase in insurance 
expenditure; respondents were asked, “How has the total premium you pay for 
residential property insurance changed from pre-earthquake period to post-earthquake 
period?” 
In Figure 6-12, 93.85 percent of respondents reported a premium increase after the 
earthquakes.  
 
Figure 6-12: Change in premium rate 
Source: Q13-How has the total premium you pay for residential property insurance 
changed from pre earthquake period to post-earthquake period. 
Base: 221 Survey respondents  
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The results lead the researcher to postulate that the increase in insurance expenditure 
might be linked to increased premium rates rather than to a change in level of insurance 
coverage and/or insurance demand. 
There are very few studies that have looked at household expenditure on residential 
insurance coverage post-loss. Dionne & Eeckhoudt (1985) showed that increases in risk 
aversion post-loss result in an increased household expenditure due to both loss-
reduction measures and insurance activity. In a related article, Kleffner & Kelly (2001) 
noted that if post-loss premiums are not risk-based, then insureds will invest less in 
insurance or self-insurance. These results help to understand the effect of a disaster on 
the amount of household income to be spent or allocated for insurance.  
6.3.2. Simple Statistical Analysis Results  
This section starts by presenting the summary results and discussions of a descriptive 
analysis on Hypothesis I: Insured assets and annual household income are positively 
associated with the annual premium insurance demanders are willing to pay for full 
residential property protection, and these are postulated to have a positive influence on 
the change in the level of insurance coverage. The results of the test of Hypothesis I are 
reported in Table 6-7. 
Table 6-7: Relationship between Variables to Test Hypothesis I 
Relationship between variables to test Hypothesis I Coefficient  p-value No. of obs. 
Premium versus Income 0.233* 0.001 221 
Premium versus Property value 0.536* 0.000 221 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
Source: Q4-Annual income; Q8-What is the approximate value of your property?; and Q11-What 
is the maximum premium you are willing to pay per annum to fully protect your residential 
property and contents from natural disasters through insurance coverage 
Base: 221 Survey respondents  
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Referring to the first hypothesis, the computed correlation coefficient value for 
premium versus income is reported in Table 6-7 as 0.233 and the associated p-value is 
0.001. The observed p-value is less than alpha value, p-value = 0.001˂ 0.05, indicating 
that the results are statistically significant. While the data is significant at the 0.05 level, 
the computed coefficient value is closer to 0 than to +1.  Based on the results, R = 0.233, 
N = 221, p-value = 0.001, it can be inferred that there is a weak positive linear 
relationship between the annual premium insurance demanders are willing to pay and 
their annual income. The weak relationship between premium and income is not 
surprising given that the analysis excludes other variables such as the value of contents, 
age, gender and education that are closely correlated to income. The results for income 
versus premium are consistent with the analysis on house insurance in that, controlling 
for other factors, income by itself should not be a major determinant of demand for 
insurance cover or the amount of premium demanders are willing to pay (Kriesel & 
Landry 2004; Kousky, 2010; Petrolia et al., 2013). 
Similarly, the computed correlation coefficient value for premium versus property 
value is reported in Table 6-7. The correlation coefficient value is 0.536 and the 
associated p-value is 0.000. The observed p-value is less than alpha value, p-value = 
0.000 ˂ 0.05, and therefore, from the results (R = 0.536, N = 221, p-value = 0.000) it 
can be concluded that the study finds a statistically significant, strong positive linear 
correlation between the annual premium an insurance demander is willing to pay to 
fully protect property and contents, and the value of that property. 
The results of the tests on research Hypothesis I show moderate relationships between 
the amounts of premium insurance demanders are willing to pay and annual household 
income. There is a strong positive linear association between the amounts of premium 
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insurance demanders are willing to pay and the property value. Although the hypothesis 
does not examine the influence of the property value on insurance take-up rates, it is 
observed that an increase in the value of property increases the average level of 
insurance coverage, holding all else constant. These results could thus imply that the 
level of insurance coverage and/or insurance demand is a function of wealth (as 
measured by property value) and income. 
We also consider Hypotheses II; The demographic characteristics of household are 
positively associated with, and influence, the change in the level of insurance coverage 
for residential property in the aftermath of a major disaster (where the main 
demographic factors examined are: age, education, gender and income), and 
Hypotheses III; Increases in both risk aversion and risk perception have a positive 
influence on the change in the level of insurance coverage for residential property 
owners in the aftermath of a major disaster. The computed correlation coefficient value 
for a change in the level of insurance coverage versus household demographic features 
and the individual’s risk perception are reported in Table 6-8. The coefficients and 
associated p-values of changes in the level of coverage versus risk perception, insured 
assets, income and gender are positively correlated and statistically significant. This 
observation is in agreement with most existing studies. For example, Lee et al. (2010), 
Showers & Shotick (1994), and Truett & Truett (1990) showed that income and insured 
assets were positively related to the demand for insurance in property insurance cover. 
Likewise, age, education and gender are shown to be positively related to insurance 
demand for both life insurance and auto-insurance as reported by Lee et al. (2010). This 
alone does not provide conclusive evidence that demographic features influence 
changes in the level of insurance coverage. However, the correlation coefficient offers 
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an opportunity to understand and further investigate how both the response variables 
and the explanatory variables are interrelated.  
Table 6-8 shows no statistically significant differences in insurance coverage by age 
and education; the only demographic variables that have a significant association with 
change in the level of insurance coverage is gender. In reference to the second 
hypothesis on the demographic variables, only gender shows a relationship with 
changes in household insurance cover, and as far as the third hypothesis is concerned, 
a change in risk perception also influences the demand for residential insurance cover 
in the aftermath of a natural disaster. 
Table 6-8: Relationship between Variables to Test Hypothesis II and III 
Relationship between variables to test Hypothesis II & III Coefficient  p-value No. of obs. 
Change in the level of insurance coverage versus Age 0.373 0.427 221 
Change in the level of insurance coverage versus Education 0.469 0.118 221 
Change in the level of insurance coverage versus Gender 0.301* 0.034 221 
Change in the level of insurance coverage versus Income 0.207** 0.008 221 
Change in the level of insurance coverage versus Property value 0.861** 0.000 221 
Change in the level of insurance coverage versus Risk perception 0.526** 0.001 221 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
Source: Q1-Which age group do you belong to?; Q3-Highest level of education;Q2-What is your 
gender?; Q4-Annual income; Q8-What is the approximate value of your property?; Q19-
Based on your perception, in relation to your current residential property and contents 
insurance policy in the aftermath of 2010 and 2011 Canterbury earthquakes, how would 
you rate the overall changes in the following items?-Probability of loss from another 
earthquake; and Q15-In the aftermath of the 2010 and 2011 Canterbury earthquakes how 
have you voluntarily changed the level of your past insurance coverage? 
Base: 221 Survey respondents  
6.4. Conclusions and Recommendations  
This survey has examined the fundamental insurance market responses after the 
Christchurch earthquakes from the demand-side perspective. The results of this analysis 
show that, the change from full replacement value type policy to nominated 
replacement value type policy is the key determinant of the direction of change in the 
level of insurance coverage. According to the outcome of the analysis, it is evident that 
most policyholders increased the level of insurance coverage so as to comply with the 
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new policy modification. However, other varying reasons for change in the level of 
insurance coverage are also observed. More essentially, the earthquakes highlighted the 
plight of those who were underinsured prompting policyholders to update their 
insurance coverage to reflect the estimated cost of re-building their property. 
The survey has added further evidence to the existing literature that insurance 
policyholders update their risk perception immediately after major catastrophe losses. 
Those who have had a recent experience with disaster loss report increased risk 
perception that a similar event could happen in future with females reporting higher 
risk perception than males. 
This analysis has also highlighted new results to the literature on the availability of 
insurance coverage after a major catastrophe event. While most studies have reported 
decreased insurance supply post disaster loss, this study presents new opportunities 
from an underwriting perspective. The findings show that a short period of moratorium 
immediately after the earthquake helps the insurance market to understand the new risk 
exposures and put in place stringent measures to provide insurance coverage for new 
risks. This is not always received well by the policyholder based on the comments of 
the survey respondents’ responses. Post-earthquake property remedies are reported to 
be important tasks to improve the value of the insured asset as well as keeping the cost 
of coverage affordable under new stringent risk-based underwriting approaches. 
There is a causality relationship between gender and the changes in household 
insurance cover. However, the exact direction of change is still ambiguous. The 
relationship would depend on insureds’ degree of risk aversion and how it changes with 
changes in the level of income, the change in value of insured assets and the change in 
insurance premiums. Of interest is that, the sampling strategy adopted in this 
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investigation is helpful in that, the four institutions sampled with predominantly skilled 
and high-income individuals reduces variation that could otherwise be caused by 
genders holding very different roles. A proposition is that, the direction of the effect 
depends on whether an increase in income increases the value of insured asset, and on 
whether the insurance demander has increasing or decreasing absolute risk aversion. In 
this case, it would be implicitly assumed that the level of risk aversion has an impact 
on decisions made post-disaster and hypothesised that both risk aversion and perception 
will be positively correlated with change in the level of insurance coverage at all levels 
of income. Thus, if insurance demanders perceive a higher possibility of further natural 
disasters then they will always adjust their insurance coverage appropriately. A more 
comprehensive data set and robust econometric analysis is required to rigorously 
investigate this proposition. 
As the composition of Christchurch dwellers evolves, and the city gets back to its pre-
earthquake state, changes in households’ demographic characteristics will affect the 
demand for property insurance cover. Those households who have had experience with 
the Christchurch earthquakes may find it easier to imagine that the disaster could 
happen again in the future; an indication of higher risk perception than for households 
who have not had this experience. Higher risk perception amongst risk averse property 
owners will lead to an increase in natural disaster insurance and other alternative natural 
disaster risk mitigation measures. Nevertheless, the results of this study comprise useful 
information about variables that have an influence on the change in the level of 
insurance coverage and/or insurance demand in the aftermath of a major catastrophe, 






7. A RISK-BASED PRICING MODEL FOR NATURAL DISASTER RISK: AN 
ACTUARIAL PERSPECTIVE FOR RESIDENTIAL INSURANCE COVER 
7.0. Introduction 
This chapter presents a pragmatic approach that can be used in the rate-making of fire 
and general cover for residential property with natural disaster risk as a rider. This is an 
actuarial risk-based pricing perspective that takes into consideration the key features of 
New Zealand’s natural disaster insurance as provided by the Earthquake Commission 
(EQC).  This study uses 2010-11 Christchurch earthquake claims data for the red-zoned 
properties as an illustrative empirical example of how the model can be used. The posed 
pricing model will, in the end, generate a technical risk premium rate that can be used 
either as a benchmark for adjustment to generate an office premium, or as an 
appropriate theoretical guideline of where the office premium should gravitate to. 
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: Section 7.1 introduces the challenges 
faced in the provision of insurance for natural disaster risks, and how the New Zealand 
insurance market copes with these challenges. Section 7.2 describes the current 
paradigm in natural disaster insurance pricing and the opportunities provided by the 
proposed pricing model. Section 7.3 presents the model’s framework. This section also 
gives a discussion of the actuary’s role in insurance pricing and demonstrates how the 
model fits in New Zealand’s residential insurance coverage using empirical claims data 
from earthquakes disasters. Section 7.4 gives the conclusions and recommendations. 
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7.1. Challenges Faced in the Provision of Natural Disaster Insurance 
Insurance markets play a crucial role in managing global natural disaster risks. This 
happens by both spreading large catastrophic losses associated with natural disaster 
events, and by providing incentives to encourage risk reduction efforts as well as 
providing the necessary rebuilding funds in the aftermath of catastrophic losses. The 
biggest challenge to insurers as they provide catastrophe loss coverage is how to 
underwrite and produce competitive and fair office premiums for natural disaster risks. 
The uncertainties of natural disasters pose a different set of risks, responsibilities, and 
responses by insurance markets. This complicates the underwriting and rate-making 
process even for the most experienced underwriter. While most global insurers and 
reinsurers do provide natural disaster risk coverage, it is increasingly becoming 
unaffordable for most insureds (Kousky and Cooke, 2012). This implies that most of 
insurance-demanders find it difficult to access affordable coverage for their homes, 
leading to mass lack of insurance, or an under-insurance problem. The risk posed by 
many people living in disaster-prone areas being un-insured or under-insured and the 
economic externalities and social chaos that would occur is increasingly pushing the 
government to take an active role in the provision of natural disaster insurance 
coverage.  
Despite the government interventions in natural disaster insurance, the ability to 
accurately calculate the probability of natural disaster events occurring, and the 
magnitude of the losses that may result is still undoubtedly a challenging task from an 
underwriter’s perspective. To help address some of these challenges, this study presents 
a pragmatic risk-based premium pricing approach. When this model is adequately 
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adjusted to specific market characteristics, then it can be used for natural disaster rate-
making in any catastrophe prone insurance market. 
Besides stringent risk-based underwriting measures, other common rate-making 
requirements to address natural disaster loss include, first, the physical infrastructure of 
the built environment strengthening to high seismic or flood requirement standards to 
offset property damage and by extension, injury and death following an earthquake or 
floods. Second, the insurance industry infrastructure (both private and public) to put in 
place substantial capital to assist in recovery and re-build in the aftermath of major 
natural disaster (Ericson and Doyle, 2004). However, of the two extra measures both 
shock-resistant physical infrastructure and an insolvency-resistant insurance market 
entail additional uncertainties due to the uncertainty of the magnitude of disasters and 
related financial impacts when these events occur. A study by Ericson and Doyle (2004) 
demonstrates that there are several data limitations with respect to when and where a 
catastrophic such as an earthquake will occur and the probable maximum loss (PML) 
it will cause. Large magnitude earthquakes are rare and occur without warning. This 
makes data collection difficult especially from countries without appropriate automate 
seismic data monitoring centres. Fortunately, New Zealand has very advanced modern 
seismographs to measure the magnitude, location and characteristics of earthquakes in 
real time. Notwithstanding the sizable historical data on seismic events in New Zealand, 
accurate translation of the data into a specific contemporary setting for insurance 
underwriting remains scant. This implies that there is still a high prevalence of 
uncertainties associated with earthquake risk analysis and how this could be used in 
underwriting in New Zealand insurance market to generate risk-based premiums. 
Studies by Brown et al. (2013, 2016) show that, prior to the 2010-11 Christchurch 
earthquakes, there was very limited risk-based insurance premium pricing in New 
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Zealand. Some underwriters are now requesting for more information like the age of 
the property, spread of risk, nature of construction, land and/or soil structure, extent of 
strengthening work and seismic report where possible. Even with all this information, 
technical provisions on the frequency and severity of catastrophes are open to 
competing interpretations due to the subjective manner in which historical data are 
compiled and interpreted. It is therefore very crucial for catastrophe risk underwriters 
to create a sense of objective knowledge out of their incomplete subjective assessment 
and different interpretations of historical loss data. While the underwriting and rate-
making of extreme disaster events should be risk-based, this should also be 
supplemented by a mixture of creative innovative skills in order to generate affordable 
premiums which when invested and accumulated can be used to offset major 
catastrophe loss claims.  
To tackle the inherent nature of spatially concentrated natural disaster risk, New 
Zealand insurers participate in elaborate reinsurance arrangements. This also ensures 
that the huge capital that is required to fund catastrophic losses is available across all 
classes of business. The international reinsurers, in turn, spread the load amongst 
themselves by only taking a portion of the underwriters’ risk. The reason why reinsurers 
take on less than 100 percent of the underwritten catastrophe risk themselves can be 
examined from the underwriting margin perspective. This can be done by comparing 
the insurer’s underwriting margin over a range of loss ratios on the original un-reinsured 
portfolio to the reinsurer's underwriting margin over the same range of loss ratios. The 
insurer’s underwriting margin can be defined as 100 percent less its un-reinsured loss 
ratio less its incurred expense ratio on the un-reinsured portfolio. Whereas the 
reinsurer's underwriting margin can be defined as 100 percent less its assumed loss ratio 
less the ceding commission. If the insurer’s margin equals or exceeds the reinsurer's 
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margin for the loss ratios that imply an underwriting loss, then clearly the reinsurer has 
assumed substantially all of the insurer's catastrophe downside risk. Thus, to adequately 
determine how much reinsurance cover insurers require, insurers must make an 
appropriate estimate of the PML of their insurance portfolio or use the market 
experience to determine their retention limit.  
In most cases, insured losses are equivalent to the insurance cover contracted, in which 
case the PML would equal the total cover. This is certainly the case with the new 
nominated value policy type now in place in New Zealand insurance market. 
Alternatively, insurers can still conservatively assume that the risk of a total loss of 
insured property can be discounted and so the PML can be set at a lower value. For 
catastrophe losses such as an earthquake, where there is a potential accumulation of 
losses, an inherent challenge is posed. In a diversified insurance portfolio, in which the 
degree of correlation between the individual risks has been controlled, the PML should 
reflect that diversification and be much less than the aggregate of the insured risks. 
Thus, the choice of appropriate retention level is mostly determined by the insurer of 
the insurance contract under consideration. Insurers will use their judgement and 
experience to decide the best and competitive retention level. To this end, the aim of 
the choice of particular limit is more likely to balance the relationship between profits 
and stability, rather than to reduce the risk that capital is exhausted, which indirectly 
enforces incentive compatibility on both the insurer and the reinsurer. The probability 
of ruin is not a concept which becomes of immediate concern to a pricing actuary at 
this stage. However, as the capital at risk approaches 100 percent of premium, then 




To adequately arrange for reinsurance coverage, New Zealand private insurance 
companies and the EQC typically have treaties with several reinsurers which is in line 
with other disaster-prone insurance markets. The reinsurers in turn spread their risk load 
amongst themselves and through the large insurance syndicates that trade at Lloyd’s of 
London. This points to the fact that New Zealand insurers participate in the global 
reinsurance market extensively. Even with the extreme natural disaster experiences in 
New Zealand, this network of insurance, reinsurance and retro-reinsurance mechanisms 
keeps the market afloat due to the extensive footprint in the global reinsurance market. 
Another key area in which the government helps is in the provision of natural disaster 
provision is through construction regulation under a common building code. For 
example, in the aftermath of Christchurch earthquakes, the Christchurch City Council 
issued new 67 percent earthquake strengthening standards as a compulsory target for 
all earthquake-prone buildings (Galloway and Hare, 2012). While these measures may 
not exclusively be a key requirement for the residential insurance policy contract, they 
are vital in the underwriting process. Homeowners can also be offered lower premium 
rates as incentives and rewards in commensurate with mitigation measures put in place. 
These measures have made insurability of natural disasters affordable and available for 
residential property owners in New Zealand.  
7.2. Current Paradigm in Natural Disaster Insurance Pricing 
This study proposes a pragmatic risk-based pricing model which seeks to address some 
of the challenges highlighted above. The proposed model appreciates that the premium 
rate generated should be sufficient to fully indemnify the contracted policy liability, 
make a reasonable profit margin without subjecting the in-force business to 
unreasonable solvency constraints, and at the same time generate competitive rates in 
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the insurance market faced. This implies that the premium rate should be much higher 
than the expected loss because the insurer has to provide a large amount of capital in 
case of extreme catastrophic events. In highly uncertain situations like these, the 
previous trend has been that of insurers inflating premiums; this is clearly discussed in 
Kunreuther et al. (1995). A popular approach currently in many insurance markets is 
that insurers are pricing and/or underwriting natural disaster risk in terms of local 
market trends and reinsurance requirements, rather than in line with actuarial principles 
of PML and statistical loss models (Bin and Landry, 2013). When the insurance demand 
surges, the private insurance companies rely on the seller of reinsurance as the price 
setter more so for catastrophe risk. Spatially correlated losses from catastrophe events 
imply that there is very minimal or no risk diversification within the insurance portfolio. 
Thus, on the one hand, relying on reinsurance markets to set the premium rates due to 
their global capability and experience in diversification of risk seems a desirable 
measure, but on the other hand, this compromises the need to use an independent risk-
based pricing approach to underwrite risks on their merits. The proposed pricing model 
deals with these challenges by providing an opportunity to incorporate the technical 
aspect of catastrophe risk to premium rates. 
7.3. Model Framework and Discussions; an Actuarial Perspective 
7.3.1. Actuary’s Role in General Insurance Pricing 
Actuarial pricing entails the determination of the technical basis necessary for the 
premium rate charged on the underwritten risks (Straub and Actuaries, 1988). Like any 
other business venture, an insurance company is a business that expects returns on 
investment. Therefore, the rate charged must be sufficient to pay for the expected claims 
payouts, office overheads and earn some profit margin as well. Adequate premiums 
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should also be able to withstand volatility associated with the insurance business. This 
implies that insurers will seek to maximize profits, preferably by setting an actuarially 
unfair premium. However, insurance regulators in each market have local policy 
guidelines and provisions on how the underwriting process should be done. In this case, 
the pricing actuary is restricted to the assumptions that can be used in the pricing model. 
For example, the comprehensive Solvency II directive regulates insurance markets in 
the EU region on pricing, valuations and reserving. In the presence of strict regulation, 
the actuary’s pricing role reduces to a calculation of risk premium sufficient to keep the 
insurance portfolio solvent. The risk premium would constitute part of the premium 
necessary for anticipated claims payouts, and the proportionate cost associated with 
these claims. One major cost associated with claims includes the amount paid by the 
insurer to investigate and settle claims including loss adjustments effects when a loss 
event occurs. The claims payouts and the associated claims cost would heavily depend 
on the mean expected loss based on the assumption that future claims costs do not 
deviate much from historical claims data. The underwriting insurer can then decide on 
the loading adjustments component of the premium necessary to cover other expenses, 
particularly office expenses, reinsurance costs and a reasonable profit margin on the 
risk premium rate to generate the gross premium, which when multiplied with the 
exposure per unit generates the premium insureds pay on a particular policy. The 
pricing process can, therefore, be summarised into two stages. The first stage is the 
estimation of the loss distribution and the associated moments of the loss, and the 
second is incorporating all the rate-making factors, expenses and margin loading in the 
pricing model. Essentially, the second stage is a cost mark-up process as opposed to a 
profit maximising price setting given demand. In such a case, a hypothetical 
underwriter could set the price equal to mean expected loss plus some reasonable profit 
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margin that can be expressed as premium rate times a mark-up rate. In economic theory, 
there are different theoretical treatments of mark-up pricing, for example Bain (1956), 
Modigliani (1958) and Baron (1973) have long argued that price and mark-up function 
as barriers to market entry set up by incumbents who wish to deter potential 
competitors. In this limit-pricing process, prices are set above the costs but below prices 
at which potential competitors could enter the market and earn positive profits. From 
an economic theory perspective, pricing depends on many factors such as the degree of 
concentration, economies of scale, product differentiation, the absolute cost advantages 
of incumbents, and to some extent the elasticity of demand. This means the loading for 
an insurance contract will be reasonably similar to the standard loading of risky assets. 
In practice, the loss distributions are selected based on past and current loss experience 
using the available data and/or through simulation process. This reiterates the need for 
cautious modelling using the historical loss data because systemic changes may have 
occurred such that prior catastrophes are no longer representative of the future. These 
systemic changes may involve both frequency and severity of the loss. For example, 
climatic and seismic changes may either increase and/or decrease the frequency and/or 
the severity of various catastrophe losses. Keen et al. (2003) gives clear reasons to 
believe that the coming years will see an increase in the frequency and severity of 
natural disasters. Similarly, economic and demographic changes may affect catastrophe 
losses in respect to the severity of the loss. This challenge can be overcome by 
adjustments for the main systemic changes involving the frequency and severity of 
catastrophes and better assumptions so that the predictive loss distribution is based on 
a statistically sound modelling framework. 
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7.3.2. How the Model Fits in New Zealand’s Residential Insurance Coverage 
7.3.2.1. Background of Residential Insurance Cover in New Zealand  
This section examines the framework and formation of the natural disaster insurance in 
New Zealand which is offered as a rider on fire and general peril coverage. Residential 
property and contents insurance coverage in New Zealand is constituted of two layers 
of insurance contracts run in a dual-insurance system. The first contract layer is covered 
by EQC, while the second contract layer is covered by the private insurance market.  
The EQC scheme currently provides EQC cover for insured residential property 
damaged by earthquake, volcanic eruption, hydrothermal activity, landslip, tsunami or 
fire caused by natural disaster. Maximum cover for each event is up to $20,000 plus 
GST for personal property (contents) and $100,000 plus GST for each dwelling. The 
government believes that without something like the EQC scheme, many homeowners 
would be under-insured or uninsured against catastrophe risks. Global reinsurers note 
that New Zealand has very high catastrophe insurance coverage rates (see Edwards & 
Davis, 2012). EQC insurance cover attracts a premium in the form of a statutory levy 
of 15 cents plus GST for every $100 of private home or contents fire insurance. EQC 
revenue is collected by each homeowner’s private insurer and passed on to EQC. Before 
the cost was tripled from five cents in 2012 it had been unchanged, per dollar of cover, 
since the scheme’s inception in 1945. 
In the aftermath of the 2010-11 Christchurch earthquakes, numerous questions emerged 
on the effectiveness of the insurance organisational dual model for natural disaster 
cover, and whether it worked as envisaged by EQC and the wider insurance industry 
(Brown et al., 2016). Due to the challenges experienced post-catastrophe, the 
government decided to review the EQC Act in light of the lessons learned from the 
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Christchurch earthquakes. From an actuarial standpoint, the current pricing 
arrangement, and the structure of the single-rate premium does not require EQC’s 
premiums to reflect the costs and risks that the scheme imposes on the government. 
Since EQC has an unlimited government funding guarantee, then the risks of the EQC 
scheme are ultimately borne by the government. This highly subsidised dual-system 
with a flat rate levy irrespective of size or location of dwelling creates a positive 
distortion in the insurance market. On the one hand, it mutes the risk signal and 
potentially creates adverse selection behaviour, and on the other, it enables private 
insurance which has a higher degree of risk rating to be cheaper because private insurers 
do not have to meet the first loss and this, therefore, helps keep insurance in total more 
affordable. This insightful thought was motivated by the quantitative information and 
correspondence received from Tim Grafton CMInstD, the chief executive of Insurance 
Council of New Zealand. 
However, it should not be lost that insurance is not the only approach for dealing with 
catastrophes. An alternative risk hedging mechanism in addition to the existing 
traditional reinsurance arrangements can also be explored. Future research work could 
investigate how these alternative measures can address the issues to do with a better 
treatment of natural disaster risk. 
7.3.2.2. Theoretic Framework of Structure of the Residential Insurance Cover 
in New Zealand 
Assume the proportion covered by the EQC scheme is up to a predetermined sum 
insured denoted by Q . The value of Q  represents the maximum amount of claim paid 
EQC scheme due to natural disaster event. The second component of the contract is 
covered by the private insurer to a maximum nominated sum insured, denoted by M . 
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The primary insurer is responsible for any claim’s cost associated with random natural 
disaster loss X  in this case, if and only if the gross loss amount is between Q  and the 
maximum nominated sum insured M  subject to any other policy conditions within the 
contracted period denoted as T . Then, this analysis presents the EQC-private insurers’ 
dual-system arrangement as follows;  
i). If  then the primary underwriter pays nothing;  
ii). If Q X M   then the primary underwriter pays X Q ; and 
iii). If X M  it is expected that the underwriter pays out then gets a rebate of 
Q  from EQC, while the exceeding portion X M  is borne by the homeowner 
as deductible. 
This arrangement relates closely to the standard excess of loss layer in the traditional 
reinsurance contract. However, the novelty of this presented arrangement is that EQC 
is viewed as though it was the primary underwriter of this contract with the retention 
limit capped at Q ; whereas the private insurer is viewed as though it was the reinsurer 
capped at . 
Let’s now relate this arrangement back to the standard theory of optimal insurance in 
Arrow (1970). Under Arrow’s theorem, the optimal insurance indemnification for a 
risk-averse insured is a deductible contract. Thus, in the present New Zealand insurance 
structure, the EQC is the only one with a deductible deal while the policyholders have 
a non-deductible contract. In the current EQC dual model, the EQC first loss of 
$100,000 is viewed as a deductible to the primary insurer, where to make the model 







Now, for an insurance indemnity denoted by P , the insurance contract arrangement i) 










             (7.1) 
Equation 7.1 presents a formulation theoretic framework that forms the basis for pricing 
the risk undertaken by both EQC and private insurers.  
When an alternative risk management process is considered as a way to deal with the 
catastrophe losses, Equation 7.1 can also be re-expressed as the difference between two 
call options with different exercise prices. This will represent a call-option spread, 
written on the loss exposure of the underlying event. Cummins et al. (1999) pose a call-
option in pricing reinsurance contracts and transferring catastrophe risk from 
(re)insurance market to capital market.; 
   0, 0,P Max X Q Max X M                 (7.2)  
The innovation in the proposition is that EQC will not only rely on reinsurance and 
government but also on the global derivative market to fund and/or minimise natural 
disaster losses.  
Equation 7.2 gives a standard call-option, this presents an interesting opportunity to 
both the EQC and the private insurers to write hedging contracts in form of catastrophe 
derivatives in line with the existing derivative market. The EQC and private insurers 
can directly write and sell contingent claims against the upper cap of natural disaster 
losses on a per occurrence basis and trade this in a similar way to the well-known 
catastrophe bonds.  
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7.3.3. Modelling Catastrophe Claims with Pareto Model on Actuarial Premium 
Principle 
This section presents the basic insurance premium rate formula as expressed in 
Equation 7.3: 
PurePremium = MeanExpectedLoss + LAE + UWExpenses + UWProfit            (7.3) 
where, LAE: denotes the amounts paid by the insurance company to investigate and 
settle claims when a loss event occurs including loss adjustment consideration, and 
UW: denotes underwriting. The pure premium refers to that portion of that premium 
rate needed to pay losses, loss-adjustment expenses and both underwriting expenses 
and profits. When the pure premium is adjusted to allow for loading per exposure unit, 
this generates a gross premium rate. Lastly, to calculate the amount of premium paid 
by the insured, the gross premium rate is multiplied by the number of exposure units. 
Normally, premium rates are fixed in advance, implying that the rates basis must be 
appropriate to match future uncertain payouts when an event triggers payments. A 
unique way to address this is to discount the solvency basis and incorporate a 
component of the probability of ruin into the pricing. This is a realistic assumption 
because insurers must adequately allow for extreme exposure, which can leave the 
insurer insolvent. This is a seemingly easy assumption but it is nowhere in the existing 
literature. The future equilibrium stability or solvency position is maintained by 
allowing for the probability of failure when pricing the contracts.  
This analysis postulates that the relationship between the mean present cash-inflows 
and the mean present value of the cash-outflows should produce an equilibrium solvent 
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position to enable the insurer to pay-out catastrophe losses when disastrous events 
occur.  
Assume 0R  represents the solvency capital requirement at the time of contract inception 
while the adjustment coefficient k is a ruin model parameter that describes the 
behaviour of the ruin probability. The standard notation in risk theory, defines the ruin 
probability as  with 0( )
kR













                        (7.4) 
Equation 7.4 stems from the fact that given an upper bound for the ruin probability, we 
would be interested to know whether k is the best possible exponent in an exponential 
upper bound. In this case, it is assumed that the adjustment coefficient  is a 
hypothetical value such that; 
 ( ) - ( )Cash in-flows Cash out-flowsk kEe e                (7.5) 
Cash-inflow is a representation of the premium inflows while the cash-outflow is a 
representation of claims outgo. 
In the standard ruin model, the adjustment coefficient for a risk process describes the 
behaviour of the ruin probability and is used to characterise the risk tolerance of the 
underwriting insurer. Several results for both independent and dependent claims exist. 
Gerber (1979) gives exact formulas for finite time ruin probabilities involving the 
adjustment coefficient , and Pitts et al. (1996) provide a consistent estimator of , 
while Mammitzsch (1986) presents necessary and sufficient conditions for the 








To compute value for k , the pricing actuary must target the probability of ruin at a 
hypothetical level, say %5.0t . The value of 0R  in the Equation 7.4 represents the 
solvency capital requirement at the time of contract inception as a proportion of insured 
risk. This value is mostly set by the regulatory regime in each insurance jurisdiction. 
For example, in the EU insurance market, the solvency capital requirement is set at a 
level to ensure that insurers and reinsurers can meet their obligations to policyholders 
and beneficiaries over the subsequent 12-month period with a 99.5 percent probability. 
This is set such that it can limit the likelihood of financial ruin to less than 1 in 200 
cases within any given year 
Section 7.3.1 describes the traditional role played by pricing actuary in general 
insurance rate-making. The actuarial professional bodies in each jurisdiction have 
guidelines that set out the assumptions and/or basis used in computation of each 
component of Equation 7.3. This implies different techniques can be adopted to 
estimate each component based on the pricing assumptions used. This work estimates 
the pure premium based on the standard variance premium principle. An appropriate 
loss distribution is used to model the expected catastrophe losses.  
In theory, actuarial premium principles based on both economic principles and a 
generalised Markov inequality are used as the method for assigning an appropriate 
amount of indemnity for an insurance policy. The present model adopts the variance 
premium principle based on Bühlmann's economic principle, initially proposed in 
Booth et al. (2004) and Bühlmann (1985). Innovative modifications have been done on 
the variance principle to incorporate the novel assumption and pricing basis proposed 
in this analysis. This model as presented should not be seen as a step back from the 
current practice of simulating disasters through catastrophe models to generate 
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expected loss costs, and probability exceedance curves to compute appropriate 
premiums. Catastrophe models based on simulation output are very limited and require 
substantial amounts of data for model construction and validation. In addition, the 
reliability of such models depends heavily on an understanding of the underlying 
physical mechanisms that control the occurrence and behaviour of natural disasters (see 
Muir-Wood & Grossi, 2008; Phelan, 2011; Joyette, Nurse & Pulwarty, 2015). While 
no one disaster expert would claim to have a complete understanding of all the 
complexities of these physical systems, scientists and engineers, aided by increasingly 
sophisticated instrumentation and computing capabilities, have continuously built 
information and knowledge in these areas. The sophisticated theoretical and empirical 
models currently being developed can reasonably simulate these complex phenomena, 
but there is still a lack of inclusion of underwriters in the entire process of developing 
the models. Thus, there is limited understanding among most insurers on how to use 
catastrophe modelling in their rate filings to help determine how much premium their 
policyholders are charged in catastrophe-prone areas. 
This study poses a pragmatic approach that can be easily understood amongst 
underwriters since it is based on the well-known variance principle. The proposed 
model deduces five fundamental components to price catastrophe risk. The novelty of 
these five components is that the concept of investigating, settlement and loss 
adjustment claims effects, and both underwriting profit margin and underwriting 
overheads and/or commissions are allowed for in the rate marking of catastrophe risk. 
This is fundamentally new in two perspectives; first, only life insurance contracts price 
policies on the basis of such assumptions. A certain form of certainty makes pricing life 
contracts interesting and safer to set premiums. This particular approach in the pricing 
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of life contracts is valuable when incorporated to the pricing of catastrophe risk with 
appropriate adjustments made to reflect the nature of general insurance business.  
Second, the uncertainty actuarial basis mostly derogated to reserving and solvency 
calculations has been appropriately incorporated and allowed for at the inception of the 
policy contract. In essence then, this approach become superior to risk loading methods 
described in Bühlmann (1984), Feldblum (1990) and Kaluszka (2001). 
On the first reflection, it might seem that using the variance principle of Bühlmann 
(1985) is not new as it has been incorporated by insurers for years in calculating risk 
loads, not just for catastrophe exposure, but in all exposures. Of note is that, when the 
ratio of the variance to the expected value is considered, this does not change when 
similar risks are added to a portfolio. In essence then, the proposed model approach of 
discounting the contingencies associated with catastrophes then loading this 
appropriate to the standard variance principle, is a unique approach which also reduces 
the process risk faced by the insurers when policies are issued. Process risk aggregates 
in pricing due to the ratio of the variance to the expected loss increasing when more 
risks are added to the pool, and due to the theoretical failure of the variance in that they 
determine only relative risk, not absolute risk. Furthermore, the application of the risk 
load methodology based on variance only results in fairly low-risk loads across various 
lines of business which may threaten the future solvency of the insurer. The volatility 
in catastrophe lines makes it more of an issue, since the variance component will add 
substantially to the overall premium charged, but again other loading needs to be 
allowed for appropriately. 
Equation 7.6 gives a compact model made up of the five fundamental components as; 
(i) mean expected value of the loss amount, (ii) a proportionate variance component to 
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accounts for the variability and the risk tolerance associated with the anticipated 
underwritten risk when a loss event occurs, (iii) a proportionate mean expected value 
to allow for the amounts paid by the insurance company to investigate, settle claims 
and loss adjustment effects when a loss event occurs, (iv) underwriting profit margins, 
and (v) underwriting overheads and commission. Now, using the variance principle and 
making the adjustment as proposed in the Equation 7.3 the pure premium rate is 
expressed as presented in Equation 7.6: 
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The notation in the Equation 7.6 is defined as follows; 2 ; ,%[ ]X Q Mt ia  denotes the 
present value of the underwriting profit margin proportional to the premium rate. Where 
%t i
a is the present value component if this is made in-arrears and discounted for t  
period at an interest rate of %i .  
Of note is that, private insurance companies may have an internal policy guide on what 
variables should the underwriting expert put into consideration when allowing for the 
underwriting profit margin. For example, a typical approach is to use accounting 













ROE   =target return on equity  
sIY   =investment income on surplus 
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P/S  =premium to surplus ratio 
opIY  =investment income on operations  
This profit loading is widely accepted, but for simplicity, this work uses the mean 
present value of the premium rate to estimate profit loading component. The term 
3 ; ,%
[ ]X Q Mt ia   is used to denote the present value of the amount of commissions and 
overheads associated with the underwritten risk as a proportion of the premium rate. 
Whereas, 
%t i
a is the present value component if this is made in-advance and discounted 
for t  period at an interest rate of %i . For %i , the base rate or risk-free interest rate is 
used and  denotes the contracted period such that . The 
proportions 
1 2 3,   and     are hypothetical values randomly selected; empirical data 
and local regulatory guidelines can be used to calculate particular values of the 
proportion. This can reduce any bias created when the proportions are determined 
judgementally. The variance component ( ; , )kVar X Q M is used to represent the 
variability and the risk tolerance associated with the anticipated underwritten risk. The 
value k (a factor associated with ruin probability) is incorporated into the variance to 
expresses risk as a dynamic process. This factor relates ruin concept to the 
counteracting factors of premium rate and severity distributions (Ohlsson and 
Johansson, 2010). Lastly, ( ; , )E X Q M denotes the mean expected value of the loss 
amount whereas ),;(1 MQXE  represents a proportionate mean expected value to 
allow for the amounts paid by the insurance company to investigate, settle claims and 
loss adjustment effects when a loss event occurs. 
The characteristic of the mean expected loss and variance components depend heavily 
on the choice of the loss distribution to fit the historical claims data. The loss model 
must represent a reasonable fit of the data. When modelling loss frequency and severity, 
t 1 2, ,........, Nt t t t t  
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it is important to fit a probability distribution to the observed data as well as to evaluate 
the observed data directly to have a clear understanding of the tail behaviour of the data. 
In this light then, when the data is fitted on the probability distribution, it is possible to 
model loss expectations in the tail end of the loss distribution for ranges of losses larger 
than those contained in the data set. This is very important, especially when the sample 
size is small and/or contains very large catastrophe losses.  
It is typical for most catastrophe losses to have a heavy long-tail, which makes the 
Pareto model the distributional family of choice to model catastrophe losses in a variety 
of actuarial and finance applications. Normally, the standard two parameter Pareto 
distribution is the best choice when the random loss variables have values greater than 
a fixed positive number, say . In this instance,   is used to indicate the minimum 
claim amount and   gives the shape of the density function. This means that the Pareto 
model covers the behaviour of large losses well, but fails to cover the behaviour of very 
small losses making it unfit for non-catastrophic losses (Cooray & Ananda, 2005). In 
this case, the random loss variables X  have a continuous cumulative distribution 
function of the form; 
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The moments of Pareto random variable X exist only a finite number of times. The 
existence of the Pareto higher moments mE X   is capped by the shape parameter  . 
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In particular, the improper integral in Equation 7.9 converges, and mE X   exists, 
whenever :m   
1 ( 1,2,3,..., ).
m
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           (7.9) 
Thus, the mean  E X  does not exist for 1  . Similarly, when 2  , the Pareto 
variance does not exist. Equation 7.9 can now be simplified to obtain Equation 7.10 for 
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Note that, the variance of X  denoted by  Var X , defined by  2( )E X E x , and can 
be computed via      2 2Var X E X E X  : the second moment minus the square of 
the first moment. When the Pareto distribution is used to model a random catastrophic 
loss, and if the mean is infinite when 1  , then the catastrophe risk is uninsurable. As 
a continuous distribution to model claim severity, the standard Pareto distribution 
models only those catastrophe claims in excess of a specified positive amount 
(Rytgaard, 1990; Klugman et al., 2012). The subsequent section uses empirical data to 
illustrate how the distribution is used to model catastrophe claims for losses greater than 
a set minimum limit or the over-capped loss amount from the EQC viewpoint. 
7.3.4. Illustrative Example of the Modelling Framework 
This section uses insurance claims data for Christchurch red-zone properties to fit the 
selected Pareto loss distribution. The loss distribution is used to estimate expected 
indemnity assuming that the data is an ideal illustrative of the cost of a catastrophe 
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event in a highly seismic region. This illustrative example demonstrates how actuarial 
risk-based rate-making techniques could be used to price residential insurance 
coverage.  
Table 7-1: Average Claims Payout per Suburb for Christchurch Red-zone Properties 
Suburb Property Under Red-zone Average Claims Payout $ 
(NZD) 
Aranui 19 160560.90 
Avondale 777 260825.00 
Avonside 635 233852.08 
Bexley 869 204430.54 
Brooklands 510 333219.59 
Burwood 1449 258885.63 
Cashmere 17 552038.36 
Cass bay 1 575005.00 
Central Christchurch 77 334656.60 
Clifton 48 687555.11 
Dallington 761 255179.16 
Ferrymead 28 363750.00 
Governor's Bay 8 576219.07 
Heathcote Valley 73 887816.62 
Hillsborough 29 397375.44 
Kaiapoi 893 232069.09 
Kairaki 71 229160.54 
Linwood 34 288355.77 
Lyttelton 32 449962.30 
Moncks bay 15 770909.63 
Mount Pleasant 12 311700.00 
New Brighton 554 303391.08 
Rapaki 9 399414.34 
Redcliffs 66 462333.42 
Richmond 347 270692.00 
Richmond Hill 19 463793.50 
Somerfield 1 164131.77 
SouthNew Brighton 50 482277.40 
Southshore 145 321399.10 
Sumner 154 522642.43 
The Pines Beach 84 204073.31 
Wainoni 71 258810.84 
Total for 32 Observations 7858 12,216,485.62 
 
Let’s assume that an insurer anticipates selling a portfolio of policies in New Zealand 
to cover residential buildings against the risk of fire and general risk with a natural 
disaster endorsement. It is assumed that the mean claim payout for the 32 suburbs is a 
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good representation of the portfolio of residential insurance policies. For simplicity, it 
is also assumed that the high-definition New Zealand Earthquake model estimates that 
the catastrophe claims from insurers’ portfolio of policies is modelled by the selected 
Pareto model. Table 7-1 displays the Christchurch red-zone properties claims data from 
32 suburbs that were declared unfit for habitation in the aftermath of Christchurch 
earthquake. It also shows average claims payout per suburb for the red-zoned 
properties. This illustrative of the pricing model looks at the data of each suburb as a 
single observation so, in total, the modelling framework is based on 32 observations 
with a total mean claim amount of NZ$12,216,485.62. 
To provide useful interpretation and modelling of the data, the first step is to present 
the results of well known plots such as the histogram and the quantiles plot. Figure 7-1 
presents the histogram and Pareto density function of the data. The plot shows that the 
histogram is highly skewed right. This is common to most catastrophe loss claims that 
are typically highly positively skewed and distributed with a larger upper tail (Klugman 
et al., 2012). In particular, it is observed that most of the claims are below NZ$480,000. 
In general, it can be observed that the claims data presents few claim amounts with very 
high values while most of the claims amounts were of low values. 
 





















This model illustration also uses Q-Q plot to give a graphical presentation for the 
goodness-of-fit of the Pareto model to the observed claims data. In general, the Q-Q 
plot is normally used to show if two data sets come from the same distribution.   
 
Figure 7-2: Q-Q Plot of Christchurch Red-zone Claims to the Pareto Model 
Figure 7-2 presents the Q-Q plot which is plotted against the observed loss data. 
According to the Q-Q plot, it can be clearly seen that the Pareto is a reasonable model 
to fit this data. 
Of note is that the Q-Q plot, as shown in Figure7-2, tends to be sensitive to variations 
of the claim values in the tail end of the distribution. The slope of the curve at the upper 
end of the claims values gives cause for concern as it is fairly easy to see that the model 
is increasingly off the slope. However, it is noted that the most useful property of the 
Pareto tail model is that, when going upwards to model larger losses the model forgets 
the original threshold  , which is not needed any further, instead the new threshold 
comes in dictated by the nature of the data being modelled. So if the model encounters 
few fairly large claim values, it is not necessary to know exactly where that tail starts 
or ends. As long as we are in the tail, which is the Pareto area, we always have the same 
parameter  , whatever the threshold. More importantly, a loss distribution with 




























many (re)insurance data it is clear that not all tails in the world of insurance are Pareto 
distributed (Embrechts & Schmidli 1994; McNeil 1997; Cummins et al. 1999), in 
particular the model often seems to be somewhat too heavy-tailed at the very large end. 
Nevertheless Pareto is the best model to use on claims with characteristics similar to 
the present data. If it fits well between – in the case of our data, say 160,000 to 560,000 
– one can use it for claims in that area independently of whether beyond 600,000 one 
needs a different model or not. 
Figure 7-3 plots Christchurch red-zone property claims against the Pareto density 
function. The Pareto distribution parameters based on the data are 1.2977   and
160560  .  
This plot reiterates the desirable properties of the Pareto loss distribution to model 
(re)insurance data, but also it illustrates the limitation of the Pareto model in that it has 
monotonically decreasing shape of the density. Thus, it does not provide a reasonable 
fit for smaller valued loss claims. It can be seen from Figure 7-3 that the shape of the 
Pareto curve changes slowly with alpha, but the tail of the distribution increases 
dramatically with decreasing alpha. 
 
Figure 7-3: Christchurch Red-zone Suburbs Property Claims against Pareto Density  
Probability Density Function



















To further compare the performance of the Pareto model in describing the claims data, 
the 32 suburbs are considered as the cells, then a goodness of fit test is done. The 
goodness of fit test represents the measures of the compatibility of the empirical data 
with a theoretical probability distribution function. The most often used goodness of 
fits tests are Kolmogorov-Smirnov, Anderson-Darling, and Chi-Square (Plackett, 1983; 
Choulakian & Stephens, 2001). 
The results are summarised in Table 7-2 which gives 2 8.1966  . Since . .=32-1=31d f
, the rejection limit is  20.95 31 44.98  . The fitted Pareto distribution is therefore, at 
the 5 percent level of significance, a reasonable fit to the data. 
Table 7-2: Goodness of Fit – Summary 
Distribution Kolmogorov-Smirnov Anderson-Darling Chi-Squared 







Now, recall that for any natural disaster claims to be payable by the private insurer in 
New Zealand, it must be greater than NZ$120,000 for both property and content, this 
represents the upper limit of EQC. Next, assume that catastrophic claims are capped at 
the mean loss generated by the loss distribution in addition to the EQC cap-limit. Using 
the Pareto distribution with parameters 1.2977  and 160560  , the mean of the 
claims payouts is 699940. The mean expected loss can then be computed conditional 
on the claims being greater than NZ$120,000. 
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Working in Matlab: 




X-120000 f X dx= 40543.2159841015




 % tail index k,  
% scale parameter sigma 






x = linspace(120000,819940,n); 
grid=(819940-120000)/n; 
first=sum(grid*(x-120000).*gppdf(x,k,sigma,theta) ); 
latter = 699940*(1-gpcdf(819940,k,sigma,theta)); 
 
fprintf('E[z] = %.10f\n',first+latter) 
The conditional expectation for the indemnity paid by the insurer is then obtained as 





E Z z    
 
Thus, we now have  0 NZ$83,652.77826.E Z z    
Note that: when Pareto with parameters 1.2977  and 160560  , is used to model 




Next, choose the probability of ruin such that %5.0t  and a solvency margin
0 =200%R . This gives 298317367.5t . To illustrate how the proposed risk-based 
model incorporates the five componts of the pure premium from Equation 7.6 assume 
the following; (i) both mean expected loss and LAE can be modelled using a known 
loss distribution and that the LAE is set at 1 percent of the mean expected loss, (ii) each 
time the insurer writes a residential insurance contract, the insurer incurs underwriting 
expenses set at, say 15 percent of each dollar of pure premium rate, and (iii) targeted 
profit margin provision at 5 percent of pure premium rate. This model does not use the 
dividend income component proposed by Bühlmann (1985) and ignores the reinsurance 
costs. The mean expected pure premium rate can therefore be calculated as presented 
in Equation 7.11: 
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When the empirical data is fitted into the Pareto model it does not have finite variance, 








  is zero or the effect 
of the variance is undetermined. 
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Since the rates are determined per contract period, let’s assume 1t   so at 2.5%i  ; 
1 2.5%
0.9756a  . When all the values are replaced in Equation 7.12; the pure premium 
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The total Christchurch red-zone claims data is made-up of 32 suburbs with an average 
claims total of NZ$12,216,485.65; this is a grand total of average payout in each suburb. 
This gives the estimated pure premium for each suburb at approximately NZ$3,295. If 
the private insurers take into consideration the first loss cover provided by the EQC, 
then the pure premium can be significantly reduced to a more competitive value. 
It is also common to adjust catastrophe claims in modelling data as they can have a 
disproportional impact on the pure premium rate. To deal with the disproportionality, 
the insurer can look into the composition of the insurance portfolio to establish the 
extent to which further pricing assumptions can be made for appropriate adjustments. 
This can further be compared to the actual office expenses, unforeseen losses, 
reinsurance cost, regulatory restrictions and exposure units. The standard procedure is 
to multiply the pure premium rate determined by an actuary by the number of exposure 
units and then adjusting the premium by appropriate rating factors in accordance with 
the insurer’s underwriting policy as well as allowing for the law of large numbers to 
apply (Schofield, 1998). If the actuary is estimating pure premium rates for a new 
insurer or new risk, there will be no internal historical data to which a loss distribution 
can apply. In such a scenario, the actuary can still determine the indicative pure 
premium rate by estimating the expected pure premium, expense provisions and a target 
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profit provision based on external data or judgmentally based individual pricing 
experience. 
7.3.5. The Choice of Appropriate Premium Principles 
The choice of the most appropriate premium principles is always a challenging task: 
actuaries rely on ad hoc approaches in choosing premium principles in some cases. The 
most important rule of thumb is that the premium principle should assign a non-negative 
value to an insurable risk as defined by its loss distribution function. Notwithstanding, 
there are some desirable properties all premium principles should adhere to and satisfy 
(Booth et al., 2004).  
 
Figure 7-4: A Comparison of Variance and Expected Premium Principles 
A common observation is that, if the distributions of the losses are highly positively 
skewed with fat-tails, features that define catastrophic losses (Schoenberg et al., 2003), 
then the variance premium principle is preferred because; (i) this gives higher premiums 
than the expected premium principle, and (ii) this gives a better consideration of risk 
when working with larger data with lower frequencies. However, in a competitive 
business environment, insurers strive to offer lower premiums for their products to 
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remain competitive. Thus, there is a residual risk of insolvency even when the best 
underwriting measures are in place in calculating the premium rates. 
To minimise this risk, the insurer must continually look into the extent to which the law 
of large numbers is applicable in the insured pool. When pricing residential property 
cover against natural catastrophes, the law of large numbers may provide a rationale for 
the economies of scale. This makes it possible for insurance companies to produce gross 
premiums that are significantly lower than the computed risk premiums. This law in the 
simplest terms provides a justification for the existence of the insurance industry 
because the main role of the insurance industry is the transfer of risks and/or pooling 
and redistribution of risks (Seog, 2010). However, it should be appreciated that only a 
small component of catastrophe risk can be diversified using pooling and redistribution 
of risk. This implies that risk-based pricing models are the best approach that an 
insurance business can use to quantify technical provisions in rate-making. Many 
studies (Eling and Pankoke, 2014; Munroe et al., 2015; Theis and Wolgast, 2012) 
propose the use of the principle of proportionality proxy in the standard formula 
commonly used in Europe insurance pricing.  
7.4. Conclusions and Recommendations 
This study has built a risk-based pricing model suitable to generate competitive 
premium rates for natural disaster insurance cover. Using illustrative data from 
Christchurch Red-zone suburbs, the model has been able to provide competitive 
premium rates for catastrophe risk. The novelty of this model is that, it presents a new 
simple approach for risk-based rate-marking. This is an insightful contribution to the 
literature of catastrophe insurance, especially with respect to premium loading. This 
model can also play an important role to set internal benchmark rates in pricing of 
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natural disaster insurance coverage. However, it is crucial to study some models on 
market behaviour to find out the expected tendencies from market conditions; and how 
the consumer reacts to the premium rates proposed. 
An emerging question is the applicability and practicability of the proposed model in 
the private insurance market, where insurers’ rates are influenced global reinsurance 
firms and/or through catastrophe simulation. When the proposed model incorporates 
the new RMS high-definition New Zealand Earthquake Model, for example, insurers 
can find the model useful to identify losses at a granular level so as to calculate the 
competitive premium.  
This modelling framework can provide a structure with which to examine the complex 
natural disaster risk pricing. This model could also help in addressing the complexities 
and challenges posed by the integration of compulsory EQC cover to the private 
insurance cover. The existence of the EQC scheme taking the first loss for dwellings 
based on a flat levy irrespective of size or location of dwelling mutes the risk signal and 
potentially creates adverse selection behaviour from the insureds’ perspective, and on 
the other side it enables private insurance which has a higher degree of risk rating to be 
cheaper because it doesn’t have to meet the first loss and this, therefore, helps keep 
insurance in total more affordable. It should also be noted that EQC pricing 
arrangements and the structure of the flat rate premium creates two main concerns. 
First, the EQC does not require premiums to reflect the costs and risks as EQC has an 
unlimited government funding guarantee. Second, EQC premiums are almost never 
changed. The premium rate first established in 1945 remained unchanged, per dollar of 
cover, for over 65 years. In 2012, it was then tripled in response to the losses generated 




8. THE DUAL INSURANCE MODEL AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR 
INSURANCE DEMAND AND SUPPLY POST-CHRISTCHURCH 
EARTHQUAKES IN NEW ZEALAND 
8.0. Introduction 
This chapter looks at the empirical implications of earthquakes for insurance markets. 
The study is centered on the supply-side of the insurance market post-Christchurch 
earthquakes. The analysis starts with an introduction of the events leading to the 
Christchurch catastrophes. The study then looks at how catastrophe risks are insured in 
New Zealand by giving a diagnostic analysis of the natural disaster insurance market 
for residential property and contents. Third, the role played by the governments in the 
provision of natural disaster insurance and how this has helped both private insurance 
and reinsurance providers to meet the reasonable expectations of customers is 
described. Lastly, an empirical analysis is carried out using datasets sourced from the 
Insurance Council of New Zealand and one confidential private insurer. In summary, 
then, the most interesting contribution in this chapter is the description of what 
happened in the supply-side of New Zealand insurance market post-Christchurch 
earthquakes. That is; (i) the change in contracts from full replacement cost to sum 
insured and the effect of this change on the insurance market, (ii) the rise in the premium 
rate and why the premium changed, (iii) the increase in the total amount of premiums 
written showing business growth; to what extent this depended on the increase in 
premium rates, changes in contract formation or changes in property value, and (iv) the 
values of the loss ratio pre- and post-quakes. A coherent review and discussion of the 
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roles played by both government and reinsurance system in the catastrophe insurance 
market is also an important contribution to the literature of disaster insurance. 
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: Section 8.1 gives an introductory 
background and economic impact of the 2010-11 Christchurch earthquakes. Section 8.2 
gives a broad discussion of natural disaster insurance. Sub-section 8.2.1 discusses the 
need for government participation in natural disaster insurance. Subsection 8.2.2 
discusses the New Zealand natural disaster insurance through the Earthquake 
Commission and subsection 8.2.3 gives a description of some natural disaster insurance 
programs worldwide with government involvement. Section 8.3 gives a description of 
reinsurance of the dual insurance model framework in New Zealand. Section 8.4 
presents results for various empirical analyses of New Zealand insurance industry 
reaction post-Christchurch earthquakes. Section 8.5 gives the conclusions 
8.1. Background and Economic Impact of the 2010-11 Christchurch 
Earthquakes 
Over 20,000 earthquakes are recorded by New Zealand’s geological hazard monitoring 
system every year, with approximately 200 of them being strong enough to be felt. In 
the years 2010 and 2011, two major earthquakes occurred in Christchurch. In particular, 
the first strong quake at a magnitude 7.1 on the Richter scale occurred at 4.35 am on 4th 
September 2010. The epicenter was 40 km west of Christchurch City and the depth of 
the quake was at 10 km (Potter et al., 2015; Wu et al., 2014). In the aftermath of the 
first earthquake, dozens of its aftershocks followed causing moderate damage. The first 
earthquake sequence initiated three other significant earthquakes close to the city of 
Christchurch culminating in an aftershock which was the second major earthquake 
which struck at 12:51 pm on 22nd February 2011, measuring 6.3 on the Richter scale. 
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The location of the second major quake was within 5 km south-east of Christchurch, at 
a shallow focal depth of 5 km (Potter et al., 2015; Wu et al., 2014). This quake produced 
damage labeled as destructive by GeoNet; the builder and operator of modern 
geological hazard monitoring systems in New Zealand. Unreinforced masonry 
buildings were severely damaged with liquefaction occurring in many parts of the 
eastern suburbs rendering entire neighborhoods completely uninhabitable (Buchanan et 
al., 2011; Bull, 2013). 
 
Figure 8-1: Location of Epicentres during the Canterbury Earthquake Sequence 
(Source: Robert Langridge, GNS Science) 
Estimates of the total economic cost of the two earthquakes vary and are subject to 
considerable uncertainty. The biggest challenge was the ongoing nature of the 
earthquake sequence, and the need to treat separately each of the 5 major events (Table 
8-1) identified by the Earthquake Commission (EQC) as being independent events that 




Table 8-1: Five Major Canterbury Earthquakes for the Period 2010-11 
Time Location Magnitude Intensity 
4:35am, 4th September 2010 840M from Ansons Road, Charing Cross 7.10 X 
10:30am, 26th December 2010 40M from Brougham Street, Sydenham 4.91 V 
12:51pm, February 22, 2011 340M from Rapiki Road, Hillsborough  6.34 VIII 
2:20pm, 13th June 2011 690M from Barnett Park Track, Redcliffs 6.41 VIII 
3:18pm, 23rd December 2011 250M from 466-68 Marine Parade South 
New Brighton, Christchurch 
6 VII 
(Source: GeoNet, 2014) 
Until the full payment of all claims and complete recovery is done, it remains a difficult 
task to give an exact figure for the total economic cost and insured losses paid out. 
There have been differences between the market value of assets and all infrastructures 
destroyed, the cost of replacing those assets over time and the additional value of 
rebuilding properties to a higher risk resilient standard or other discretionary 
improvements. In addition, disruption of businesses and of lives following a natural 
disaster can be substantial, but it is difficult, if not impossible, to measure the financial 
implications of all of these effects accurately.  
The Christchurch earthquakes provided an unprecedented challenge for the insurance 
industry and indeed to the entire New Zealand economy. The New Zealand Treasury 
estimated the total cost of insurance claims for the earthquakes at a value above NZ$40 
billion, approximately 18% - 22% of the country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
(Kachali et al., 2015; Parker and Steenkamp, 2012). Taking into account the 
complications with claims involving multi-unit buildings, retaining walls and land 
issues, private insurers paid out NZ$17.8 billion in settling claims resulting from the 
Christchurch earthquakes in 2010 and 2011 as at the end of March 2016. The payments 
were apportioned into two categories, NZ$9.6 and NZ$8.2 billion for settlement of 
commercial and residential claims, respectively. This represented a significant 
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contribution towards the estimated NZ$40 billion economic loss incurred in the 
Canterbury region. The figure includes damages to buildings and contents, as well as 
disruption to business activities but does not include underinsured or uninsured losses 
(Brookie, 2014; Kachali et al., 2015). The fact that natural disasters have both 
immediate and long-term economic effects has not been captured in any of these 
estimates. This study assumes that the economic impact of the two quakes could be far 
higher when all the affected aspects are financially quantified. An early estimate by 
Aon Benfield put the Christchurch earthquakes amongst the most significant natural 
disaster events in the insurance world, with insurance losses initially estimated at 
NZ$13.5 billion (Brown et al., 2016; Doyle and Noy, 2015). Later in 2013, these 
estimates were adjusted to NZ$16.5 billion and now the figure stands beyond NZ$40 
billion, according to the New Zealand Reserve Bank estimates (Parker and Steenkamp, 
2012; Potter et al., 2015, Timar et al., 2014). Table 8-2 gives the top ten insurance loss 
estimates from natural disasters worldwide in 2011. The losses from the Christchurch 
quakes, even at the most conservative figures, stood at position two globally in the year 
ending 2011 (Swiss Re, 2012). 
Table 8-2: Christchurch Earthquakes Compared to Global Events in 2011 
Top ten insurance loss events in 2011 Estimated losses in $ (USD ‘billions’) 
Earthquake Japan 35.00 
Earthquake New Zealand, 22 February 2011 13.50 (later revised to 40) 
Flooding Thailand 10.78 
Severe Weather USA Southeast, Plains, Mid-West 7.30 
Severe Weather USA Plains, Mid-West, Southeast 6.75 
Severe Weather Hurricane Irene 5.00 
Flooding Australia 2.42 
Severe Weather USA Southeast, Plains, Mid-West 2.00 
Earthquake New Zealand, 22 December 2011 1.80  
Severe Weather USA Plains, Mid-West, Southeast 1.70  
(Source: Aon/Benfield, 2013) 
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The upward trend in overall economic losses in recent decades highlights the global 
economy’s increasing exposure to natural catastrophes. The sigma report shows that 
the reinsurance industry in 2011 suffered one of the highest, if not the highest level of 
insured losses ever (Swiss Re, 2012). That year also saw the tsunami in Japan, an active 
windstorm season in North America, and Thailand and floods in Queensland Australia. 
Studies by (Dahlen & Peter 2012; Parker & Steenkamp 2012; Merkin, 2012) found that 
these disasters led to unprecedented losses for the global insurance market, where they 
cascade from the policyholders via primary insurers to reinsurance companies. As a 
result, there was a tightening of the reinsurance market, leading to a very significant 
increase in reinsurance costs after the Christchurch earthquakes in New Zealand. The 
reinsurance costs were global and translated into a significant increase in premiums for 
households in nations prone to natural disasters. Given that New Zealand insurers 
extensively participate in the offshore reinsurance market, the global reinsurance rates 
extensively impacted on how the local insurers priced the residential insurance policy. 
8.2. Natural Disaster Insurance 
8.2.1. Need for Government Participation in Natural Disaster Insurance 
Table 8-2 illustrates how devastating natural disasters can be to the normal operations 
of an economy. The magnitude of the economic loss from catastrophes can thus never 
be left to the private insurance mechanism to fully protect the economy and/or to deal 
with the social chaos that might emerge in the aftermath of a major disaster. Thus; 
insurance for natural disasters is not a matter to be left to the private insurance players 
alone. This study demonstrates that it is absolutely necessary for the government to 
participate in the provision of natural disaster insurance. A good question to follow is, 
why and what role does the government play in the provision of natural disaster cover 
for the residential property insurance business. There are two key possible spatial 
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rationales for government involvement in the provision of natural disaster provision. 
The first is that, there would be spatially concentrated negative externalities and by 
extension, this creates cost spill-overs to major economic activities if many people in 
an earthquake-hit area were uninsured or underinsured. The second is that, without 
government involvement, many homeowners would find coverage unaffordable or 
unavailable which leads to mass under- or uninsured due to higher premiums required 
for catastrophe risk. In most cases, governments provide emergency assistance to these 
homeowners after large natural disasters. However, if many homeowners remain 
without insurance cover, this creates risks and uncertainty for homeowners, insurers, 
and governments every time disaster strikes. In the case of New Zealand, providing 
insurance to enable damaged homes to be repaired continues to be a major rationale for 
retaining government insurance participation via EQC. Globally, private insurance 
markets for catastrophe insurance tend to be marked by low rates of insurance uptake 
and fluctuations in the supply of insurance cover. This results in significant levels of 
under-insurance or uninsured properties among property owners. Previous studies 
(Mills, Roth & Lecomte, 2006; Kunreuther, 2017; Comerio, 2014; Pierepiekarz et al., 
2014; Cooper et al., 2015), have found only around 18 percent of California 
homeowners have earthquake insurance, despite California being very seismically 
active, and in Japan, around 28  percent of homeowners have earthquake insurance. To 
appreciate this low insurance uptake, it is worth reflecting on the position Canterbury 
homeowners and the government would be in if only 30 percent or less of earthquake 
affected homeowners had no natural disaster insurance coverage.  
Political economic considerations make it more likely that government support would 
be called for if many people are uninsured than if few people are uninsured. When there 
are large numbers of under-insured or uninsured property owners, the experience 
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elsewhere in the world is that governments feel compelled to provide financial 
assistance to affected households. When a disaster occurs in that environment, 
homeowners face large catastrophic losses and most individuals depend on the 
uncertainties of emergency government assistance. The biggest problem posed by the 
emergency assistance for property owners is that, it can encourage the assisted and other 
owners to not buy insurance against natural disasters, generating larger future risks for 
homeowners and governments. In order to avoid the insurance market inefficiency and 
adverse selection behaviour from property owners, a form of government-sponsored 
insurance coverage is necessary. A region with a higher likelihood of occurrence of a 
disaster and without government participation is unattractive for private insurers to 
offer coverage due to extreme catastrophe loss exposure.  
These reasons form the justification why most developed nations have some form of 
intervention in disaster insurance provision. Although the participation in insurance 
schemes in the form of government-sponsored insurance programs differ in principle, 
generally all government schemes are designed to address most of the issues 
surrounding spatially concentrated risks, availability, and affordability catastrophe 
insurance to most homeowners. 
8.2.2. New Zealand Natural Disaster Insurance through the Earthquake 
Commission 
In a study of 42 high-risk countries in 2011, New Zealand ranked second highest for 
non-life insurance penetration relative to GDP (with premiums equivalent to 5.2 percent 
of GDP) and highest in the world in the residential insurance penetration (CEBR, 2012). 
Although the residential insurance penetration is very high in New Zealand, over 90 
percent, earthquake insurance penetration, in general, is about 80 percent, as compared 
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to that in North America at 20 percent; virtually everyone has an insurance policy 
protecting their home (Pierepiekarz et al., 2014). In other parts of the world, 
underinsurance continues to be a problem. For example, only 17 percent of the 
economic losses of Japan following their 2011 tsunami were covered by insurance 
(Cooper et al., 2015). The high penetration of insurance in the residential market can 
largely be attributed to two factors; (1) the fact that New Zealand is ranked third in the 
world for expected losses that could occur from a natural disaster as a percentage of 
GDP in any given year (Brown et al., 2013), and (2) the program offered by the EQC. 
The EQC is a Crown entity that has its origins in an insurance pool set up in 1941 to 
address war damages. It was later expanded to cover earthquake damages and in 1993 
became the EQC. The EQC provides natural disaster cover for buyers of residential 
insurance provided by private insurers. This is a unique natural disaster insurance 
scheme which is provided as a rider, this is an add-on to the primary policy, which 
offers benefits over and above the policy subject to certain conditions, on fire and 
general peril cover offered by the private general insurance market in New Zealand. 
Therefore, all residential property owners who buy fire insurance automatically acquire 
EQC insurance. Under the residential building and contents insurance cover provided, 
all general insurers in New Zealand collect a levy on behalf of the EQC. As important 
as it is to homeowners, those who do not buy private insurance cover for their 
residential properties for whatever reason do not receive this EQC cover. In return for 
paying their EQC premiums, homeowners are no longer reliant on uncertain emergency 
government assistance following a natural disaster. Instead, they have the certainty of 
a legislated right to catastrophe insurance with pre-established terms, backed by the 
government funding guarantee. Homeowners in higher risk areas also benefit from 
EQC’s flat-rate pricing structure, which keeps private insurance premiums affordable 
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nationwide. That, in turn, helps keep national homeowner take-up rates of insurance 
against natural hazards very high. That is of direct benefit to homeowners and private 
insurers. The high rates of private insurance take-up also greatly reduce the risk that the 
government will be called on after a natural disaster to provide assistance to uninsured 
homeowners. 
Although the government is required to provide the resources to pay EQC claims, 
homeowners pay EQC premium. In contrast, emergency assistance packages expose 
the government to large unfunded fiscal risks when catastrophes occur. Besides 
provision of subsidised disaster cover, EQC plays useful roles in supporting broader 
government and community interests. For example, the recent move of private insurers 
from providing full replacement value type policy to a nominated replacement value 
type policy may result in high levels of underinsurance if homeowners do not consider 
the full range of costs associated with repairing property following a natural disaster 
when deciding on the sum insured value. While the EQC scheme cannot compensate 
for inadequately set private insurance cover, it has played a key role in helping avoid 
underinsurance by providing homeowners with the necessary information to make 
better decisions about natural disaster insurance cover and natural disaster risk 
management more broadly. EQC has also played a critical role in transferring natural 
disaster financial risk to reinsurance arrangement internationally, funding research into 
the natural disaster and mitigating damage. 
8.2.3. Natural Disaster Insurance Programs Worldwide with Government 
Involvement 
Previous studies (Aseervatham et al., 2015; Atreya et al., 2015; Grace and Klein, 2003; 
Grossi et al., 2005; Klein and Kleindorfer, 1999) point to the fact that government 
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participation in insurance markets is not unique to New Zealand. The National Flood 
Insurance Program (NFIP) managed by the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA), California Earthquake Authority (CEA) and Japanese Earthquake 
Reinsurance (JER) have similar natural disaster programs, while Turkey has one of the 
newest such programs now in place. Although there are disaster programs in most 
developed nations, this study lists a few examples to compare them with New Zealand’s 
EQC programme. The unique features of EQC in New Zealand’s government 
involvement reveal the greater semi-autonomous role that governments could play in 
the private insurance market. 
In the USA, standard homeowners insurance does not cover flooding and associated 
natural hazard perils. The federal government established the NFIP in 1968 (Dacy and 
Kunreuther, 1969; Michel‐Kerjan and Kousky, 2010) to help provide means for 
property owners to protect themselves financially from the floods associated with 
hurricanes, tropical storms, heavy rains and other conditions that heavily impact some 
states in the US. Managed by the FEMA which maps flood risks and sets flood 
insurance premiums, the programme is designed as a voluntary partnership between the 
federal government and local communities. The NFIP provides insurance up to a 
maximum limit for residential property damage, now set at US$250,000 for building 
coverage and US$100,000 on contents coverage. The underlying principle of the 
program is to subsidise the cost of flood insurance on existing homes, in order to 
maintain property values, while charging actuarially fair rates on new construction. 
Similarly, the California Earthquake Authority established by the California legislature 
in 1995 following the 1994 Northridge earthquake, is designed to preserve the state-
mandated offer of earthquake coverage. The CEA required the participation of 70 
percent of California homeowner insurers before it could begin operation. Insurers 
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choosing not to participate are required to offer a similar brand of earthquake coverage 
to residential policyholders. The CEA offers a scaled-down policy covering homes and 
certain apartment buildings, but not other structures such as swimming pools, garages 
and driveways. Unlike New Zealand’s EQC, no public funds are pledged or available 
to cover CEA-insured losses. If an earthquake causes damage greater than the CEA’s 
claims-paying capacity then policyholders would be paid on a prorated basis. The 
prorated claims would be calculated on the basis of the total amount of expected claims 
compared to the remaining available funds. 
In Japan, the 1966 Earthquake Insurance Law (enacted after the Niigata earthquake of 
1964) established the Japanese Earthquake Reinsurance (JER), to whom private non-
life insurers were obliged to offer earthquake insurance and cede 100  percent of the 
earthquake premium and liabilities (Tsubokawa, 2004). The JER thus acts as the sole 
earthquake reinsurer for the private insurance market. The total claims-paying capacity 
of the program is currently ¥5,500 billion (US$45 billion), which is estimated to 
correspond to the scenario of the 1923 Great Kanto earthquake with a return period of 
220 years. In the event the insured earthquake losses exceed this amount, claims would 
be prorated accordingly. The maximum liability of the government of Japan, JER, and 
private insurers is 87%, 10%, and 3%, respectively. 
In the aftermath of the two major earthquakes in 1999, the Government of Turkey 
decided to enforce earthquake insurance on a nationwide basis with the sole purpose of 
privatising the potential risk by offering insurance via the Turkish Catastrophic 
Insurance Pool (TCIP). This program bundles the major part of disaster risk and exports 
it to the international reinsurance and capital markets (Bommer et al., 2002). This 
measure was aimed at reducing government’s fiscal exposure in the event of a major 
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catastrophic earthquake, as well as to encourage risk mitigation and safer construction 
practices. To achieve these goals all registered residential properties in Turkey (the total 
number currently is about 19 million) are required to be in the compulsory earthquake 
insurance coverage.  
Initially funded by the World Bank, the TCIP program became effective as of March 
2001 and is currently one of the most renowned insurance brands in the Turkish 
insurance market. High brand recognition and increasing earthquake insurance 
awareness among homeowners gives leverage to take-up rate in earthquake insurance 
(TCIP policy count was about two million as of September 2004, increasing to 7 million 
by end of 2014). The TCIP policy offers coverage on a first-loss basis, meaning that it 
does not impose underinsurance penalties when the value of a residential property is 
significantly higher than the limit of coverage obtained from the TCIP. Unlike the CEA, 
which imposes a deductible of 10 percent, the TCIP applies a minimum 2 percent 
deductible to the sum insured to avoid small claims, reduce moral hazard and reduce 
the pools’ administrative and reinsurance cost. 
This study examined just a few examples of government-sponsored programs to 
emphasize the centrally important role played by such programs in the natural disaster 
insurance. An audit of governments’ involvement in insurance provision worldwide set 
New Zealand as the only country with unique compulsory natural disaster fund to only 
those who buy private home insurance cover and which is 100 percent government 
guaranteed. The role played by the EQC in the aftermath of Christchurch quakes cannot 
be understated; without the EQC, it would be almost impossible for the private 
insurance to single-handedly rebuild Christchurch City. 
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8.3. Reinsurance of the Dual Insurance Model Framework in New Zealand 
This section examines the roles played by reinsurance scheme to support the dual 
structural-framework of natural disaster insurance in New Zealand. In the aftermath of 
the 2010-11 Christchurch earthquakes, questions emerged on the efficiency of the dual-
insurance model in New Zealand when extreme catastrophe losses occur. This study 
finds that the key to success of the New Zealand dual insurance system, despite the 
possibly high incidence of catastrophe losses, is the elaborate reinsurance arrangements 
in place.  
Akin to government involvement in natural disaster insurance, the existence of a global 
reinsurance system is of absolute necessity to the success of private insurer supply of 
natural disaster insurance coverage. In light of the benefit policyholders derive from 
government’s involvement in the insurance market, it is important to note that, 
reinsurance is of direct benefit to primary insurers, and only of indirect benefit to the 
policyholder. In most cases, a reinsurance arrangement is made to make insurance 
available, but not always to address the problem of affordability. To this end, 
reinsurance does not really solve the un-affordability of risk-based premiums, and the 
social effects of under- (or not) insured catastrophes. In general, the insurance market 
appreciates four benefits of the reinsurance system to the market as follows; (i) 
increasing underwriting capacity, (ii) stabilising profits, (iii) reduce the unearned 
premium reserves, and (iv) provide protection against a catastrophic loss. The fourth 
benefit, provide protection against a catastrophic loss, is the center of this discussion.  
A reinsurance transaction simply represents an equal transfer of risk and premium from 
the insurer to the reinsurer. Therefore, the fundamental question is: why do primary 
insurers and/or government insurance schemes buy reinsurance for catastrophe risk? 
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One of the main reasons primary insurers seek reinsurance arrangements is that primary 
insurers cannot diversify away catastrophe risk exposure, they resort to a risk-transfer 
arrangement with global reinsurers to rid themselves of undesirable excessive 
concentrations of the catastrophe risk. Thus, we can say that; many small and regional 
primary insurers usually do not have a well-diversified portfolio of risks. This is 
exacerbated by the concentration of catastrophic risk. Reinsurance arrangements allow 
these insurance companies to diversify underlying disaster loss exposures beyond the 
internal risk pool. Furthermore, insurance companies are not in many cases owned by 
diversified investors capable of diversifying the residual non-systemic risk inherent in 
an insurance company's portfolio through positions in their personal investment 
portfolio. As a result, reinsurance provides an alternative mechanism for further 
reducing the non-systemic risk to shareholders of the insurance firm. 
In summary then, the reasons why reinsurance is of value to disaster insurance is 
centered on the ability of the reinsurance company to bear the risk of catastrophic loss 
at a lower cost than that of the primary insurance company. As such, by efficiently 
transferring risk to the reinsurer, a reinsurance contract reduces the cost of writing 
primary insurance, ultimately expanding primary insurance capacity. Since losses from 
natural disasters are highly correlated geographically and because insurance companies 
tend to have regional concentrations of risk from these catastrophe losses, primary 
insurance companies will always seek reinsurance to manage their exposure to natural 
disaster losses. 
The effectiveness of reinsurance mechanisms in disaster risk management system 
directly impacts the supply of primary insurance for natural disaster risks, and indirectly 
feeds into the premium rates. Because of the highly correlated nature of natural disaster 
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risks, however, private reinsurance companies are not always able to fully diversify all 
disaster risks in the system. As a result, global reinsurance markets continue to 
experience stress from overexposure to disaster risk. In New Zealand dual insurance 
system, the overexposure and accumulation of risk have been partially addressed 
through contract modification from full replacement value or open-ended type policy 
to nominated replacement value type policy. This modification means that the residual 
risk is now borne by the policyholder rather than the reinsurance system. Local insurers 
may have searched for a substitute mechanism to cap exposure or moved away from 
reinsurance to something else. Further study to investigate this proposition is required. 
In addition, future studies can investigate whether the policy modification leads to 
higher probability of under-insurance. The possibility of under-insurance is undesirable 
socially, and it provides an even greater rationale for reinsurance and government 
continued collaboration to enhance primary insurers’ capacity and affordability of 
coverage. 
Lead by the syndicates at Lloyd's of London, the crucial role played by the reinsurance 
market post-Christchurch catastrophe cannot be overstated. The complex structure of 
the reinsurance arrangement is shown in Figure 8-2, which depicts the stages in the 
catastrophe insurance market through which New Zealand natural disaster business is 
insured. This is grouped into three levels; primary insurers, primary reinsurers, and 
retro-reinsurers, based on their position in the chain of insurance and reinsurance buyers 
and sellers. 
On Level, I are the primary insurance companies that issue homeowners policies. The 
direct writers in turn purchase reinsurance contracts normally referred to as 
“catastrophe cover” from primary reinsurers on Level II. On Level II are companies 
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such as large professional reinsurers, many syndicates at Lloyd's of London as well as 
large and small broker market reinsurers worldwide. Some reinsurers specialize in this 
business. Typically, those companies would be leads; lead reinsurer is 
the reinsurer responsible for negotiating the terms and rates of insurance treaty that 
other reinsurers participate in, who would quote terms on contracts which other 
companies would then follow.  
 
Figure 8-2: Structure of Natural Disaster Insurance and Reinsurance Transfer 
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Occasionally and more-so in highly catastrophe prone markets, reinsurers directly 
influence the premium rate and other policy conditions at level I. For example, the 
Christchurch earthquakes led to a switch from total replacement home insurance to the 
sum insured. These changes were directed by the reinsurance corporation in order for 
reinsurers to better understand their maximum liability for residential properties in New 
Zealand. 
On Level III are companies who reinsure the primary reinsurers. They provide 
catastrophe cover referred to as “primary retrocessional contracts” for the primary 
reinsurers. Although many of the primary reinsurers will write a handful of these 
primary retro-contracts, the number of companies that specialise in and write a 
significant volume of this business is a small subset of the universe of reinsurers. Some 
syndicates at Lloyd's are specialists in this type of business. These companies at Level 
III themselves buy secondary retrocessional catastrophe cover referred to as London 
Market Excess ‘LMX’ of Loss business. There is not a distinct fourth level of 
companies writing these, but they are written by a subset of Level III companies 
themselves. 
This investigation finds that an estimated 37 percent of Lloyd's total business in 
reinsurance has most relevance to New Zealand. Gross written premiums amounting to 
NZ$340 million is generated from New Zealand private insurance customers each year. 
This places the market at position 47 amongst the 200 countries Lloyd's business works 
(Franco, 2014). The current level of reinsurance cover for EQC’s reinsurance 
programme is $4.6 billion and the EQC’s deductible (excess) on this programme is 
$1.75 billion. A further look at the financial reports of the two big brands in the New 
Zealand insurance industry (IAG and Suncorp), points to the fact that in the aftermath 
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of the quakes underwriters took-out more reinsurance arrangements than before. They 
had taken a view that, it is perhaps riskier hence bought as much cover as they could 
get. The private insurance companies under the Insurance Prudential Supervision Act 
are required to buy a certain quantum of reinsurance. The study confirms that the 
biggest insurance groups have gone further to strengthen their future financial position. 
For example, IAG increased its reinsurance protection for New Zealand to reinsurance 
payouts of NZ$7 billion for a single big quake within the 2015 financial year. It was 
also protected with NZ$6.75 billion for a second large seismic event in the same year. 
This is a 75 percent increase in reinsurance compared to 2011 reinsurance figures which 
stood at NZ$4 billion (IAG, 2015). 
8.4. Insurance Industry Reaction Post-Christchurch Earthquakes 
This section examines the post-quakes reaction on the supply-side using empirical data. 
The main objective is to show how the 2010-11 earthquakes impacted the insurance 
market using various insurance business statistics. The data used in this analysis is from 
two sources: Insurance Council of New Zealand (ICNZ) and one confidential private 
insurer that provided comparable data for this analysis. The ICNZ data is the business 
statistic on the data portal for the periods 2008 to 2015 which is published annually, 
therefore it gives a broad presentation. The Council currently has 28 members who 
collectively write more than 95 percent of fire and general insurance in New Zealand. 
The study uses this business statistics to investigate the responses and implications of 
the earthquakes to the supply-side of the entire insurance market.  
In order to give a coherent description of the supply-side insurance market response, 
this section also investigates two more data sub-set. The domestic building, domestic 
content, and earthquake: domestic cover forms the second part of the analysis. The 
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second data sub-set is composed of both industry and one private insurer for the period 
2009 to 2014. This two data sub-set analysis aims to produce comparable plots to 
illustrate the changes after the earthquakes from both industry and insurer standpoint. 
In the end, then, this section gives a meaningful illustration and the implication of the 
earthquakes to the operations of insurance markets. The major obstacle faced in the 
attempts to source sufficient data is the unwillingness of many organisations to provide 
their private business statistics. An opportunity to rigorously analyse the supply-side of 
the insurance market responses after earthquakes have been missed. 
Table 8-3 gives an outline of the New Zealand insurance market for the period 2008-
2015. The most important entry for investigation is the gross written premium, the net 
claims incurred and the loss ratios for each year. The gross written premium is the total 
premium, direct and assumed, written by an insurer before the deductions for 
reinsurance and ceding commissions. It may include additional and/or return premiums. 
Gross written premium is calculated as the actual premium less all premium refunds 
and rebates. 
Table 8-3: All Business (NZ$ Millions) 12-months to September 2008 - 2015 
Year-End 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Gross Written Premium ($) 3,260 3,417 3,604 3,980 4,449 4,770 5,258 5,261 
Net Written Premium ($) 2,808 2,911 3,119 3,179 3,462 3,653 4,018 3,880 
Net Earned Premium ($) 2,748 2,857 3,073 2,962 3,247 3,507 3,912 3,896 
Claims Incurred ($) 1,881 1,845 2,097 3,312 2,206 2,175 2,350 2,546 
Loss Ratio (%) 68.46 64.59 68.22 111.81 67.94 62.03 60.07 65.35 
Business Costs (Staff...) ($) 898 941 997 1,023 1,006 1,201 1,315 1,367 
Combined Ratio (%) 101.13 97.53 100.66 146.36 98.93 96.27 93.69 100.45 
(Source: Insurance Council of New Zealand, 2016) 
Note: Where the Combined Ratio exceeds 100 percent insurance Council members 
have made a loss in the 12 months reporting period. 
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The combined ratio is calculated in the last column of Table 8-3. The combined ratio is 
used in analysing the underwriting performance of insurance industry, especially for 
non-life insurance where the risk exposure is short-term, generally one year contracts. 
The displayed combined ratio is an aggregate covering different types of business lines 
and hence different types of risks. The reason behind the high ratios is that insurance 
companies had written negative premiums due to high business cost including changes 
in outstanding claims provision, operating expenses, staff expenses and commissions. 
Numerous natural disaster events also pushed the average combined ratio of the 
industry to higher than 100 percent in the years 2008, 2010, 2011 and 2015.  
A visualisation plot of the whole industry data illustrating the insurance market changes 
in both premiums and claims from 2008 to 2015. Figure 8-3 shows a sharp increase in 
incurred claims in the years 2010, 2011 and 2012. The increase of incurred claims is 
due to the large earthquakes events within this years which led to unusually high claims 
expenditures in most of the product line. The fact that the huge claims related to 
earthquakes occurred over such a short time frame implies that the negative 
implications were cumulative and compounding to the whole industry.  
  
Figure 8-3: NZ Insurance Industry All Business Data for the Period 2008 - 2015 
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Both Table 8-3 and Figure 8-3 demonstrate steady premium growth with an average 
annual growth above 8  percent since 2008 with the highest positive growth in net 
earned premium registered in 2014. 
Table 8-4 and Figure 8-4 outline the gross written premium for each product line of the 
whole industry in both numerical and percentage basis. The first impression inferred 
from Table 8-4 on the total values column is that the GWP has been experiencing steady 
growth from about 3.3 billion in 2008 to 5.3 billion in 2015. This apparent growth may 
be attributed in some part to an overall increase in the value of insured assets, insurance 
market competitiveness and global capital market change influence on reinsurance 
markets. The significant portion of the increases in premium rates, EQC levies and 
better reporting on the part of ICNZ members’ data among other variables have also 
impacted on the earned premium. However, there are other hosts of varying factors 
which can be attributed to premium growth; a study on drivers of premium growth may 
be required to avoid subjective conclusions.    
Table 8-4: GWP of All Business Class (NZ$ Millions) for period 2008 - 2015 
Year-End 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Commercial ($) 441 464 469 502 590 598 684 687 
Residential ($) 766 840 933 1,052 1,170 1,342 1,477 1,522 
Motor ($) 1,159 1,210 1,226 1,340 1,355 1,410 1,509 1,564 
Marine ($) 114 126 120 120 144 137 141 137 
Liability ($) 267 280 298 314 338 369 457 468 
Earthquake ($) 207 213 220 350 549 609 643 561 
Other ($) 306 283 297 296 303 305 347 321 
Total ($) 3,260 3,417 3,604 3,980 4,449 4,770 5,258 5,261 
(Source: Insurance Council of New Zealand, 2016) 
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The industry all business data for the eight years clearly indicates that the amount of 
money spent on insurance cover had increased. For example, residential and earthquake 
insurance business class has been on an increasing trend with earthquake insurance 
registering double-digit growth from an annual business proportion of 6.3 percent in 
2008 to 12.2 percent in 2014 and then a slight decrease to 10.7 percent in 2015 (see 
Figure 8-4). In dollar terms, the gross written premiums for earthquake insurance has 
grown three-fold from NZ$207 million to NZ$561 million. After the earthquakes, 
residential buildings and contents insurance also recorded a similar increasing trend 
from an annual business proportion of 23.5 percent in 2008 to a business proportion of 
28.9 percent in 2015. Figure 8-4 clearly shows that earthquake insurance and residential 
buildings and contents insurance as the only two product lines that recorded a 
continuously increasing gross written premium between the periods 2010 - 2015. 
Despite the fact that other products lines recorded some growth in premiums; each 
class’s growth was decreasing as a proportion of the whole insurance business. This 
can be interpreted as a supply-demand response after the earthquakes, however, the 
actual factor responsible for these changes remains ambiguous. 
 












2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
13.5% 13.6% 13.0% 12.6% 13.3% 12.5% 13.0% 13.1%
23.5% 24.6% 25.9% 26.4% 26.3% 28.1% 28.1%
28.9%
35.6% 35.4% 34.0% 33.7% 30.5% 29.6% 28.7%
29.7%
3.5% 3.7% 3.3% 3.0%
3.2% 2.9% 2.7% 2.6%
8.2% 8.2% 8.3% 7.9%
7.6% 7.7% 8.7% 8.9%
6.3% 6.2% 6.1% 8.8% 12.3% 12.8% 12.2% 10.7%
9.4% 8.3% 8.2% 7.4% 6.8%
6.4% 6.6% 6.1%
Year
Commercial Domestic Motor Marine Liability Earthquake Other 
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For the individual product lines with very high growth in GWP, this study postulates 
that the increase in premiums can be interpreted in three ways. First, it can be seen that 
the demand for these two classes of products has been sharply increasing since 2010; 
second, the increase in gross written premiums can be attributed to increases in the 
premium rates, both insurer and reinsurer rates, and third, increase in EQC premiums 
levies in order to build-up the national disaster fund: which is currently depleted. 
The main objective of this section is to investigate the supply-side responses after the 
earthquakes using insurance business statistics. The changes on residential insurance in 
the last five years may be, for the major part, attributed to the earthquake experiences. 
There have been fundamental changes in contract design and wording in the residential 
property insurance market. While the impact of the changes may not be inferred from 
the scant data set used in this analysis; the possible future implication of the policy 
modification can’t be underestimated. The industry data for this line of business 
indicates higher loss ratios, proportionate relationship of incurred losses to earned 
premiums expressed as a percentage, in the year’s 2010, 2011 and 2012 computed to 
be 70%, 178% and 84% respectively, although the ratios for the 5 years are positive, 
the 2011 loss ratio demonstrates that the industry was extremely affected by the claims 
from the earthquakes. This ratio shows that the industry made a cumulative claim of 
about 78 percent in excess of the maximum threshold of 100 percent. 
Insurance underwriters and regulators use the loss ratio as one of the tools to gauge 
industry’s capacity to offer coverage and the ability to remain solvent when a major 
catastrophic event occurs. When the New Zealand residential insurance market loss 
ratios are compared to those in the USA property and casualty insurance industry results 
for the same period, the loss ratio is slightly above 70 percent (Hagendorff et al., 2015). 
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This confirms that the insurance industry as a whole in New Zealand was not extremely 
exposed in most year apart from the huge losses incurred in 2011. The sustained growth 
in gross written premiums, along with continued soft market conditions-characterised 
by some premium rate increases and low catastrophe losses after the 2011 quake has 
since then strengthened the residential insurance product line to withstand against any 
possible ruin. However, the business cost in the whole insurance section is on the 
increase based on the combined ratios percentages. 
Table 8-5: Residential buildings and contents (NZ$ Millions) for period 2009 - 2014 
Year-End 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Gross Written Premium ($) 897 996 1,052 1,197 1,369 743 
Net Written Premium6 ($) 825 910 901 991 1,107 617 
Net Earned Premium7 ($) 806 883 803 915 1,025 576 
Claims Incurred ($) 536 619 1,431 769 732 441 
Loss Ratio (%) 66% 70% 178% 84% 71% 77% 
(Source: Insurance Council of New Zealand, 2015) 
In the end, what these values show is that New Zealand has been a relatively good 
market for insurance, and has encouraged reinsurers to stay in New Zealand following 
the Christchurch earthquakes. This is supported by the fact that even after the major 
earthquakes most of the local insurance and the EQC have been able to fully meet there 
claim obligations on time. 
                                                 
6Net written premium is gross written premium less outward treaty and facultative reinsurance premium. 
7Amount of total premiums collected by an insurance company over a period that have been earned based 
on the ratio of the time passed on the policies to their effective period. Net earned premium is net written 
premium plus unearned net premium at beginning of quarter less unearned net premium at end of quarter. 
Gross earned premium is gross written premium plus unearned gross premium at beginning of quarter 





Figure 8-5: GWP and Claims Incurred for the Industry 
(Residential buildings and contents) 
Figure 8-5 depicts the overall situation in the industry, showing the total net claims 
incurred in the 6 years versus the gross written premium in the same period for 
residential insurance cover. At glance, Figure 8-5 depicts New Zealand residential 
insurance market as a stable product line. It is totally remarkable that there is only one 
spike on incurred claims around the earthquakes of 2011. This can be explained by the 
fact that the majority of the earthquakes claims were either dealt with by EQC as under-
cap, and it does confirm the important role played by the government-sponsored 
insurance scheme in addressing catastrophe losses, or the industry received substantial 
reinsurance recoveries after the earthquakes. The data for 2014 represents 6-months 
only, thus it should not be interpreted as a decrease in both premium growth and 
incurred claims. It is also observed that the residential building insurance markets is 
historically volatile since sales or construction of properties largely depend on the 
appetite of banks to sell mortgage which indirectly effects on insurance premiums.  
It is also important to note the implication of the earthquakes from insurer’s standpoint. 
One of the main responses after the earthquakes is that insurers are now approaching 
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the market more cautiously and have learned the important lesson to treat each risk 
independently. To illustrate the supply-side responses from insurer’s point of view, this 
study presents data from one private insurance company that provided a confidential 
business statistic that could be compared with those from the industry. Thus, the dataset 
from the insurer representing premiums and claims runs from 2009 to 2014.  













Gross Written Premium ($) 56,900 63,000 77,500 84,700 89,600 50,300 
Net Written Units 184,100 193,300 193,200 184,600 194,700 102,900 
Claims Incurred Total ($) 36,960 123,370 269,440 48,640 83,080 51,700 
Number of Claims 24,230 27,270 29,930 22,500 22,620 12,300 
Reinsurance Recoveries  (200) (81,800) (218,700) (9,100) (41,000) (25,800) 
Net Claims Incurred  36,760 41,570 50,740 39,540 42,080 25,900 
Loss Ratio (%) 65% 66% 65% 47% 47% 51% 
 (Source: Confidential Private Insurance Company in New Zealand) 
The first impressive observation from the Table 8-6 values is that, all the loss ratios are 
positive and in fact very low when compared to those of the entire industry. The loss 
ratios for the private insurer average to 57 percent per annum for the 6 years. In essence, 
the 57 percent loss ratio indicates that on average, the insurers needed 57 percent of the 
annual premium earned simply to pay losses and loss adjustment expenses, leaving 43 
percent of premiums available to cover all other business expenses. Again it can be 
inferred from this data that, the reinsurance recoveries plays an important role by 
offsetting a big proportion of the amount of claims incurred by the private insurers. This 
implies that, although the private insurer was affected at a gross level, sufficient 
reinsurance arrangement kept the insurer’s business at a very stable position even after 
large loss experience. 
Results from one insurer may not be representative of all other insurance companies 
who might have (or not) diversified portfolio of residential insurance policies 
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distributed evenly across the New Zealand insurance market. Since this investigation 
uses business statistics for the period 2009-2014, the statistics are not sufficient for the 
study to form trends in the insurance business cycle. Thus, the results provide only a 
useful illustration of the impact of the earthquakes claims within this period from the 
insurer’s perspective. 
 
Figure 8-6: GWP and Claims Incurred for the Insurer  
(Residential buildings and contents) 
It is rather straightforward to identify the business implications of the earthquakes from 
the loss ratio percentages and the premiums growth as presented in Figure 8-6 As 
mentioned earlier, the loss ratio may not necessarily imply that insurance inadvertently 
made losses, however, the magnitude of the ratio should give an impression of the 
claims experience of the insurance company. Therefore higher or lower ratios do not in 
totality mean the underwriters made losses or profits in a particular product line, it is 
indicative of the challenges faced by the underwriters in settlement of claims especially 
those associated with extreme catastrophe events. However, the ratio figures are more 
meaningful when looked at over a decade rather than year on year to understand various 




Figure 8-7: Loss Ratio for the Industry (Blue) Insurer (Red) 
(Residential buildings and contents) 
A plot of the loss ratio of the private insurer alongside that of the whole insurance 
industry for periods Jan 2009 to June 2014 is presented in Figure 8-7. This plot clearly 
shows the industry loss ratios for 2011 to be very high when compared to the average 
loss ratio for the years pre- and post-earthquakes. In such a scenario of a very high ratio 
of earned premium versus incurred claims, the insurance industry has a reason to worry 
about its ability to meet all the insured claims and the business operating costs once 
they fall due. In most cases, however, the industry will be fully protected either by 
catastrophe reserves or claims recoveries from reinsurance arrangements and other 
alternative risk transfer systems out in place. The private insurer registered significantly 
lower percentages of loss ratio for the 6 years, 2009-2014 when compared to the whole 
industry. Perhaps this can be attributed to a lower claims ratio, a lower claim payable 
as a percentage of premium income. In most cases insurers with access to superior data 
analyses large volumes of data set to identify high-level risk trends, such as the most 
common reasons for claims in a particular product line. Insurers then take steps to 
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mitigate those causes and improve their underwriting loss ratios; this is certainly the 
case for this private insurer understudy.  
8.5. Conclusions 
This chapter has argued that government intervention in the provision of natural disaster 
insurance is of absolute necessity to avert situation of noninsurance and underinsurance. 
It has been shown that, in a situation of mass noninsurance and underinsurance, 
spatially concentration of both catastrophe risk and negative externalities creates cost 
spill-overs and social chaos. This study demonstrated that, political economy 
considerations make it more likely for government support to be called for if many 
people are uninsured than if few people are uninsured. However, the analysis finds that 
emergency assistance for property owners after catastrophe events can encourage most 
property owners to not buy insurance against natural disaster and also develop adverse 
selection behaviour, generating larger future risks for homeowners and governments. 
This study observes that homeowners in higher risk areas benefit from EQC’s flat-rate 
pricing structure of the dual insurance model, which keeps private insurance premiums 
affordable nationwide. That, in turn, helps keep national homeowner take-up rates of 
insurance against natural disaster very high. The high rates of private insurance take-
up also greatly reduce the risk that the government will be called on after a natural 
disaster to provide assistance to uninsured homeowners. 
The key to success of the dual insurance system despite the high prevalence of 
catastrophe losses is that, the New Zealand insurers and the EQC have an elaborate 
reinsurance arrangement in place. As such, by efficiently transferring risk to the 
reinsurer, the cost of writing primary insurance is considerably reduced ultimately 
expanding primary insurance capacity and supply of insurance coverage. Since losses 
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from natural disasters are highly correlated geographically and because insurance 
companies tend to have regional concentrations of risk from these catastrophe losses, 
primary insurance companies will always seek reinsurance to manage their exposure to 
natural disaster losses. In New Zealand’s dual insurance system, overexposure and 
accumulation of risk at reinsurance market have been partially addressed through 
contract modification from full replacement value type policy to nominated 
replacement value type policy. This modification means that the residual risk is now 
borne by the policyholder rather than the reinsurance system. Local insurers may have 
searched for a substitute mechanism to cap exposure, move away from reinsurance to 
something else, study to investigate this proposition is required. Similarly, future 
studies can investigate to what extent does the policy modification leads to higher 
probability of under-insurance. 
This analysis also concludes that large claim experience related to earthquakes occurred 
over a short-time frame creating a cumulative and compounding losses in domestic 
building, domestic contents and earthquake domestic product line for the whole 
industry. This led to depletion of national disaster fund from EQC perspective and a net 
loss ratio of 178 percent for 2011. There was also a drastic increase in both the EQC 
levies and the private insurance premiums. Furthermore, the ICNZ and private insurer 
data show that the insurance premiums have been on steady growth with the highest 
growth registered after the earthquakes. However, it is ambiguous to form a reasonable 
conclusion specific reasons for growth in premium and if this is in some part as a 
response to the changes after the earthquakes. The premium growth can be attributed 
to a host of varying factors; a study on drivers of premium growth may be required to 




9. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
9.0. Introduction 
This chapter gives the main findings and general conclusions based on the results of 
this study. The recommendations, limitations and policy implications of this research 
are considered and suggestions for further research into the reactions of residential 
property insurance market in the aftermath of the natural disaster are given. This 
conclusion chapter also summarises the contributions of the thesis and its possible 
impact, and discuss the important directions of future work. 
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: Section 9.1 lists the summary and 
conclusions of this research. Section 9.2 presents the contributions and significance of 
the study. Finally, section 9.3 presents the recommendations and discusses the policy 
implications of the study. 
9.1. Summary and Conclusions 
The general goals of this research are centered towards establishing insurance market 
response after earthquakes. This study has only investigated the property and content 
insurance from both demand and supply standpoint for the period pre- and post-
Christchurch earthquakes. The Christchurch earthquakes are used as a case study to 
investigate how catastrophic natural disaster affects insurance coverage. The thesis 
presents post-catastrophe responses on both supply-side and demand-side and captures 
the perception towards risk in the period immediately after the catastrophe and how this 
drives insurance decisions. The study has reviewed existing work on natural disaster 
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insurance and conducted a survey and interviews on both the demand-side and the 
supply-side of the residential property insurance market. The study’s findings are based 
on results of descriptive and statistical analysis, and simulation using theoretic models. 
The key findings of this study are: 
i). Natural disasters create challenges for insurers because there is substantial 
ambiguity associated with the probability of such events occurring and spatially 
concentrated negative externalities to major economic activities when disasters 
occur. This, in turn, implies that the premiums for such events are much higher 
than the expected loss because the insurer has to provide a large amount of 
capital and reserves required to insure catastrophic events. 
ii). The demand for catastrophe insurance may be too low since it is not optimal for 
the policyholder to buy insurance coverage at such a high premium. Thus, high 
premium suppresses insurance demand, but the magnitude of how high 
premiums and high probability of risk actually affect insurance demand is still 
largely unknown. 
iii). In other catastrophe insurance markets, the supply of disaster coverage is 
curtailed unless the government provides some form of subsidy to private 
insurers. However, the reason why insurance demand decreases with time from 
the last disaster, even when the private insurers’ supply of coverage is highly 
subsidised by the government, is still unsettled. 
iv). Political economic considerations make it more likely that government support 
would be called for if many people are uninsured than if few people are 
uninsured. When there are large numbers of under-insured or uninsured 
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property owners, the experience elsewhere in the world is that governments feel 
compelled to provide financial assistance to affected households. 
v). Homeowners in higher risk areas also benefit from EQC’s flat-rate pricing 
structure, which keeps private insurance premiums affordable nationwide. That, 
in turn, helps keep national homeowner take-up rates of insurance against 
natural hazards very high. This is of direct benefit to homeowners and private 
insurers. The high rates of private insurance take-up also greatly reduce the risk 
that the government would be called on after a natural disaster to provide 
assistance to uninsured homeowners. 
vi). The results of this analysis show that, the change from full replacement value 
type policy to nominated replacement value type policy is the key determinant 
of the direction of change in the level of insurance coverage. The outcome of 
the analysis clearly indicates that most policyholders increased the level of 
insurance coverage so as to comply with the new policy modification. 
vii). The survey has added further evidence to the existing literature that insurance 
policyholders update their risk perception immediately after major catastrophe 
losses. Those who have had a recent experience with disaster loss report 
increased risk perception that a similar event could happen in future with 
females reporting higher risk perception than males. 
viii). Most studies have reported decreased insurance supply post-disaster loss; this 
study presents new opportunities from an underwriting perspective. The 
findings show that a short period of moratorium immediately after the 
earthquake helps the insurance market to understand the new risk exposures and 
put in place stringent measures to provide insurance coverage for new risks.  
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ix). There is a causality relationship between gender and the changes in household 
insurance cover. However, the exact direction of change is still ambiguous. The 
relationship would depend on insureds’ degree of risk aversion and how it 
changes with changes in the level of income, the change in value of insured 
assets and the change in insurance premiums.  
x). An increase in an individual’s income alone has no major effect on insurance 
demand. The direction of the effect depends on whether an increase in income 
increases both the premium rates and the insured asset, and on whether the 
insurance demander has increasing or decreasing absolute risk aversion. Thus, 
if the insurance demanders perceive a higher possibility of natural disaster then 
they adjust their coverage appropriately.  
xi). Large claim experience related to earthquakes occurrence over a short-time 
frame created cumulative and compounding losses in domestic building, 
domestic contents and earthquake domestic product line for the whole industry. 
This led to depletion of national disaster fund from EQC perspective and an 
industry net loss ratio of 178 percent for 2011. There was also drastic increase 
in both the EQC levies and the private insurance premiums.The post-earthquake 
average loss ratio is equal to 91 percent for residential buildings and contents 
insurance coverage in New Zealand for the period 2009 to 2014. This can be 
compared to USA property & casualty insurance industry results for the same 
period in states with similar risks, where the loss ratio is slightly above 75 
percent (Hagendorff et al., 2015). This shows the product line has been 
underperforming in New Zealand insurance market when compared to the USA 
insurance market.  
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xii). The EQC creates a positive market distortion by providing a huge excess for 
natural disaster cover, however, these distortions are mostly positive distortion 
to both policyholders and private insurers. The existence of the EQC scheme 
taking the first loss for dwellings based on a flat levy irrespective of size or 
location of dwelling mutes the risk signal and potentially creates adverse 
selection behaviour from insureds perspective and on the other side it enables 
private insurance which has a higher degree of risk rating to be cheaper because 
it doesn’t have to meet the first loss and this therefore helps keep insurance in 
total more affordable.   
9.2. Contributions and Significance of the Study 
This study has made an array of contributions from its findings. This research provides 
unique empirical and theoretical contributions through first conducting a demand-side 
survey of individuals who had been affected by catastrophic events. The survey 
responses are then analysed with an aim to understanding how catastrophes affect 
insured’s demand. Then supply-side interviews and discussions with key stakeholders 
in insurance supply were carried out. The empirical data from both the supply-side and 
demand-side is collectively analysed and interpreted with the theoretical models’ 
outputs to generate comparable findings. 
Secondly, contributions are made through the intertemporal model and the actuarial 
model employed to empirically and theoretically test how demand and supply respond 
to natural disaster events. 
The main contributions of this approach for the present study are: 
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i.) The theoretical model simulation results present a novel approach in which pre- 
and post-loss insurance markets can be analysed. The key innovation and 
contributions of this model are:  
a) The model provides a natural theoretical way to establish how the demand 
for insurance is affected by the size of the loss suffered in the previous 
period, that is, the post-loss insurance demand. 
b) The model provides a unique way to study the effects of increases in risk 
aversion, increases in the premium, and increases in the perceived 
probability of loss on the demand for insurance especially when this occurs 
in different periods. 
c) It is notable that with this model insurance could be sought sequentially in 
two periods of time, and in the second period it is known whether or not a 
loss event happened in period one. And then the model incorporates a 
parameter on probability updating in an effort to explain why demand for 
coverage increases after a loss event. 
d) The period one demand for insurance increases relative to the standard 
single period model, when the second period is taken into consideration. 
Period two insurance demand is higher post-loss, higher than both the 
period one demand, and the period two demand without a period one loss. 
e) Lastly, when the intertemporal model results are compared to the findings 
from previous studies on the insurance demand, it can be inferred that 
insurers tighten the underwriting criteria when the insurance demand 
increases post-loss. Positive change in the insurance demand increases the 
cost of insurance cover in the short-run. Two major policy implication 
outcomes of increase in insurance demand post-loss based on Christchurch 
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earthquakes is that; (i) deductibles changing from a  percentage of the claim 
to a  percentage of the insured value, and (ii) stringent risk-based 
underwriting measures in attempt to address adverse selection behaviour 
and risk classification. 
ii.) An actuarial perspective to pricing residential property coverage against natural 
disasters with an earthquake catastrophe endorsement, presents a unique risk-
based approach. The key innovation and contribution of this actuarial model 
are:  
a) It presents a new simple approach for rate-marking. This is an insightful 
contribution to the literature on catastrophe insurance especially with 
respect to premium loading. This model will play an important role to set 
internal benchmark rates in pricing natural disaster insurance coverage. 
However, it is crucial to study some models of market behaviour to find out 
the expected tendencies from market conditions; and how the consumer 
reacts to the premium rates proposed.  
b) This modelling framework provides a structure to examine the complex 
natural disaster risk pricing. This is a unique model that could also help in 
addressing the complexities and challenges posed by the integration of 
compulsory EQC cover to the primary private insurance cover without risk-
based underwriting the natural disaster risk. Thus the model presents an 
efficient risk-based pricing approach that can be used for natural disaster 
rate-making in any insurance market with similar risk characteristics. 
c) When the proposed model incorporates the new RMS high-definition New 
Zealand Earthquake Model, insurers can then use the model to uniquely 
identify losses at a granular level so as to calculate the competitive premium. 
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This is a major contribution given that the local insurer has revealed 
earthquake modelling marginally inform underwriting and pricing at a 
geographical level in relation to the likelihood and severity of the events. 
And as such, there have been no major moves to price technically for an 
earthquake as there is still limited accurate information from predictive 
models that can usefully provide incidence or severity information.  
iii.) The statistical analysis contributes to the existing literature on insurance 
demand determinants and other demand associated variables by: 
a) Examining whether the variables in question have a significant association 
with the household demographic characteristics, and how these collectively 
affect change in level of the insurance demand post-loss. 
b) Conducting a demand-side survey to tease out, purely, the insurance market 
response from the demand-side perspective and investigate how various 
insurance demand determinant variables influence change in the level of 
insurance coverage post-catastrophe using simple descriptive analysis and 
correlation analysis. The output of this analysis is a crucial contribution to 
understand how insurance demanders have adjusted their level of insurance 
as a result of the contract modifications and the effects of insurance demand 
determinant variables post-disaster. In essence, this gives an innovative 
way to understand the effect of catastrophes on both the demand and supply 
sides of the insurance market. 
9.3. Recommendations and Policy Implications 
The present study was driven by the desire to understand the domestic insurance market 
response, both on the demand-side and the supply-side, in the aftermath of a major 
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disaster. A number of results have been achieved that can be incorporated into the 
market’s best practice while some parts of this study could be improved to generate 
better results.  
Within the post-Christchurch disaster insurance outlook, with increased risk-based 
pricing and stringent underwriting terms in New Zealand, there is a higher risk of 
underinsurance among property owners. This is more likely so with the new policy 
requirements in place where the property owners are now required to nominate the sum 
insured for their property. When there are large numbers of under-insured or uninsured 
property owners, the experience elsewhere in the world is that governments feel 
compelled to provide financial assistance to affected households. When a disaster 
occurs in such an environment, homeowners face large catastrophic losses and most 
individuals can only depend on the uncertainties of emergency government assistance. 
The biggest problem posed by the emergency assistance for property owners is that, it 
can encourage the assisted and other owners to not buy insurance against natural 
disaster, generating larger future risks for homeowners and governments. In order to 
avoid the insurance market inefficiency and adverse selection behaviour from property 
owners, a form of government-sponsored insurance coverage is necessary. 
Further to government interventions: 
i.) There is a need to develop education awareness program for property owners in 
order to improve their accuracy in estimating a sufficient sum insured, and the 
benefit of regular updates of insurance cover limits. 
ii.) Risk-based underwriting is the way forward. Insurance premium rates that 
reflect building seismic risk provides risk signals and future savings to 
individual owners and encourage them to engage in cost-effective mitigation 
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strategies to reduce their vulnerability. There are several benefits of adopting a 
good earthquake insurance policy in both property risk management and 
earthquake disaster management, but its role in managing seismic residual risk 
in New Zealand’s insurance market has yet to reach its full potential. 
The EQC scheme has not delivered to the degree envisaged by all the stakeholders, this 
conclusion is drawn from the comments raised by the survey respondents and the 
numerous under-cap/over-cap claims filed in courts. It is grossly underfunded in that 
the premiums payable by policyholders for this dual system have no actuarial basis. 
EQC pricing arrangements and the structure of the flat rate premium creates two main 
concerns; first, the EQC does not require premiums to reflect the costs and risks as EQC 
has an unlimited government funding guarantee. Second, EQC premiums are almost 
never changed. The premium rate first established in 1945 remained unchanged, per 
dollar of cover, for over 65 years. In 2012, it was then tripled in response to the losses 
generated by the Christchurch earthquakes. The EQC premium on home and contents 
insurance increased on 1 November 2017 for the second time post-earthquakes. The 
proposal put forward is that, at the previous premium rate of 15 cents per $100 of cover 
it would have taken more than 30 years to rebuild the Natural Disaster Fund (NDF) to 
$1.75 billion, the amount of excess EQC needs to pay on its current reinsurance 
programme. Increasing the premium rate to 20 cents would help EQC meet its long-
term costs and rebuild the NDF to this level within 10 years. The scheme is also unfair, 
in that it benefits only those who have taken out fire and general peril insurance with 
the local private insurance companies. Having observed this, the recommendations of 
this study are: 
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i.) A more inclusive quasi-social government guarantee insurance mechanism 
could be considered for the property owners electing to carry out alternative risk 
mitigation measures such as self-insurance backed by advance seismic 
retrofitting and flood mitigation measures in line with the local council codes. 
Perhaps future studies could look into how to introduce compulsory minimum 
actuarial based levies as premiums for the government guaranteed insurance 
mechanism or some sort of risk-differentiated premiums. 
ii.) Some of the supply-side distortions observed should be addressed. The feature 
of the current dual insurance model is a risk-sharing arrangement between EQC 
and the private insurer. At present, EQC takes on natural disaster risk as a result 
of a private insurer selling a fire policy. Therefore, there is the potential for the 
private insurer to impose risks on EQC that they are not exposed to, for example 
by selling fire-only policies, in contrary, most residential insurance policies sold 
in New Zealand are all-risks policies that cover natural disaster damage. These 
complexities and challenges posed by the integration of compulsory EQC cover 
under the fire and general insurance coverage could be looked into for future 
efficiency. 
In the present study, interviews and discussions with local insurers have found that 
earthquake modelling marginally informs underwriting and pricing at a geographical 
level in relation to the likelihood and severity of the events. A popular common 
approach in New Zealand has been to ensure that the insurer is not over-exposed in 
terms of geographical market share and in this light; the major risk mitigation for 
earthquakes has only been through reinsurance. In addition, many insurers now decline 
to provide standalone earthquake cover in certain parts of Christchurch and some 
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buildings are now simply uninsurable for natural catastrophes. Having observed this, 
the study recommends that: 
i.) With the cost of insurance increasing, attention needs to focus on efficient 
reinsurance mechanisms. Insurers and other catastrophe management 
stakeholders must be innovative to develop other catastrophe risk management 
avenues, ranging from the private securitization of insurance risks to public-
private partnerships to increase insurance capacity in constrained markets. 
Insurers can also explore the availability of alternative risk financing instrument 
supplement traditional reinsurance and achieve cost-efficient means of 
obtaining coverage and capacity for different levels of catastrophic loss by 
examining the options and choices. Alternative Risk Transfer (ART) market 
solutions, like cat-bonds, will enable insurers to select the most appropriate risk 
finance and acquire contingent capital at economic cost, shifting the insurance 
risk away from traditional reinsurers to the wider capital markets. 
ii.) The modelling framework provides a structure with which to examine the 
complex natural disaster risk pricing and, as such, it should offer a number of 
opportunities for insurers to update their pricing models, and to look for 
improvements and future innovations. An emerging question is how to use risk-
based models to measure the risk tolerance of the underwriting insurer against 
natural disaster. When the proposed model incorporates the new RMS high-
definition New Zealand Earthquake Model for example, then insurers can use 




iii.) This model may also be improved in order to be useful for assessing natural 
disaster loss capital requirements and reserves strategy so as to meet solvency 
margin requirements or other reserve requirements. 
The increases in catastrophes around the world have had a remarkable effect on the 
New Zealand insurance industry and the ability to obtain insurance and reinsurance 
coverage. In practical terms, reinsurance costs have skyrocketed for insurers. Major 
underwriting restrictions are being applied to policy coverage also. This implies a lot 
of pressure for increased premiums. From an underwriting perspective insurers are now 
looking for more rating factors, like the age of buildings, land structure, nature of 
construction, the spread of risk, and extent of strengthening work. The current state of 
catastrophe modelling does not allow comprehensive pricing of the perils covered by 
both EQC and private insurers. There are gaps in modelling for land risks, as well as 
for building damage from the non-earthquake perils covered. This is due to gaps in data 
and scientific understanding that are unlikely to be filled in the short to medium term. 
However, insurers are requesting seismic reports in high seismic regions. The seismic 
reports together with geophysical and technical data collected throughout the 
Christchurch earthquakes settlement process are extremely valuable in ongoing 
research of hazard risk mitigation and management. Going forward, higher risk regions 
and properties are expected to face further increases in premiums in the coming years, 
as insurers become better at pricing individual risks. Continuous premium increases 
would be unaffordable for some homeowners and are likely to result in lower rates of 
insurance cover in higher risk areas.  
In this context, the study recommends that: 
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i.) Insurance stakeholders should develop a nation-wide scheme or a registered 
facility that presents insurers and other key stakeholders with a list of known 
risks situated across the country. 
iii.) Insurance stakeholders should develop a national awareness program for 
property owners to improve their understanding of alternative natural disaster 
mitigation strategies such as seismic retrofitting their properties and securing 
house contents. This measure should be able to reduce the pressure on insurance 
costs and those who have installed sufficient risk mitigation strategies should 
be treated more favourably from an underwriting viewpoint. 
iv.) Due to the increased occurrence of catastrophes and the changing nature of 
disasters, risk-based pricing could mean that those who cannot afford mitigation 
measures also might not be able to afford insurance coverage. Therefore, there 
is a need for both private insurers and public disaster managers to develop a 
strategy of how to reduce losses from future natural disasters as well as to 
appreciate the limitations of individuals, organisations and communities in 
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Appendix 1: The Text of the Electronic Survey 
 Preview Survey 
 
Survey to examine how insurance demanders reacted to their insurance coverage in 
the aftermath of 2010-11 Christchurch earthquakes 
You have unlocked your survey. When you have finished editing, please lock your 
survey again. 
PART A: GENERAL HOUSEHOLD INFORMATION 
Thank you for taking the time to answer this anonymous short online survey 
regarding residential property and contents insurance coverage. The survey is 
directed only to insured home owners and real-estate property owners and 
should take no more than 10 minutes to complete. 
Select a graphic to use for this question 
1) Which age group do you belong to? 
 
a) 18 - 30 years 
 
d) 51 - 60 years 
 
b) 31 - 40 years 
 
e) 61 - 70 years 
 
c) 41 - 50 years 
 
f) Over 71 years 
2) What is your gender ? 
a) Male 
b) Female 
3) Highest level of education; 
a) High school graduate 
b) Technical/University graduate 
c) Postgraduate degree 
d) Other  
4) Annual income;  
 
a) Below $14,000 
 
c) $48,001 - $70,000 
 
b) $14,001 - $48,000 
 
d) Above $70,000 
5) What is your property's postcode or suburb  





7) If your property was built prior to June 2012, have you previously filed for 
earthquake or any other natural hazard claim through EQC or your insurer? 
a) Yes 
b) No 
8) What is the approximate value of your property? 
 
a) Below $300,000 
 
d) $500,000 - $600,000 
 
b) $300,000 - $400,000 
 
e) $600,000 - $700,000 
 
c) $400,000 - $500,000 
 
f) Above $700,000 
PART B: INSURANCE COVERAGE INFORMATION 
 
9) Did you consider the possible occurrence of a natural disaster when you bought 




10) Would you be willing to spend more money on your property that would make it 
more disaster resistant in line with new council seismic and floods standards? 
a) Yes 
b) No 
c) Not decided 
 
11) What is the maximum premium you are willing to pay per annum to fully protect 
your residential property and contents from natural disasters through insurance 
coverage (please check only one) 
 
a) Below - $600 
 
c) $900 - $1,200 
 
b) $600 - $900 
 
d) Above $1,200 
 
12) What is the maximum amount of money that you are willing to pay per annum to 
fully protect your residential property and contents from the risk of damage from 
natural disasters through alternative risk management and risk reductions 
measures in line with the new or updated council standards (please check only 
one) 
 
a) Below - $20,000 
 
c) $40,000 - $60,000 
 
b) $20,000 - $40,000 
 
d) Above - $60,000 
 
13) How has the total premium you pay for residential property insurance changed from 





c) No change 
 
14) Do you perceive insurance coverage per dollar of property insured is greater now 
than before the earthquakes  
a) Yes 
b) No 
c) Do not know 
 
15) In the aftermath of the 2010 and 2011 Canterbury earthquakes how have you 
voluntarily changed the level of your past insurance coverage?    
a) Increased 
b) Decreased 
c) No change 
 
16) If increase, in response to Question 15 above; why? (check all that apply) 
a) To cover a more valuable asset 
b) The risk is now higher 
c) Insurance payout allowed me to dedicate more to insurance 
d) In response to changes in the premium 
e) Other  
 
17) If decrease, in response to Question 15 above; why?  (check all that apply) 
a) To cover a less valuable asset 
b) The risk is now lower 
c) Insurance payout was insufficient to allow me to dedicate more to 
insurance 
d) In response to changes in the premium 
e) Other  
 
18) Comparing the new post-earthquake ''sum insured'' insurance coverage to the pre-
earthquake ''full replacement value'' insurance coverage, how do you rate your 
satisfaction? 
a) More satisfied 





19) Based on your perception (including actual experience, observations and also what 
you have heard from others; e.g. insurance companies, banks, independent financial 
advisers or government agencies), in relation to your current residential property 
and contents insurance policy in the aftermath of 2010 and 2011 Canterbury 
earthquakes, how would you rate the overall changes in the following items? 
















































       
 
20) Based on your perception (including actual experience, observations and also what 
you have heard from others), how would you rate your overall satisfaction with 
the New Zealand residential property and contents insurance market on the 
following items; 
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21) Based on your perception (including actual experience, observations and also what 
you have heard from others), how would you rate the overall market 
perception that, prior to 2010 and 2011 Canterbury earthquakes most properties 
where considered to be: 








a) Under-insured   
     
b) Insured for true 
value 
  
     
c) Over-insured   
     
 
22) In the aftermath of the 2010 and 2011 Canterbury earthquakes the New Zealand 
residential and content insurance policy has changed from an open ended insurance 
cover to specific sum insured coverage. Based on your current property value, how 
would you rate the overall market perception that, residential properties and 
contents are now considered to be: 








a) Under-insured   
     
b) Insured for true 
value 
  
     
c) Over-insured   
     
 
23) Have you had a case where an insurance provider declined to offer insurance 








a) Property falls in exclusion/red zone 
b) Pre-existing earthquake damage 
c) Property did not meet minimum construction standards 
d) Others  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
